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Conventional Arms Cuts in Far East Outlined
LD2208125789 Moscow TASS in English 1224 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

According to leaked information, the Japan Defence Agency's annual report, to be published in September, comments on the Soviet Union's plans to slash its armed forces in the Far East.

The Japanese newspaper YOMIURI said that, while describing Soviet troop reductions in Europe as a positive and important step helping defuse tension in East-West relations, the agency plays down the cuts in the Far East as nothing more than plans remaining on paper, and contended that the Soviet military threat to Japan still exists.

How does the agency justify this conclusion? Very simply: by claiming that nothing has been said about what cuts will be made.

This assertion is, mildly speaking, surprising. The impression is that the Japan Defence Agency is totally isolated from the outside world and that its ranking officials neither read newspapers nor listen to the radio.

Otherwise, they would have detailed knowledge about the sizable cuts being carried out by the Soviet Union in its eastern part.

An abundance of figures in any article usually makes it very dull for readers, but since Japan Defence Agency officials complain about the absence of data, I have put together data they could include in their report.

During 1989 and 1990 the Soviet Armed Forces will be cut by a total of 500,000 officers and men. Land forces will be reduced by 24 motor rifle and tank divisions. A further 60 units will be disbanded in the Air Defence Forces, while the Air Force will dissolve the commanding structures of two air units, four air divisions and 19 wings.

The Navy will reduce several naval units, air wings, coastal artillery units, marine and logistic units. Twenty-four submarines and 45 naval surface ships will be scrapped.

A total of 200,000 officers and men will be discharged from military service in the eastern part of the Soviet Union. The command structures of four armies (two in the Transbaykal Military District and one each in the Far Eastern and Turkestan military districts) and of three army corps (one in the Far Eastern Military District and two in the Turkestan Military District) will be disbanded.

Soviet armed forces along the Soviet-Chinese border are already undergoing structural reorganisation. Seventy-five per cent of Soviet land forces and the entire air group (five divisions, including one motorised rifle division, two tank divisions and two air divisions, as well as a number of other units) will be withdrawn from Mongolia.

Equipment pulled out of that country will total over 850 tanks, 1,100 infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, 820 artillery systems, some 190 planes and 130 helicopters. Some of the removed units will be disbanded.

Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East during 1989 and 1990 will be reduced by 120,000 officers and men. Land forces will have 12 fewer warships. The remaining forces will adopt a purely defensive posture.

Doesn't all this show that the USSR is effecting substantial cuts and changes in its Armed Forces in the Far East, implementing the key provisions of its defensive military doctrine and the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency?

Only those who fail to overcome political inertia and think in outdated terms cannot see this.

The unilateral cuts in Soviet Armed Forces in Asia are our call on interested countries to achieve reasonable defence sufficiency in the Asian-Pacific region.

Cosmonaut Titov Interview on Viability of SDI
PM2308080189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Aug 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut, Hero of the Soviet Union, and Colonel General of Aviation G. Titov by Colonel M. Rebrov: "Is It Possible to Win a 'Star War'?"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Reports have recently been appearing increasingly frequently in the foreign press, including the U.S. press, which attest that the SDI technology being developed [razrabatyvat] by the Pentagon and its contractors has essentially begun emerging from within laboratories onto test sites on land, in the air, and in space.

[Rebrov] German Stepanovich, the editors' mail contains many letters with questions and views on "star wars." Most of the arguments are over whether it is possible in principle to create [sozdat] systems with space-based elements capable of detecting and destroying enemy missiles a few seconds after launch.

[Titov] In principle—yes. However, it seems to me that the chief question for discussion should be not the technical problems waiting to be solved—sooner or later it is possible to resolve a task of any technical difficulty—but the situation which will arise if they are solved. Let us argue like this: Is it really less likely that the Soviet Union will manage to create [sozdat] its own countermeasures? And if it does so, what will happen to U.S. security: Will it increase or be reduced?

[Rebrov] The U.S. leadership persistently suggests to the public that the United States is supposedly creating [sozdavat] a new "weapon of peace..."

[Titov] I would like at once to draw attention to the words "new" and "peaceful." As is known, no weapon yet created by mankind has served any purpose other than destruction. Let us turn to history. Every time a new kind of weapon has appeared, attempts have been made to pass it off as a means capable of putting an end to wars. Here are just a few examples. The machinegun was once credited with such capabilities. Alfred Nobel believed that his dynamite-producing plants could put an end to wars. True, with time he realized his mistake. However, there have been more recent attempts too to dress weapons in peaceful clothes. Edward Teller presented the hydrogen bomb as a guarantee of eternal peace on our planet. Today various military space systems are called "weapons of peace."

[Rebrov] Yes, SDI entered history as the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [sentence as published]. Moreover, during his presidency Ronald Reagan called it "America's insurance policy."

[Titov] The desire to present SDI to the whole world as a defensive system pursuing humane aims is an impossible task. In my opinion, the majority of sober-minded people capable of analyzing both the scheme itself and the methods of achieving it have been convinced of the opposite. The basic elements of SDI are to be nuclear devices, lasers, and other kinds of weapons belonging to the so-called "third generation."

[Rebrov] In the past the press has mentioned the U.S. "Prometheus" project. Then "Delta," "Alpha," and others. What is meant by this?

[Titov] In the first instance it is a question of nuclear devices launched into space and used to "scatter" hundreds of thousands of metal pellets capable of causing tremendous damage. Such a nuclear device makes it possible to scatter spherules in space, imparting to them a velocity 100 times greater than that of a rifle bullet.

I could categorize as a so-called "weapon of peace" the new concept of space strike (!) arms, which the Pentagon takes as the basis for the "star wars" program. And there are different versions of the "Brilliant Pebbles" program, according to which thousands of small guided interceptors would be sited in space. These are objects 1 meter long, weighing approximately 50 kg. It is essentially a matter of replacing the use of powerful explosions by accurate targeting and hitting a fast-moving target not with a bomb or some explosive substance but with quite simple objects.

The "Zenith Star" and "Delta Star" projects may be included here. The former provides for putting into orbit a powerful "Alpha" chemical laser, and the latter a special satellite to gather the information needed to create [sozdat] missile interceptor control systems. The "Proton Torpedo" project exists—a neutral-particle beam weapon—and others...

Now about the range of the systems being created [sozdavat]. It is great. The question arises: If it is possible to bring down missiles as they are launched, why should not strikes be made against ground targets? And so it turns out that it is a question not of a defensive weapon but of a new offensive weapon. In the frank admission of authoritative persons in America itself, the space shield of which so much has been said recently is needed in order to wield the sword.

[Rebrov] German Stepanovich, we have approached the chief question of interest to our readers: "Does SDI have an 'Achilles' heel'?"

[Titov] There is a natural law in technology: The more complex a system, the greater the number of its components, and the more intricate, so to speak, the interactions between these components, the less reliable it is. SDI was conceived as a very complex system, and so it has not one "Achilles' heel" but several. And, I repeat, this is perfectly natural. The Americans themselves realize and admit this.

[Rebrov] Consequently, to win a "star war..."

[Titov] ...is not so easy.

[Rebrov] Yes, this follows from the logic of your arguments. But specifically what countermeasures and technical means can there be to counter SDI or, rather, its elements?

[Titov] Do you want me to criticize what vast amounts of money have already been spent on and what many very solid establishments are tackling in the United States?

[Rebrov] No, it is a question of a principled approach to the problem, of explaining the "Achilles' heels." Where are they?

[Titov] Above all, reliable communications between all the elements of the system, which can be disrupted, blocked, or put completely out of action. How? There are many options. Incidentally, they can be found in U.S. literature. The developers [razrabotchiki] of the guidance systems, power carriers, and power systems in general have their difficulties too...

It is to be supposed that there are also ways of enhancing the viability of the very missiles against which SDI's combat systems are directed. It is possible to increase many times over the number of "targets"—real targets and dummies—to confuse detection systems. It is also

possible to undertake something against the actual space-based systems designed to hit strategic ballistic missiles... In other words, combinations of active and passive means are capable of rendering SDI ineffectual.

[Rebrov] However, this does not lessen the danger of "star wars."

[Titov] And I would call this the chief argument against siting any weapons in space. Because it threatens world security, including U.S. security. It is naive to think that conducting combat operations in near-earth space and against the earth from space will not affect everyone living on our planet. And I must say that the planet is quite small and fragile. We have already had occasion to see this for ourselves.

[Rebrov] How do "star wars" begin?

[Titov] I believe it would be more correct to put the question somewhat differently: How might such wars begin? Here too I would again like to recall some events in history. Tragic events! Comparatively recently we all witnessed how dangerous for mankind is an imperfection in even apparently most modern apparatus. I mean the explosion of the U.S. Challenger spacecraft, the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, and other serious accidents...

Further. Professor Norman Cousins of the University of Los Angeles, a well-known U.S. public figure, has calculated that during a 5-year period more than 100 "blips" appeared on U.S. computer displays, signaling a missile attack supposedly being launched on the United States. I cite the professor himself: "Fortunately, we had enough time to check those signals and to assure ourselves that they were the result of technical errors." A natural question: But what if they had not had enough time or had drawn an unjustified, hasty conclusion?

Let us recall the sensational case of the "electronic virus" which some joker introduced into a computer, thus preventing the machine from working in conformity with logic, its memory, and the program as a whole. Does this not provide food for serious thought?

I believe I have answered your question.

[Rebrov] Thank you. Examples and figures are very convincing.

[Titov] It has so turned out that I have been dealing with aviation and space rocket technology for several decades. To what has been said I can add that in complex control systems, which is what the electronic controlling complexes of space weapons are, a very dangerous phenomenon—reflex involvement of one system by another—is very likely. And if, because of some technical error, part of one side's active means starts working, the other side's counteraction system will react instantly, utilizing still more active means. That is the logic.

[Rebrov] The "star wars" program stands in the way of a nuclear-free world. Six years have passed since SDI was proclaimed. Its original plans have been modified, and different assessments have been made of the spending on this program and of the deadlines for realizing its individual elements. How do you account for such vagueness?

[Titov] There are very different reasons—from the scientific and technical groundlessness of individual exotic plans and the main idea of the whole scheme to restrictions on the appropriations allocated. According to some estimates by U.S. specialists, spending on SDI will exceed $2 trillion. But the U.S. Administration has not yet proposed any solution to the budget problems which will inevitably face U.S. taxpayers.

[Rebrov] Nevertheless, about the cost...

[Titov] No precise definition of the cost of SDI exists. According to a statement by Doctor Robert Bauman, a former participant in military space research, it is not feasible to try to create [sozdat] a full space defense of U.S. territory. But even a system of more limited potential will require tremendous expenditure. Incidentally, the world spends $30,000 on the arms race every second, or $1.8 million a minute.

[Rebrov] The question also arises of the conformity of all the developments [razrabotki] under the SDI program with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

[Titov] What conformity can there be if the U.S. military departments continue to conduct tests of space-based weapons, whose systems and components both sides have pledged "not to create [sozdavat], test, or deploy," as follows from Article 5 of the ABM Treaty?

Gremitskikh 22 Aug Foreign Ministry News Briefing

Discusses Karelia, CSSR, Poland

PM2308163289 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

[G. Charodeyev report on USSR Foreign Ministry press briefing: "Loyalty to the Spirit of Helsinki"]

[Text] The regular briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center was addressed by Yu.A. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, who read out a USSR Foreign Ministry statement on Afghanistan. He went on to comment on reports that have appeared in the Finnish press recently on the possibility that has supposedly arisen for the transfer of certain regions of Soviet Karelia to Finland. The newspapers reported a "proposal" by T. Holvitie, parliamentary deputy for the National Coalition party, to "buy part of the territory of Karelia from the Soviet Union." The idea of the possibility of reaching agreement with the USSR on this question was also put forward in a number of delegates' speeches at the Finnish Rural Party congress.

"A great deal could be said," the speaker at the briefing said, "about the inviolability of borders in postwar Europe, which is enshrined in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, and about the fact that the Soviet Union does not sell its territories. But it appears that the Finns themselves have already replied to these 'proposals.' I would like to draw attention to the words of Foreign Minister P. Paasio, cited in the newspaper TURUN SANOMAT. He said: 'This whole story stinks.' And he added: 'Holvitie wanted to benefit himself, not Finland.' P. Vayrynen, chairman of the Finnish Center party, stated: 'In any trade you need not only a buyer, but also a seller. The Soviet Union does not intend to sell off its territory.' Y. Virolainen, chairman of the Karelian Union and parliamentary deputy from the Finnish Center party, stressed, for his part, that the question of the Soviet-Finnish border was finally resolved by the 1947 Paris peace treaty. One must agree with this view. The postwar borders should remain inviolate."

Hungarian correspondents asked for an official assessment of the events of 1968 in and around Czechoslovakia.

"These events," the Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, "cannot be correctly understood outside the political and international context of the time. The analysis of the internal aspects of the 1968 events is, in our view, the CSSR's prerogative. The outside world's interpretation of and reaction to them were at the time largely the result of the then level of confrontation between the two military-political blocs. As for the present-day Soviet approach, it is clear from a number of high-level statements that we unequivocally reject the use of force or the threat of force, especially military force, both by one alliance against another, and within the alliance."

A Polish journalist asked: How does the USSR Foreign Ministry view the problem of forming a government in Poland?

"The formation of a government is the Poles' internal affair," the speaker at the briefing stressed. "At the same time we are not indifferent to this matter: Poland is our neighbor and ally. Our countries and peoples fought together against Hitlerite fascism and are linked by longstanding close relations. We are watching attentively the development of the situation in Poland, and we hope that that country's political forces will act constructively in the interests of finding a solution that will make it possible to lead the country out of crisis and find ways of surmounting the difficulties that have arisen."

A question from IZVESTIYA's correspondent: "ASSOCIATED PRESS has transmitted from Jerusalem, citing the national news agency ITIM and Israeli state radio, several reports that Ariel Sharon, minister of trade and industry, was officially invited to visit Georgia the other day. The invitation was conveyed via the Soviet Georgian trade delegation that was in Israel on a visit. Is this in accordance with reality?"

"No invitation was conveyed to Mr Sharon. Any reports on that score are without any foundation whatever," Yu.A. Gremitskikh stressed.

Discusses GDR-FRG Border Incident

LD2208162689 Moscow TASS in English 1522 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—The Soviet Union congratulates the Romanian people on national day, due on Wednesday—the 45th anniversary of the liberation from Nazi occupation—and expresses conviction that Soviet-Romanian fraternal friendship and all-round cooperation will continue to develop. This statement was made by Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, at a news briefing in Moscow today.

On the Afghan problem, he said that the failure by the armed opposition to score military successes in operations against the Afghan regular army introduced some new elements in the situation in and around the country. Along with the growth in the prestige of the central government and the regular Afghan Army, growing numbers of field commanders of the opposition stop conducting combat operations, he said. According to the information of the Afghan armed forces, two-thirds of field commanders do not fight in actual fact. The rest either participate in intestine clashes or launch active operations against government troops only under the pressure from outside forces—Pakistan, the United States or Saudi Arabia. There are no combat operations over 80 per cent of the Afghan territory.

Then Gremitskih commented on the recent incident on the GDR-FRG border which took place on the night of August 17-18 when houses, a church and border facilities of the GDR, situated near the border between the two states, were fired on from the West German territory. "Shots at the border are always a dangerous symptom," he said. "The more so, since this is the border between the two German states where considerable contingents of troops of the two military and political alliances are massed." The Soviet side shares the concern of all who see in such actions a threat to quietude in Central Europe and to the development of good-neighbourly cooperation between European states.

Replying to questions by journalists, he refuted rumours of the possible arrival in Georgia, a Soviet Transcaucasian republic, of Israeli Minister of Trade and Industry Ariel Sharon. Gremitskikh described them as speculation concealing corresponding wishes of the Israeli side and pointed out that no invitation to visit Georgia had been made to Ariel Sharon.

Gennadiy Tarasov, head of the Middle East Department of the Foreign Ministry and special representative on the Middle East, today leaves for Damascus as part of regular Soviet-Syrian consultations, Gremitskikh continued. Conversations will focus on the situation in and around Lebanon.

The Soviet spokesman told journalists that an international UN seminar on multilateral confidence-building and war prevention measures will be held in Kiev between September 4 and 8. The seminar will be attended by prominent scholars, experts, senior officals of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and public figures from more than 20 countries.

Notes Najibullah Criticism of U.S.

LD2208132789 Moscow TASS in English 1304 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—The failure of the Afghan armed opposition to achieve military successes in its operations against the Afghan regular army introduced some new elements in the situation inside and outside the country, Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, told a briefing here today.

Along with the growth in the prestige of the central government and the regular Afghan Army, growing numbers of field commanders of the opposition stop conducting combat operations, he said. According to the information of the Afghan Armed Forces, two-thirds of field commanders do not fight in actual fact. The rest either participate in internecine clashes or launch active operations against government troops only under the pressure from outside forces—Pakistan, the United States of Saudi Arabia. There are no combat operations over 80 percent of the Afghan territory.

Then the Foreign Ministry spokesman touched on the content of a news conference by President Najibullah in Kabul today. Addressing journalists, the Afghan president noted that now the United States, which stands out in words for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan question, is turning into a direct participant in the conflict. Supplying the opposition with cluster-warhead missiles which kill the civilian population, the United States has turned from a gurantor of the Geneva accords into an anti-Afghan force, the Afghan president pointed out.

Applauds Mongolian Peace Initiative

LD2208161889 Moscow TASS in English 1553 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman has stressed the need for additional efforts by all Asian nations to achieve a final victory for a peace policy in the region.

Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the Ministry's Information Directorate, addressing newsmen at a briefing here today, drew attention to the latest initiative advanced by Mongolian leader Jambyn Batmonh.

His idea is that all countries of the northeastern part of the Asia-Pacific Region start considering the question of forming a permanent negotiating mechanism that would cover economic cooperation, trade, military and technological ties, military trust, safety of international communications, ecology, cultural contacts and humanitarian issues.

"The Soviet Union regards this initiative within the context of the overall efforts by socialist countries to defusing military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific Region," Gremitskikh said.

It is believed in the USSR that this idea is very topical and that there is a real opportunity for the immediate beginning of its implementation, he added.

"Forms of contacts may vary, but what is important is that overdue problems be handled through concerted efforts at the negotiating table."

Discusses Papers, Death of Nazi Hess

LD2208142589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1250 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 22 August, TASS—Yuriy Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry spoke at a briefing held here today about the debate that has resumed in the West on the causes and circumstances of the death of the Nazi criminal Rudolf Hess.

As was officially announced by the military authorities in West Berlin, he said, Rudolf Hess committed suicide on 17 August 1987. Soon after his death, a version was put forward in the West that Hess did not commit

suicide, but was killed. In recent days, a new wave of discussions about the circumstances of his death has arisen in connection with the presentation of the book "The Murder of Rudolf Hess" in Munich.

Hess' son Wolf Ruediger, the lawyer Alfred Zeidl, and professor of forensic medicine Wolfgang Span put forward and substantiated the version that Hess was killed in Spandau Prison by the British Secret Services because they believe it to be highly likely that the allies were intending to release Hess from prison because of his old age. (He was 93 when he died.) Apparently this seriously alarmed the British Special Services, who feared that once free Hess would reveal the whole truth about the real political reason for his sensational flight to Britain in May 1941, and his contacts there with British representatives.

Yuriy Gremitskikh reiterated the historical version generally accepted today that Hess, with or without the consent of Hitler, set off for Britain in order to persuade its leadership to bring the war to an end and conclude a peace treaty with Germany. However, he continued, when the American commandant of Spandau Prison, in his discussions with Hess, asked whether Hitler had sanctioned the flight to Britain, Hess had replied: Don't be naive and don't ask such questions.

It goes without saying, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted, that the Soviet side cannot say, and has no intention of saying, anything definite about the version put forward in the FRG. But another question objectively arises that concerns the circumstances of the so-called mission by Hess to Britain. As we know, documents and materials kept in British archives concerning the flight and Hess' contacts in Britain have been classified until the year 2017. The very fact of the stubborn unwillingness to publicize these documents and materials immediately in 1941, after the war, or now, in connection with the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II, shows that we are talking of far from ordinary things, Yuriy Gremitskikh stressed.

He expressed the view that, judging by indirect information, the publication of these materials could shed light on the pre-history of World War II, and also on the way things stood in Britain, in Europe, and throughout the world in the period approaching the culmination of World War II in 1941.

Deputy Premier Laverov Receives UNIDO Chief

PM2308084589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Aug 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Cooperation Continues"]

[Text] On 17 August N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, received D. Siazon, director general of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO]. Questions of further deepening of cooperation between the USSR and UNIDO were discussed.

United States & Canada

U.S. Congressman Aspin Interviewed on Visit

PM2208140989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Congressman L. Aspin by correspondent A. Itskov under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Interview": "Parliamentarians Remain Satisfied"; date, place of interview not given, first five paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation from the U.S. House Armed Services Committee is over.

The 14 U.S. legislators met with their Soviet colleagues from the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and the International Affairs Committee. The U.S. guests were on a fact-finding tour of the country: They visited the Baykonur Cosmodrome, a missile base in Ivanovo Oblast, and the hero-city of Sevastopol, where they saw the missile cruiser "Slava." In the region of the city of Chapayevsk the U.S. guests visited a plant for the destruction of chemical weapons, which is ready for commissioning, and familiarized themselves with the most advanced technology for destroying these deadly weapons.

The U.S. congressmen's 10-day tour program also included getting to know about the lives and combat training of officers and men in certain Soviet Army subunits.

At a concluding news conference in Moscow Friday, all members of the U.S. delegation without exception stressed that during their stay in the USSR the U.S. congressmen had had a marvelous opportunity to see for themselves a great deal that had "hitherto been entirely inaccessible to Western representatives."

Before leaving for home L. Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, answered IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Itskov's questions.

[Itskov] You are leaving Moscow when the weather is warm and sunny. Does the Moscow weather match your mood after the visit by members of the congressional delegation to the USSR?

[Aspin] Oh yes, undoubtedly! Our tour was extremely useful and interesting. Quite honestly, I was a bit worried about August. Many people go on vacation during this period, and political activity, of course, falls off temporarily. But, fortunately, this has not happened on this occasion, despite the vacation period. The warmth, hospitality, openness, and genuine spirit of friendship that we have felt all allow us to say that the visit was an outstanding event.

[Itskov] I accompanied members of your delegation at the chemical weapons destruction plant, and your colleagues unanimously advocated exchanges of technology in the sphere of chemical weapons destruction. From your viewpoint, could such exchanges be possible in other spheres, too?

[Aspin] Yes, I too have heard this kind of proposal and, in general, I agree with it. It is quite obvious that there are still many areas where technology could be exchanged. I am not sure that military affairs will take priority here, but there is truly immense scope in civil production.

[Itskov] During your delegation's visit to the USSR a great deal has been said about the usefulness of contacts between representatives of the House Armed Services Committee and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Do you think it would be possible to set up a so-called "hot line" between congressional committees dealing with the armed forces and, for instance, the USSR Committee for Defense and State Security Questions?

[Aspin] That's a good idea and, quite honestly, it should be borne in mind for the future. Admittedly, I hope that no "crises" will emerge in relations between our parliamentarians which would require an urgent exchange of opinions. But, at any rate, a reliable form of communications would be extremely useful nowadays.

[Itskov] The Soviet Union has announced its defense sufficiency program to safeguard our country's military security. Is the United States planning to do the same?

[Aspin] The idea of defense sufficiency is today attractive to many of my fellow Americans, too. President Nixon once tried to formulate it with regard to nuclear weapons. But now this idea is being interpreted considerably more broadly, and the United States, I think, will return to an examination of this issue.

[Itskov] Bearing in mind the atmosphere of amicability and glasnost during the visit of the congressional delegation to the USSR, do you think that this could have a favorable effect on the Geneva talks on strategic offensive arms reduction too?

[Aspin] I think that the businesslike and warm atmosphere prevailing in relations between the parliamentarians in our countries who deal with defense issues could to a considerable extent have a positive effect on the Geneva strategic offensive arms reduction talks. And that would be quite natural.

[Itskov] What would you like to say to IZVESTIYA readers?

[Aspin] I would like to say that we intend to receive a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions and International Affairs Committee on a visit to the United States with the same warmth and amicability. The timetable for such a visit—January-February 1990—seems entirely realistic to me.

U.S. Congressional Agriculture Delegation Visits

Meets Supreme Soviet Committee Leader

LD2208161689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Just a few days ago, a group of the Armed Forces Committee of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives were guests of the supreme legislative body of our country. Now another meeting has taken place. There was a conversation with the delegation on agriculture from the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, led by its chairman, De la Garza, at the USSR Supreme Soviet today.

Welcoming the U.S. parliamentarians who have come to Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agrarian Issues and Food, Yemelyanov, deputy chairman of the committee, stressed that unfortunately relations between our two countries have been governed for too long by ideology and that has done no small amount of damage. However, the picture is changing now and we are coming to understand that there are more things uniting us than dividing us. In these conditions, contacts between the parliamentarians of the USSR and the United States assume importance, for the more we know about each other, the less tension and the more mutual understanding there will be.

The exchange of welcoming speeches lasted just a few minutes and the sides immediately moved on to concrete discussion of the problems of interest to them.

The United States is one of the largest suppliers of grain to the Soviet market. It is probably by no mere chance that one of the first questions asked by the members of the U.S. delegation was this: What are the intentions of the USSR regarding further purchases of grain from the United States?

Members of the Supreme Soviet said that the country has outlined perestroyka of policy in the area of grain farming structure. Further, in order to increase the incentive of farmers in increasing grain production, the state has offered to buy the peasants' surplus for hard currency. In the opinion of members of the committee, all these measures will lead, on the whole, to a reduction in grain imports by the Soviet Union.

Another theme of the discussion was areas of cooperation in the agricultural sphere. Parliamentarians from the two countries voiced proposals to establish contacts between the relevant academic institutes in order to increase the production of agricultural output and also to resolve ecological problems. The sides assigned an important role to developing contacts between the actual producers, the farmers in the USSR and the United States, reciprocal visits between them and familiarization with each other's experiences. A luncheon was given on behalf of the chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet to mark the occasion of the visit by the U.S. delegation.

Further on Meeting

LD2208191489 Moscow TASS in English 1834 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—"We record a meeting of Soviet and American legislators specialising in agrarian affairs as a good opportunity to widen cooperation in the area of agriculture", Aleksey Yemelyanov, deputy head of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Agrarian Questions and Food, said at a meeting with a delegation of the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The delegation headed by the Committee's chairman E. de la Garza (Democrat, Texas) arrived this morning in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"Solution of the food problem is one of priority tasks in our country, this is why our specialists in agriculture wish to study the United States experience in such concrete areas as organisation and management of agricultural production, the use of up-to-day equipment and the upgraded technologies in the agrarian sector", Yemelyanov said.

He said the USSR's optimum needs in the import of grain are now being revised to decrease this import. This is planned to be achieved by increasing purchases in the domestic market, specifically, by stimulating producers in the USSR through buying part of their products for foreign currency. Other ways for reducing the import of grain are the improvement of the technologies of storage and transportation and keeping from use of grain in pure form as fodder for cattle.

The role of members of parliaments of the two countries in shaping the agricultural policies of their states came up for discussion during the conversation. American legislators showed much interest in structural changes in agriculture in the USSR.

Upon the conclusion of today's meeting, E. de la Garza told TASS the congressmen had arrived here to understand better the changes in the agrarian sector of the USSR. He said that there was an open and interesting dialogue during the meeting, which the congressmen regard as a good beginning to their trip.

Meets With Nikonov

LD2208200889 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—Viktor Nikonov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, met today with a delegation of American congressmen headed by E. (Kika) de la Garza, chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture.

Nikonov described to the American visitors perestroyka processes currently under way in the USSR and profound changes taking place in the country's agro-industrial complex.

He stressed the importance of the ongoing invigoration of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in agricultural production and processing, attributing this to an improved political climate in relations between the two countries.

At the same time, Nikonov said, there are unused reserves and potentialities in the development of Soviet-American trade and economic ties. This calls for goodwill from both sides, which would make it possible to lift remaining artificial obstacles in the way of bilateral cooperation and substantially expand Soviet-American trade and economic links.

Certain conditions for that have already been created, he added.

De la Garza and members of the U.S. delegation positively assessed the Soviet perestroyka policy and its favourable effect on the development of the entire complex of American-Soviet relations and the establishment of mutual understanding and diverse cooperation between the two countries.

They expressed hope for a further development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and their impregnation with fresh contents, including in the agro-industrial complex.

U.S. Trial on Violation of Cocom Rules Decried

18001525 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Aug 89 p 3

[Article by TRUD Special Correspondent Yu. Dmitriyev: "A 55-Year Prison Term for What?"]

[Text] I still recall how last year the then-trade representative in Washington, O. Kozhevnikov, while being interviewed by this author, said with annoyance: "The most unpleasant aspect of trade and economic relations with the United States is the Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] system, which sets up barriers in acquiring many of the goods, technology lines, and high-tech equipment which our national economy needs. And at times, there are noisy anti-Soviet campaigns, also because of this system...."

Unfortunately, one such campaign is heating up these days. According to reports from the United States, an American police department filed a suit in Brooklyn Federal District Court, New York, involving violation of the law controlling export. Among the five defendants are citizens of the United States, Norway, Japan, and the USSR, parties to a contract to supply apparatus for underwater research from the United States to the Soviet Union via Norway and Japan, supposedly in violation of export permission. The names of the Japanese are Mr (Kh.) Yamaguchi, former associate of the large "Shinoye" Engineering, and Mr N. Takakhashi, president of the "Marine Service" firm.

These details have appeared in the foreign press. The order from one of the American firms had been placed back in 1983, for the sum of half a million dollars. The text of the accusation indicates that this research apparatus is capable of conducting acoustic surveillance in the ocean, and that it may also implement underwater scientific work. The equipment was delivered to Japan via Norway. Japanese customs officials detained part of the apparatus during subsequent shipment to the USSR. After this, the American businessman Mr Long was arrested. Now the issue of extradition of the aforementioned foreigners to the United States authorities is being reviewed.

As you can see, the case is taking a sharp turn. If the court establishes guilt, the sanctions will be harsh—55 years of imprisonment or a fine of 200,000 U.S. dollars. One of the accused is Ilya Petrovich Butakov, the deputy chairman of our "Sudoimport" foreign trade association. As is known, this organization is concerned with the export and import of ships, various types of equipment for ships, and ship repair. I met with I. Butakov. He, of course is well informed on what has taken place, since he directly participated in the implementation of this contract.

"First of all," said I. Butakov, "I must state, with all responsibility, that the apparatus indicated was acquired at the requisition of our official state organization, the USSR Ministry of Geology, which conducts research and prospecting work in a number of regions of the world's oceans. The military department is not involved here. It is not our fault that the Americans developed some of the centers in the equipment's composition first; they are made in the United States and their export to socialist countries is forbidden. The 'Marine Service' Japanese firm, located in Kobe, with which we concluded the contract, indeed fulfilled it only partially. Parallel to the so-called case of the ('Tosita Kikay') firm which broke 2 years ago, the Japanese police authorities got involved in the anti-Soviet campaign with equal zeal. Nagaki Takakhashi, the 58-year-old president of the 'Marine Service' firm, awaits a subpoena from the New York court, as does the president of the Norwegian firm, Mr (Sverre Shlitter Khenriksen)."

What is your attitude toward what has happened? In your opinion, what is at the foundation of this matter? Is this provocation, or can this be explained some other way?

"In the first place, my colleagues who participated in the preparation and the signing of the contract and I had nothing to do with anyone other than the representatives of the 'Marine Service' firm. We accept none of the accusations leveled at us, although what has happened is extremely unpleasant. As a citizen of the Soviet Union, and being located within its territory, I am not subject to the jurisdiction of American legislation. I am aware that the Norwegian Government has already issued a statement that it considers its citizen accused in this case to be innocent, and has taken him under its protection. I am certain that should the need arise, the Soviet Government will also take appropriate measures."

The question arises: Why was this deal not made directly with the U.S. firm? There are several reasons for this, but the main reason was the then-existent, fairly cool relations between our countries, which were far removed from the principle of mutual advantage and favor in trade. As far as the notorious Cocom lists are concerned, of course we are aware of their existence, but no one has ever sent them to us, and we have not familiarized ourselves with their contents. We feel that knowing all these fine points is the business of the salesman....

What else? Professional explanations, an analysis of the situation based upon argumentation requires introducing a large quantity of documents from various individuals and organizations. And this can be prepared, should the need arise. But in my opinion, the crux of the matter lies elsewhere. The improvement of relations between the USSR and the U.S.A., our peoples being drawn closer together in a definite way, shading the return trade activity of both countries' businessmen; this, in my view, is cause for alarm in certain circles, that is, among American enemies of perestroyka. To me, striving to impede potential in the development of Soviet-American relations is the deeper aim of this indelicate legal examination.

We requested representatives of the USSR Ministry of Geology and USSR Procuracy to comment upon the material we prepared. These are their responses to the editors:

V. Volkov, USSR deputy minister of geology:

"The item purchased in contract 77-10/40372-260, a towed, deep-water hydro-acoustic system, has been installed on the scientific research vessel 'Petr Antropov' of the 'Dalmorgeologiya' association, and is being used in regional work for the study of distribution fields of of solid mineral resources in the world ocean. It should be noted that this system was ordered over 6 years ago, and today is not the latest thing in the science and technology of the field. I can report, for your information, that the 'Yuzhmorgeologiya' association has developed and put into production the 'Abissal' system, a much deeper-water (6,000 meters) phototelehydrolocational system which, by its tectonic-technological parameters can today surpass any other system now in existence in the world. The West German firm '(Proysag)' and the American firm '(Klayn)' have already shown interest in acquiring it, and we are conducting negotiations."

P. Laptev, USSR deputy procurator general:

"The situation that has arisen is fairly serious. Human rights issues include, in particular, the legal defense of the interests of Soviet citizens abroad. The state cannot allow infringement of our compatriots' rights abroad. This is a political, legal, and moral issue. As far as the case raised in this correspondence is concerned, I must explain the following.

"In accordance with the Fundamental Criminal Legislation of the Union of SSR's and union republics currently in effect, only an individual guilty of committing a crime directly stipulated by the law is subject to accountability and punishment. This stems from the commonly accepted norms of international law. A Soviet citizen cannot be subject to prosecution in the USSR for actions which entail responsibility according to the law of another country, but are not viewed as a crime or other violation of law under Soviet law. In this case, a Soviet citizen cannot be handed over to some state to be brought to accountability. The international treaties on legal aid concluded by the USSR with a number of countries maintain the principle that extradition may take place only in those cases when the action is considered a crime by the legislation in the USSR, and if the state is a party to the treaty. As far as this matter is concerned, the U.S. court is not within its rights to hand down any sort of decision on the forced extradition of a Soviet citizen to the U.S. authorities, as this would be a gross violation of international law.

"It should be noted that we have no extradition treaty with the United States. The United States, making use of this, in effect has already sheltered the criminals over whom we raised the issue and who have already been convicted by the Soviet court. Despite numerous appeals from the Soviet side, over a prolonged period of time, the criminals have felt themselves free within the territory of the United States. How can this be reconciled with the American appeals in the fight against international terrorism?

"The artificial discharge of passions surrounding the incident described in the correspondence only plays into the hands of those who are not interested in strengthening Soviet-American cooperation, including cooperation in the area of human rights."

China

PRC Physicists Visiting Dubna Urge More Exchanges

LD2308083689 Moscow TASS in English 0733 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] Dubna August 23 TASS—A group of Chinese physicists from China's atomic energy institute stayed

on a fortnight visit in the USSR at the invitation of the directorate of the Dubna joint nuclear research institute.

The Chinese delegation, led by Professor Wang Gangchang, honorary director of the institute, familiarised themselves with activities of the international scientific centre affiliating eleven socialist countries.

The Chinese scientists have been accorded a warm reception both in Dubna and other institutions, and they are pleased with their stay in the USSR, Professor Gangchang told TASS. They have been greatly impressed by the work to create a new experimental unit, a nucleotron on superconductive magnets, which are underway in the high energies laboratory under the direction of Academician Aleksandr Baldin.

Speaking of further contacts with physicists of Dubna and other scientific centres, Professor Gangchang favoured a regular exchange of scientists and cooperation. China has experimental units of high scientific-technological standards, on which colleagues from other countries can work together with Chinese physicists, he said.

International cooperation helps develop science and improve mutual understanding between people and we favour mutually-beneficial cooperation, Professor Gongchang said in conclusion.

PRC Contractors Strike Over Poor Conditions

PM0808145189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent B. Reznik: "We Are Striking Because We Want To Work—That Is How Construction Workers From the PRC Explained Their Decision"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—At the beginning of July, about 500 PRC citizens working on contract on a construction project in Khabarovsk stopped work. The strike lasted a week. But it seems that this extraordinary event left the local authorities completely unconcerned. At any rate, not one representative of party and soviet bodies at the rayon, city, or kray level even tried to establish the reasons that had compelled these emissaries from a friendly country to stop work.

So what is going on in Khabarovsk? In order to understand this, we have to go a long way back. The most powerful local construction association—the "Dalstroy"—is acutely short of worker cadres. That is not all. The old "helpers" can no longer be relied on—organized recruitment and paroled prisoners, popularly known as "chemists" [criminals conditionally released to work at remote construction sites]. Real life has exhausted these dubious sources of cadre recruitment for construction subdivisions.

One could mourn and complain of the shortage of several thousand unskilled workers, of course. But one could also remember that idle time in "Dalstroy" last year amounted to 23,000 man-days, almost half of all the work was performed manually, and the year's output per person was less than R10,000. It is not hard to see from these indicators that economic effect cannot be guaranteed by just any old group of people. The leaders of "Dalstroy" have been concerned not so much with looking for ways to increase labor productivity, mechanize labor-intensive and, unfortunately, unprestigious construction work, and introduce progressive methods as with trying to make good their cadre shortage by any means.

These endeavors have taken them into international spheres.

The foreign economic ties of the Far Eastern region are now developing at a furious pace, although, as practice shows, they are not always developed wisely. For example, who could have possibly foreseen the subsequent metamorphoses on reading the following point, say, of the "protocol of intent" signed at the end of December last year in Khabarovsk by the leaders of "Dalstroy" and a company for international technical cooperation in the PRC Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia: "The Soviet side expressed the wish to involve the Chinese side in the design and construction of 'turnkey' industrial and civilian projects in cities in Khabarovsk Kray"?

The desire is a good one! Our own construction workers do not have the strength to make rapid, qualitative improvements in the social sphere above all. And the Chinese comrades showed us beautiful avenues with wonderful buildings and edifices drawn in different perspectives—their work in Hohhot Province. What is more, the company specializes in poured-concrete construction. We could learn from this progressive method at the same time... In short, cooperation could only be welcomed. What is perplexing is what has actually come of these intentions.

Three months ago, 1,500 Chinese construction workers, mainly young people, arrived in the kray. Almost 400 of them were instructed to finish building the Radio Center in Khabarovsk. This project is no ordinary project and is even renowned throughout the country: Central television has shown the tree growing inside it. This is not surprising—after all, the Radio Center has been under construction for 20 years! This year it had been decided to commission it by the fall, using our own resources. I went to the site and talked with workers, and team leader Zhuravlev, hearing about the arrival of the Chinese colleagues, expressed his amazement at the time: What is the point of bringing in 400 foreign construction workers when there is not always work for 100 of our own men—there are problems time and again with the supply of materials? But the leaders of "Dalstroy" and the "Zhilstroy" Trust did not want to listen to the voice of reason.

When they concluded the agreement, they knew full well that there would be nothing for the 400 workers to do at the Radio Center site and that the remaining workload

could be handled by the 100 construction workers already there. So why were they brought in? To help out in other areas where they were "trailing behind." The Chinese construction workers were assigned to finish off a book store, build the "Rostekstiltorg" base, a ferroconcrete plant, a wood processing combine...

And now we come to the main cause of the strike—low wages. On average they amount to just over R100 per month but at some sites workers have been paid between R14 and R54.

"The company guaranteed us between R250 and R300 a month. It promised that we would only work in our specialized field," bricklayer Ma Bing said.

But he, a specialist with long service and work experience, is being employed in auxiliary operations at the ferroconcrete plant. In the 3 months he has been working in Khabarovsk, Ma Bing has not been paid once—he has just been given a small advance. He does not even have a clear idea of exactly how much he has earned. In order to live and feed themselves, he and his comrades are having to sell their own things at the market.

V. Peschanskiy, first deputy chief of "Dalstroy," shares the responsibility for all this with the rather numerous representatives of the Chinese company's directorate in Khabarovsk who, he claims, have ducked out of organizing labor at the sites. It is probably true that both sides are to blame. But our construction officials have treated the foreign workers as they recently used to treat the large "special contingent." The Chinese construction workers have been housed in the empty hostels of the former special commandants, where paroled prisoners used to live under the watchful eye of the militia. They have even forgotten to remove the bars from the windows... Their facilities have not been organized: There are not enough shower rooms and kitchens and the rooms are overcrowded. Neither books nor newspapers are available in their own language. It would only take an hour to adjust the television antenna outside so that they could pick up broadcasts from the PRC. For 3 months this has been talked about and nothing more. Whichever way you look at it, the "host side" is primarily to blame. And, to be more specific, A. Shcheglyuk, deputy chief of "Dalstroy" for cadres and social conditions.

That is not all. The permanent presence of such a number of foreign workers in the city is not only an economic phenomenon but a political one. Surely it is odd that, though aware of the situation, no ideological worker from local party organs has done anything to change it? True, V. Solton, chief of a sector in the party kray committee [kraykom], told me that in August the Kraykom Secretariat plans to discuss the question "On the Practice of Party Committees' Work With Foreign Citizens Working in Enterprises and Organizations in the Kray." Well, no such work is being done, so how can there be any practice?...

Many organizations, enterprises, and academic establishments have international friendship clubs. The Khabarovsk branch of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society is active on paper. However, in 3 months not one activist from these social organizations has crossed the threshold of the hostels where the Chinese workers are now living. The lack of everyday amenities was one of the reasons for the strike.

The attitude of the central planning organs, ministries, and departments to the Far East has long fallen into the simplistic pattern of "grab it and run." Is there any need to remind people how difficult it is in these conditions to develop this land and make it habitable? The low wages, acute shortage of housing, and chronic shortfalls in the whole social sphere do not hold out much promise of highly skilled worker cadres coming here. Instead of offering fundamental solutions to the problem of developing the territory, many departments have found temporary salvation by bringing in foreign manpower to work at their plants. More than 17,000 citizens from the DPRK, China, Vietnam, and Cuba are currently working in enterprises in Khabarovsk Kray. They procure timber, sew clothing, make footwear, grow vegetables, produce lumber... More and more foreign workers are being invited to enterprises in Maritime Kray and Amur and Chita Oblasts... What is this—a solution to the acute cadre shortage? Here we are obliged to say what senior departmental representatives do not like to voice out loud: In virtually every case we not only use rubles to pay for the labor of foreign workers, we also pay for it with materials in extremely short supply: timber, cement, and metal.

"The paradox is that if our construction sites had a plentiful supply of these materials, for example, there would be a sharp drop in idle time, labor productivity would increase, and there would be absolutely no need to resort to help from extra manpower. And certainly not manpower from other countries. With the present approach to resolving the problem, we are only increasing the very acute shortage of essential materials," Doctor of Economic Sciences N. Tsvetkov, head scientific staffer at the Economic Research Institute of the Far Eastern Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said.

International economic cooperation, including cooperation between our country and the countries of the Pacific basin, must and will develop. It is important to ensure that everything in this state matter is resolved without departmental arrogance and on the basis of real mutual benefit.

Near East & South Asia

Afghanistan's Najibullah Holds News Conference

LD2208190189 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Kabul August 22 TASS—A news conference for local and foreign journalists was held in the Afghan capital today. Addressing the news conference, President Najibullah informed journalists of the development of the military and political situation inside and around Afghanistan.

The president noted that the USSR and Afghanistan strictly observe all the provisions of the Geneva accords aimed at a political settlement around Afghanistan, whereas Pakistan and the United States virtually trampled underfoot the prestigious international documents. Several states stepped up overt interference in Afghan affairs in the six months after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Pakistani intelligence services set up an "interim government" in Rawalpindi with a direct backing from the United States and have been entertaining up to this time the idea of "planting" it in Afghanistan.

Detachments of extremists, Pakistani tribal militia and Saudi [Arabian] mercenaries launched a major offensive on Jalalabad, Qandahar and Khowst. Peter Tomsen, the U.S. President's special representative to the armed Afghan opposition, is coordinating supplies of new weapons to insurgents. All this is at variance with the fact that Pakistan is a signatory of the Geneva accords and the United States is their guarantor. It is evident that the present American Administration adopted the course for conducting the policy of state terrorism against Afghanistan. This is evidenced by supplies of extremists with cluster Missiles which are of special danger for population.

Touching on the domestic situation, Najibullah pointed to sharp contradictions between opposition leaders abroad and field commanders who do not wish any longer to exterminate civil population in cities and village with rocket fire.

The Afghan Government repeatedly came out with constructive initiatives aimed at normalising the situation inside and outside the country. The president announced new initiatives in his speech over radio on the 70th anniversary of restoration of the country's independence. Its keynote was a proposal to call an international conference with the participation of Afghanistan. Pakistan, Iran, India, China, the USSR and the United States to approve the status of Afghanistan as a neutral and non-aligned state and to define principles of its demilitarisation.

The Afghan Government is sure that, provided the Geneva agreements and the resolution of the 43d session of the UN General Assembly are strictly fulfilled, the Afghan problem may be resolved in a short period of time. In this respect Afghanistan counts on the assistance of all peace-loving states and the United Nations, Najibullah pointed out.

Replying to journalists, the president noted that those who say that the fact that Najibullah is in office, is the only reason for the continuation of the war, are hypocrites. "Do the United States and other countries spend billions of dollars only to depose Najibullah? No, they don't. Those who fan up the war, do not like the popular government and the independent policy it pursues."

Touching on the prospects for restoring the war-ravaged economy, Najibullah said that the immediate termination of combat operations by all parties involved in the conflict is the main condition for this. Many countries have begun giving economic assistance to Afghanistan. These are above all the Soviet Union and India.

President Najibullah noted in conclusion that "the doors of the Afghan home are always open for foreign journalists. There is no need to penetrate this house through a small opening window pane." The Afghan side expresses deep regret over the illegal infiltration of the Afghan territory by foreign journalists together with opposition detachments. "We do not want a repetition of an accident with French journalists who tried to infiltrate into Herat. One of them was killed in a shootout." The Afghan side is ready to render assistance to all representatives of the mass media, wishing to visit the most outlying areas of Afghanistan.

Moscow Public Meeting Marks Afghan Independence
PM2308081989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Aug 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "In Honor of the Anniversary"]

[Text] A solemn public meeting in Moscow on 17 August was devoted to the 70th anniversary of the restoration of Afghan independence. The speaker, Yu.S. Sukhin, deputy chairman of the board of the Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Afghanistan and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic minister, and other speakers noted that the restoration of Afghanistan's independence in August 1919 made the strengthening of interstate Soviet-Afghan collaboration possible. It was based on the interests of mutual benefit and both sides' desire to strengthen each other's national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international authority.

It was said that the progressive changes which have taken place since the April revolution in 1978 are being implemented in conditions of the people's desperate struggle against internal and external counterrevolution. The whole course of events since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan demonstrates the durability of the lawful government. The USSR together with the government of the Republic of Afghanistan are doing everything to make a just and universal peace settlement finally possible in Afghanistan.

S.M. Gulabzoy, Afghan ambassador to the USSR, spoke about the history of the Afghan people's struggle for independence. Speaking about the current situation in his country, he stressed that Afghanistan and the USSR have fully carried out their obligations stemming from the Geneva agreements, while Pakistan and the United States are not only failing to observe them but, on the contrary, are intensifying subversive activities.

Taking part in the soiree were G.B. Kolbin, chairman of the USSR National Control Committee, leaders of a number of ministries and departments, representatives of party, soviet, and public organizations, and a delegation from the Afghan Peace, Solidarity, and Friendship Organization led by A.B. Rangbar, its chairman.

French Warships Dispatched to Lebanon

PM2208152589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by unnamed correspondent: "French Ships Going to Lebanese Shores"]

[Excerpts] Paris—While French ships headed by the aircraft carrier "Foch" are heading for the shores of Lebanon, General Michel 'Awn, the head of that country's transitional military government, said in an interview with the Paris newspaper JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE that he is in favor of a French intervention in Beirut. [passage omitted]

France's dispatch of a naval armada has generated a severely negative reaction from Muslim forces and groupings operating in that country. Thus, the pro-Iranian Shiite Hizballah organization has warned Paris not to begin "a new crusade against Lebanon." The terrorist "Revolutionary Justice Organization" is threatening as a retaliatory measure reprisal against the two U.S. hostages which it is holding unless the United States forces France to halt this action. [passage omitted]

At the same time Paris is continuing diplomatic efforts aimed at the halting of hostilities and the peaceful solution of the conflict. A. Decaux, minister delegate for francophone affairs, has returned from Beirut after holding talks with leaders of the antagonistic sides and meeting with the Soviet ambassador. He reaffirmed Paris' support for General 'Awn: "For several centuries France has had privileged relations with the Lebanese Christians. We will not abandon them. There are no reasons for us to abandon this traditional policy." [passage omitted]

Despite all the initiatives of France and other states, JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE writes, the matter of a settlement of the Lebanese crisis has not advanced from a standstill. The presence of French naval forces in the Mediterranean despite France's intentions only complicates the situation and fans the flames of the conflict.

East Europe

Mazowiecki, Walesa Cited on Tasks for Poland

PM2208113389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Stop Press"]

[Text] Warsaw, 21 Aug—A meeting has been held by St. Brygida's Church in Gdansk between T. Mazowiecki, who has been asked by the Polish president to form the country's government, L. Walesa, chairman of Solidarity, and inhabitants of the city.

Introducing T. Mazowiecki to the crowd, L. Walesa urged them to "take upon themselves the responsibility for Poland." Poland must be built, he said, and help is needed in this. We shall create the opportunities for all who want to implement reforms and who support a better Poland. It must be built, even though this will be difficult. The Solidarity chairman stressed that the trade union's members must also try to help in this.

I see enormous tasks ahead of me, T. Mazowiecki stated. I recognize that Poland's paramount need is for bread, not a prime minister. But how is everyone to be satisfied? We must abandon the sense of hopelessness and believe that our people can make life in Poland better and ensure that there are no shortages here. Now, as a new chapter is beginning, we must believe that we have the strength to achieve this. If I am going to be prime minister there is no alternative for me, either.

The rally by the church was accompanied by antics from groups of young people from the illegal "fighting Solidarity" and anarchists. They shouted slogans against all and sundry, PAP [POLISH PRESS AGENCY] writes, chanting such things as "Down with the commune" and "We want bread, not a prime minister" and ignoring the crowd's requests not to disturb the peace. The attempts to cause disorders were not developed. Law enforcement officers did not have to intervene, the agency stresses.

Walesa Outlines Urgent Problems

LD2308094489 Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] The leader of the Polish Solidarity trade union, Lech Walesa, says that Poland faces a number of problems requiring urgent solutions. These are creating a market economy, forming a government willed by the people, and holding local elections. Walesa was talking with a reporter of the Soviet weekly MOSCOW NEWS. He warned that local self-government should be organized, otherwise the bureaucratic apparatus would choke economic and political reforms.

Poland Situation 'Tense,' Strikes Continue

LD2208184189 Moscow TASS in English 1716 GMT 22 Aug 89

["Situation in Poland Remains Tense"—TASS headline]

[Text] Warsaw August 22 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Potemkin:

Contrary to the expectations of some observers, the decisions of the Polish president to suggest to Polish parliament a new candidate to the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers has not eased sociopolitical tension in Poland.

Reports continue to come about strikes and protests of the working people demanding a considerable wage increase in connection with the growth of living costs.

Alarming reports that firemen of a number of Polish cities intend to go on strike in the days ahead came on Tuesday morning. Work stoppages intended by all-Poland section of power engineers of Solidarity might cause serious disturbances in power supply. Miners remain on strike. Port workers of the Katowickie, Czestochowskie and Bielskie Voivodships threaten with walkout. And though some collectives suspended such actions for the days ahead so as not to interfere with the cabinet formation, the collectives of many enterprises are ready to strike.

First secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party Mieczyslaw Rakowski and a group of members of the party's leadership were received by Poland's president Wojciech Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski was familiarised with the conclusions stemming from the Central Committee's stand adopted by the 14th plenum. Much attention was given at the meeting to the prospects of creating a government of broad coalition based on confidence and national accord.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, official candidate to the post of prime minister since yesterday, [21 August] held on Tuesday a series of preliminary consultations and meetings with politicians and representatives of various public forces. A meeting of the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic planned for Wednesday is to discuss the appointment of new chairman of the cabinet of ministers. If the appointment is made, he will be able to embark on legal grounds on the forming of a new cabinet.

Italian IL MESSAGGERO published on Tuesday an interview with leader of Polish Solidarity Lech Walesa, who said, specifically, this: "Nobody has yet taken the road from socialism to capitalism, but this is precisely what we intend to do. After a prolonged phase of socialism, we intend to bring Poland back to a situation in which it was before the war, when it was a capitalist country. This road has not been charted by anyone. We have chosen as an economic and political model Western countries that achieved good results. But we do not know how to apply the experience of capitalist countries to our reality".

PZPR's Strictures on New Government Cited

PM2208112989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[Anatoliy Starukhin dispatch under the "Correspondent Comments" rubric: "The PZPR Central Committee Stance"]

[Text] Warsaw, 21 Aug—The effective withdrawal of the United Peasant Party [ZSL] and the Democratic Party [SD] from the coalition with the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and their formation of a coalition with "Solidarity" is a politically dubious step and a breach of the "round table" principles. That is how the 14th PZPR Central Committee Plenum in Warsaw assessed the agreement of the leadership of the ZSL and SD deputies' clubs to a coalition without the PZPR, undermining the accords on the structure of political forces within the Polish Sejm.

The plenum elaborated the party Central Committee's stance on the question of the formation of a new government and the current political situation. It pointed out that the situation within the country has deteriorated in a dangerous fashion and the political structure of the gradual systematic changes which were elaborated with such difficulty at the "roundtable" by the representatives of leading political forces has begun to totter. The bitterness and weariness of Poland's citizens burdened with the deteriorating economic situation and the incessant political destabilization is increasing. A government based on broad national trust must be created as rapidly as possible to resolutely tackle the problems of working people's everyday lives, revive the economy, and ensure public order. The participants in the plenum discussed all this in alarm. Only a government involving representatives of all political forces within the Sejm structure can extricate Poland from the profound crisis today.

The PZPR Central Committee stressed that, by agreeing to a new coalition without the participation of the PZPR, the leaders of the ZSL and SD deputies' clubs effectively ripped up an agreement regarding the composition of political forces within the structure of the country's supreme organ of power. This alliance was not one of expediency and could not be the subject of political games. If this agreement, earlier approved by CEMA, fails once and for all, the plenum noted, those people who initiated the breakup of the former coalition will bear historical responsibility for the opportunities they missed of ensuring the country's transition with the minimum conflict to the era of a new economic and political order.

It was frequently underlined at the plenum that, particularly of late, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the increased importance of the ZSL and the SD and the extension of their involvement in exercising state power and resolving other most important questions. Both parties' program initiatives played an important role in the former government's policy. The PZPR counts on further cooperation with ZSL and SD members who are true to the ideas of the "round table" and the accords adopted there. The PZPR Central Committee also appreciates "Solidarity's" readiness to assume the burden of joint responsibility for the real rather than imaginary solution of issues of the greatest importance for present-day Poland.

None of the country's main political forces, it was noted at the plenum—neither the PZPR nor "Solidarity"—will be able to cope independently with the dangers, especially in a confrontation situation, and extricate the country from the crisis. The PZPR's involvement in the new government must without fail accord with its political and state potential. The PZPR Central Committee

plenum appealed to all party members and all the country's citizens to fully mobilize all their efforts to counter the attempts to exploit the prevailing situation in order to destabilize the state and call into question the fundamental principles of Poland's existing system and its role in the community of socialist states. Poland must remain a reliable member—from the economic and military viewpoint—of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact.

PZPR Must 'Fight' for 'Own Prestige'

PM2208160589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by correspondent L. Toporkov under the rubric "Panorama of International Events": "A Difficult Choice. A New Alignment of Political Forces Is Taking Shape in Poland"]

[Text] The events which have taken place in Poland in recent months, especially in the period between April and August, attracting the attention of the whole world, have decisively changed the country's political system. We have witnessed a painful departure from what is described a "party state" based on the monopoly of power by the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], and a transition to a state of parliamentary democracy.

Let us recall how the events developed, at least as from July. Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected president of the Polish People's Republic at a joint session of the Sejm and the Senate. This marks a key stage in the chain of transformations which were initiated by the 10th PZPR Central Committee Plenum, and followed up with the "roundtable" and the parliamentary elections in June. However, it is a stage which furnishes food for most serious thought. The leader of the party of Polish communists managed to win the election for the top state post in the country by a single vote. Then General Czeslaw Kiszczak was appointed head of government and was to set about forming an administration. At the same time the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee had to be replaced because W. Jaruzelski, having been elected president, was not allowed to hold any party posts. Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the former prime minister who came in for merciless criticism from all sides for his activities in that post, became first secretary. It was then that the temperature of the political struggle began to rise sharply. The opposition was totally dissatisfied with the emergence of the party triumvirate—Jaruzelski, Rakowski, Kiszczak—that is, with the consolidation of the party's monopoly on state power.

It was then that Lech Walesa, whose skill in conducting a subtle political game is undeniable, took an unexpected step. He engineered a rapprochement with the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party. They were both going through a crisis and gladly grabbed the lifebelt thrown to them, thus causing the former ruling coalition, which, incidentally, had been neither very strong nor very equitable, to fall apart. The PZPR stood isolated. In parliament, where the positions of Walesa's "squad" are strong, it proved difficult if not simply impossible for it to defend its plans. Even its Deputies Club displays obstinacy and disobedience at times—which never happens in the ranks of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club (the opposition).

C. Kiszczak, having failed to form a "grand coalition" government, was forced to resign. Suddenly, unexpectedly for everyone—it could even be described as a sensation—the figure of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, with whom nobody reckoned, a longstanding adviser of Walesa's who does not like to push himself to the fore or advertise himself, emerged on the political horizon. He is now to become the "captain of the sinking ship," in the words of the prominent journalist D. Passent.

So the alignment of political forces in Poland has changed completely. The appointment of a non-communist as chairman of the Council of Ministers marks a radical turning point in Poland's postwar history. Does this mean that a thoughtless and senseless dismantling of everything will set in from now on? It is thought not. Not just for the weighty reason that the portfolios of minister of national defense and minister of internal affairs remain in the hands of the PZPR, or because the sides have agreed to implement the "roundtable" decisions form the basis for the policy of national accord shared by all.

The main reason, it seems, in fact lies elsewhere. This is the beginning of the stage of parliamentary democracy, when the people's sympathies will tend toward those who are able to manage matters better and, consequently, whose positions are more correct. Despite its defeat, the PZPR has by no means used up all its powder. Without regret it parted with the ideals of state socialism, and what is more, it did so on its own initiative.

What will happen to the party in the future? Is the fact that it is no longer "ruling," "guiding," the "vanguard," or the "leading force in society" a catastrophe for it? Healthy party forces say no. Since there is nothing worse than clinging on to myths. The party simply needs profound restructuring. It needs to boldly revise its strategy and tactics and abandon the petty grievances to which a certain part of its aktiv is subject. (How can it be, they say, that we used to be everything and are now nothing?). This process continues, although—in the words of Slawomir Wiatr, the young PZPR Central Committee secretary—it is still inadequate and belated.

Will the PZPR become an opposition party? Judging by the documents of the 14th Central Committee Plenum held the other day, this question was one of the main points under discussion. It still remains open for the party, the PZPR hopes, to successfully become part of a broad coalition of all the political forces represented in parliament. It is entitled to that, having shown itself to be a realistically minded social force striving to act in an

innovative way. The fact that it no longer plays first fiddle should only mobilize the party and encourage it to move forward along the road of improvement rather than reviving dead dogmas.

The PZPR, having freely decided to limit its own power by sharing it with other political forces—above all, the opposition—is experiencing "shock therapy" from the parliamentary elections and the emergence of a new government cabinet created not by it or on the basis of its model. It did this deliberately, proceeding on the basis of the demands of life and the logic of the development of society, which is heterogeneous, divided, and even split.

The people's moral and political unity has been admitted to be a myth. The time has come for sober analysis and assessments, and an accurate representation of the structure of forces and the prospects for development. There has been a recognition that the PZPR was not the party of the entire people, even though it acted in its name—which in principle could not produce favorable results, either political or economic. It had lost the people's confidence and its prestige was declining. The party had become old and had stopped renewing itself with young people.

We recall how the opposition movement, which emerged against a background of discontent with living standards and demanded reforms, democratic freedoms, and the abolition of the old, compromised mechanisms of power, gained in strength. It grouped itself around the "Solidarity" trade union that emerged to protect working people's interests. Its emergence and first steps were not free from extremism, arrogance, or rejection of compromise; it became caught up in "street democracy," struggle for the sake of struggle, and slogans such as "all or nothing." Confrontation with the authorities led to the enforced necessity of martial law: Passions destructive to society had to be curbed.

Violence, whatever its source, is not the best means of resolving social conflicts. But in the Polish version it has been used not only by the government side. When it came to the struggle the opposing forces, journalists here conclude, lacked political culture. That will come later, when it becomes obvious that there will be no winners in this struggle, which is exhausting to all sections and, most important, a burden on society as a whole. There will be an understanding—by both sides—of the need for compromise and the rejection of dogmas and doctrines not borne out by life. Both the centralized command-administrative system, with its economy afflicted by shortages, and the aggressive "all or nothing" philosophy based on the old idea of monopoly will begin to be dismantled.

When reading L. Walesa's interview with a CNN correspondent, I noticed the following detail from the opposition movement's changed philosophy. "We must implement reforms," L. Walesa said, "political, economic, and social reforms, and not substitute one monopoly for another. I am not sure that our monopoly would be better than the old one.... Monopolies do no one any good."

Nor is a monopoly now sought by the PZPR, which has self-critically acknowledged that it is incapable of bearing the responsibility for affairs in the state and society. People linked everything that is happening in the country with the party's name. Including the failures and the crisis. The party has drawn far-reaching conclusions from the experience of the past, distant and recent. In renewing itself and accepting the legalization of the opposition and elections on completely new principles, the party has in fact conducted a nationwide referendum. The June elections were a kind of plebiscite, which we have described in the newspaper on numerous occasions recently. Many people tend to claim that the PZPR lost in those elections. The more farsighted of its figures are saying: Yes, this was a defeat, a bitter but necessary one, and more optimistic than tragic because it showed the true alignment of forces and not the stage-managed one, as happened in the past.

The party must fight for its own prestige. As M. Rakowski has said, the PZPR must become the party of political struggle. It can no longer shelter behind power which it gave to itself. It will have to earn that power by acting boldly and effectively if it wants to remain an influential force in society. This undoubtedly will be under discussion at the party's forthcoming 11th congress.

The Warsaw weekly POLITYKA wrote recently: "The most difficult thing for the party now is to overcome the psychological barriers. First, it must discard many of its doctrines...and incantations to the effect that we will never relinquish power once we have achieved it. Second, the party, which indeed was the state and therefore ruled it and extended its power to all spheres of social life, must now become just one of the many forces in a democratic state, that is, it must shed the instruments to which it had become accustomed and which it had always employed."

The PZPR's courage and maturity are shown by the fact that it took its own decision to travel honestly that difficult part of the road which it chose of its own free will. It is only through a policy of common sense, openness, and good deeds and not by the power of the state apparatus and its means of coercion that the party intends to restore confidence in it and its own prestige.

USSR Mainly Wants 'Stable,' 'Friendly' Poland

PM2208161989 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 3

[Correspondent Viktor Shutkevich report: "Prime Ministers and Stuntmen"]

[Text] Warsaw—Events in Poland are developing in such a breathtakingly fast and surprising way that they resemble scenes from a movie with a fiendishly intricate

plot and an unpredictable denouement. A movie in which stuntmen play the parts of prime ministers. Or, conversely, prime ministers act the part of stuntmen.

This is not my comparison. It was first used by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, head of the country's government last fall. Just the other day this same expression—a "stuntman's job"—was repeated by Lech Walesa who, in his own words, never thought that he could become prime minister and does not think so now. Finally, the latest contender for this office—Tadeusz Mazowiecki—also stated frankly that he has "misgivings about many things." Nevertheless, Mazowiecki added, someone has to try.

Many people have tried. In the time that I have been your own correspondent in Poland—just 1 year, and what a year!—there have been four prime ministers here. Each one lasted less time than his predecessor. I remember the sensation caused by the resignation of Z. Messner, whose government lasted 4 years. M. Rakowski's government was forced to resign after 9 months. Prime Minister C. Kiszczak spent just 2 weeks in office and did not even have time to form a cabinet.

That, however, is not the important thing. In this case what is far more important to us is not the simple fact that one prime minister has been replaced by another but rather what the latter's background is and what party and forces in society he represents. For the first time in Poland's postwar history there is a real contender for this office who does not belong to the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], isn't even a member of the United Peasants' Party [ZSL] or the Democratic Party [SD] (the alliance parties, as they were customarily called), but is a representative of the opposition. Not even some abstract or loyal opposition but that selfsame Solidarity, which in December 1981—that is, when martial law was introduced in the country—went underground and was legalized just 5 months ago. I add: That selfsame Solidarity which in June this year scored a stunning success in the country's parliamentary elections, winning an absolute majority of seats in the Senate and gaining 35 percent of the deputies' seats in the Sejm.

But Solidarity taking power into its own hands? Solidarity forming a government? Even when the election results became known, few believed that. It was assumed—not only by the authorities but also by many figures from the opposition itself—that such a thing could happen some time in the future, in about 4 years: At that time, according to the roundtable agreements, new and completely democratic elections to both chambers were to be held in the country. Reality, however, developed according to a completely different and even more unexpected scenario....

To understand how this has come about, let us trace the events of the past few weeks. We should remember first of all that despite its defeat the ruling coalition, which apart from the PZPR includes the ZSL, the SD, and the trade unions and the association of lay Catholics supporting them, won the majority of the seats in the Sejm—65 percent—thanks to the round table accords. Thus it retained the right to form a new government. Soon after the elections, President Jaruzelski nominated PZPR Central Committee Politburo member C. Kiszczak, foreign minister in the previous government, to the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers.

However, even during the new prime minister's confirmation in parliament there were serious disagreements among the coalition partners. Quite a few ZSL and SD deputies voted against the candidate nominated by the president. And when C. Kiszczak had difficulty in polling the required number of votes it became clear right then that it would be very difficult for him to fulfill the functions of prime minister. That is how it turned out.

Meanwhile his nomination was criticized most harshly in parliament. President Jaruzelski, PZPR Central Committee first secretary Rakowski, head of the previous government, and other ministers of the outgoing cabinet also came under attack. As the newspaper POLITYKA put it, the parliamentary opposition launched a "major psychological battle, preparing the ground to take power in the future." Finally, on 7 August, clearly feeling that the ground was already sufficiently prepared, Lech Walesa made the well known statement in which he proposed to the ZSL and the SD that they form a new coalition headed by Solidarity and put together a "government of national responsibility"—a government without communists.

The two parties' leaders agreed. A week later they met with Walesa, after which the new coalition was created. It now has 264 seats in the Sejm. The PZPR has 173 seats. For the first time in the postwar period the PZPR has found itself in the minority in parliament. It is believed that its representatives will occupy just two key posts in the future government—defense minister and internal affairs minister—appointments which are the prerogative of the country's president.

This turn of events caused a storm of the most conflicting emotions among PZPR members. At numerous meetings and in party aktivs deep concern was expressed at the development of the situation, there was criticism of the "treachery of Solidarity and the former coalition partners" who broke the roundtable agreements, and alarm was voiced for Poland's future. How the party should conduct itself in this entirely new political situation was discussed at a PZPR Central Committee Plenum held last Saturday. The plenum worked behind closed doors. Western correspondents, waiting impatiently for reports, produced the most fantastic hypotheses—even to the point of wondering whether the party leadership would again decide to impose martial law in the country and restore its executive power by force, seeing that it still has the potential for that: Both the army and the internal affairs organs are under PZPR control, not to mention the fact that the country's highest office, the presidency, remains occupied by the former

PZPR Central Committee first secretary. Something else is obvious, however: To regain its lost prestige the party must begin painstaking work among the masses and win their trust. At the moment the vast majority of Poles—and PZPR members themselves are frankly saying this—see the party as mainly to blame for the mistakes and disappointments which postwar generations have endured.

The political realities in the country are such that a government formed solely from PZPR members and its best partners would scarcely have a firm social base. The party, incidentally, realized that even before the elections and put forward the idea of creating a broad coalition government which would include opposition figures in addition to representatives of the ZSL and the SD. However, Solidarity refused to take part in such a coalition. Nor was there support, either from the opposition or from the PZPR's former advisers, for the idea subsequently put forward by the PZPR of creating a so-called "government of experts" whose members would be chosen solely on the basis of their professional competence in various sectors of the national economy irrespective of their party affiliation. The government crisis dragged on. Mindful of the prevailing political realities, President Jaruzelski accepted C. Kiszczak's resignation on Saturday and asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki, member of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club and chief editor of the weekly SOLIDARNOSC, to form the new government. (In addition to him the opposition also put forward two other candidates—B. Geremek and J. Kuron.—V.Sh. note)

Now for a few words about Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He is in his sixties and by profession is a journalist. In the fifties he was a founder of the Polish Catholic Intelligentsia Club and for many years edited the Catholic weekly WIEZ. From 1961 to 1969 he was elected a Sejm deputy. During the well known events of 1980-1981 he was a Solidarity expert in Gdansk and along with other Solidarity activists was interned after martial law was imposed in the country. In the succeeding years T. Mazowiecki worked for the legalization of Solidarity and headed the commission on questions of trade union pluralism in the Citizens' Committee under Lech Walesa—a kind of opposition "shadow cabinet" created at the beginning of this year. T. Mazowiecki was one of the initiators of the roundtable meeting between the authorities and the opposition. Replying in a newspaper interview to the question of what the dialogue between them should center on, Mazowiecki stressed: "It is necessary to talk about Poland. Poland is our common and highest asset." Just the other day in a press statement he noted that he intends to rely on "nonstandard, reformist solutions." What kind of solutions those are remains unclear. However, something else is patently obvious: The post of prime minister in present-day Poland remains among the most perilous. The situation in the country remains tense, not to say explosive. People are exhausted by the waiting lines, the rise in prices, and the constant shortage in the stores of the most basic items—sugar, flour, matches.... Nor have the hopes pinned on the previous government's transfer of the meat trade to free market principles been justified yet.

The situation is being aggravated by strikes, which are affecting more and more enterprises. Tired of the endless inflation—according to some forecasts it could reach 250 percent by the end of the year—the strikers are losing sight of the real potential of their enterprises and of the country's economy as a whole and are demanding immediate wage rises of 100-150 percent. The administration is often forced to meet them halfway. But that, in turn, leads to the even faster disappearance of goods from the stores, causes them to become more expensive, and further undermines the purchasing power of the zloty.

How do we get out of this vicious circle of inflation? This question has been strenuously pondered by not only prime ministers but also, it can be said without exaggeration, by millions of Poles. The most varied and sometimes pretty unexpected proposals are made. Recently, for example, the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Glemp, during a solemn service at Czestochowa unexpectedly raised the question of reparations, which Poland had been unable to obtain in full at the end of World War II. "During a crisis," the cardinal stressed, "the people have the right to defend themselves, using every opportunity, and one of them is to reexamine the causes which sank us economically." The claim is perhaps justified. However, an appeal for extra reparations is scarcely going to be heeded in the West. Hopes for financial assistance from the West, which, as the primate of Poland observed, "was promised on a pretty modest scale, which has subsequently grown still smaller...," also remain faint to date. The Poles will, it seems, have to rely on themselves alone. But meanwhile the country is holding a 4-day weekend, the longest of the year, to celebrate the Feast of the Assumption. Meanwhile there are appearing—as usually happens in a period of acute social tension—people bent on explaining all their woes in the most simplistic fashion by pinning the blame for them on foreigners, the alien neighbor.... Noisy demonstrations by young people beneath anti-Soviet slogans are taking place in Gdansk and certain other cities. In Sopot, as readers will know, the graves of Soviet soldiers who died here during the last war have even been defiled. The most extremist groupings are cursing not not just the communists but Solidarity itself, which, they say, is now cooperating with the former. The country's future prime minister, as a Solidarity figure, is bound to hear these voices. On the other hand, he should also take into account—and Lech Walesa, Solidarity's leader, recalled this recently—that Poland remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, and consequently—I think, this conclusion is obvious—should discharge its obligations to its allies, whatever government is in office....

As far as our attitude to the changes taking place with our neighbors is concerned, this was clearly articulated at a recent press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry: The Soviet Union has no intention of interfering in any

way in the Poles' internal affairs. However, it is perfectly natural that our country, as a great power, has its own interests in Poland. The main one is that we would like to see a strong, politically stable Polish state that is friendly toward us as our neighbor.

Slyunkov Receives Outgoing Polish Ambassador

LD2208171589 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—Nikolay Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, received today the Polish ambassador to the USSR, Wlodzimierz Natorf, who is completing his tour of duty in Moscow in connection with his election as secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee.

In a friendly exchange of views, the two officials stressed the importance of mutual understanding and good-neighbourly cooperation between the Soviet Union and Poland for the vital interests of the peoples in the two countries and for securing a peaceful future for Europe.

Solidarity Pact With Parliamentary 'Club' Noted

PM2208113789 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Responsibility of Choice. Poland's Political Circles Seek Ways To Get the Country Out of the Crisis"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The first joint session of the "Solidarity" National Executive Committee Presidium and the Citizens' Parliamentary Club" [OKP] Presidium was held in Gdansk 20 August. J. Ambroziak, member of the OKP Presidium, told journalists that it examined the question of determining the principles of cooperation between the OKP and the "Solidarity" trade union and for exchanging opinions between them. In connection with T. Mazowiecki's nomination for the post of prime minister and the formation of a government by a representative of the opposition, the problems and principles of acting within the government-OKP-"Solidarity" "triangle" were discussed in order to ensure that they are as favorable as possible for the country and society. [passage omitted]

Prague Demonstration Inspired From 'Outside'

PM2208135189 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 23 Aug 89 p 3

[TASS report: "Unseemly Action"]

[Text] Prague, 22 Aug—On Monday on Wenceslas Square in the Czechoslovak capital an attempt was made to disrupt public order. As CTK reported, about 1,500 people tried to hold an unsanctioned rally to mark the 21st anniversary of the August events. They sought to cause tension and provoke violence, the report stressed. It has been wholly confirmed that this act was stage-managed from outside. Its aggressive nature was inspired by provocative appeals from a representative of the Italian Radical Party, S. Stanceri, and equally by the antisocialist slogans promulgated by so-called Hungarian tourists from the Union of Young Democrats (FIDES) who came to the square.

The group of Hungarian "tourists" unfurled a banner stating "The Bolsheviks came with tanks, we have come with flowers." This, in fact, served as a signal for a demonstration by almost 1,500 people.

Among the participants in the disorder were representatives of Polish "Solidarity" and a large number of Italians. Belligerent criminal elements constantly joined this nucleus. The provocation did not receive support but was condemned by the inhabitants of Prague. The actions by the provocateurs were nipped in the bud by the forces maintaining order.

On the whole, the past 2 days in Prague have passed calmly, by no means least because of the preventive measures taken by the authorities.

CSSR Government Determined to Keep Order

PM2308091589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by correspondent L. Kornilov: "RUDE PRAVO, 21 August 1989"]

[Text] Prague—The situation in Prague preceding the 21st anniversary of the entry of the troops of five Warsaw Pact countries could not be described as absolutely calm. To judge by the development of the situation recently some instances of violation of public order and destabilizing manifestations were to be expected. It is no accident that the CSSR Government recently stated that it is "fully determined to impede these antisocial designs and to safeguard legality, calm, and order," and urged all Czechoslovak citizens to support these efforts.

We cannot fail in this connection to recall the political campaign which has been launched in the Czechoslovak press in the past 1/2-2 months in response to the emergence on the waves of the Western radio stations and subsequent illegal dissemination in the CSSR of the appeal "A Few Phrases," described here as an antisocialist, antipopular pamphlet.

"We resolutely condemn," "We want to live and work in peace," "We fully support the perestroyka process," "We join our voice to all patriotically minded people who denounce the illegal groups' act of provocation"—these words occurred again and again in the dozens of letters, including collective letters, which have been published since 30 July in RUDE PRAVO. The Czechoslovak Communist Party has received over 15,000 protests. Workers, party workers, and figures of culture have been asking in particular what the people who signed the

pamphlet, including some popular artistes, writers, and artists, actually want. Statements have been published by several Czechoslovak citizens expressing anger at the misinformation alleging that they have signed "A Few Phrases" when they did not sign it. Many people compared "A Few Phrases"—both in its thrust and in the structure of its heading—with "2,000 words" and other 20-year-old documents.

But let's return to today's issue of RUDE PRAVO. Published on the international pages is an account, reported by the CTK agency, of an interview published in IZVESTIYA on Saturday with three direct participants in the August 1968 events in Prague.

It also publishes a survey of international mail on this subject. It gives an account of articles in GDR newspapers, the Polish TRYBUNA LUDU, the West German UNSERE ZEIT, and the Bulgarian RABOTNICHESKO DELO and ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME. Some of these organs reprinted the above-mentioned 18 August Czechoslovak Government address and the statement of the presidiums of the chambers of the CSSR Federal Assembly, published 19 August, which expressed surprise at the statements of the Polish Senate and Sejm concerning 21-year old events.

News Sources Cited on Prague Demonstration

LD2208143189 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Prague August 22 TASS—About 1,500 people gathered on Prague's Wenceslas Square on Monday [21 August] for an unsanctioned demonstration to mark the 21st anniversary of the August 1968 events, the CTK News Agency reported.

The demonstrations tried to stir up tension and provoke violence, the report said, adding that the action was orchestrated from abroad.

The aggressive nature of the demonstration "was inspired by provocative slogans of a representative of the Italian Radical Party, S. Stanceri, and anti-socialist slogans on banners brought to the square by Hungarian 'tourists' from the Young Democrats' Union (FIDESZ)," CTK said.

The Hungarian "tourists" unfurled a banner reading "the Bolsheviks came with tanks, we come with flowers", which actually sparked off the demonstration.

Representatives of illegal groups gave interviews to foreign television reporters, expressing their sympathy with the activities of Czechoslovak dissidents.

The demonstrators included representatives of Poland's Solidarity Trade Union and many Italians, who were later joined by criminal elements, the report said.

The demonstration was broken up by police.

CTK said that the ring-leaders, including several Poles, Hungarians and Italians, would be punished under Czechoslovak law.

The past two days in Prague were generally calm due to preventive measures taken by the authorities. Police and people's militia units were put on alert.

The newspaper RUDE PRAVO says in a commentary today that various forces in Czechoslovakia and abroad had expected that the anniversary of the 1968 events would provoke conflict with the state. This is the objective meaning of all actions, from petitions to the organisation of provocations on the streets.

Forces, posing as the opposition, and their foreign "advisers" and allies carefully prepared for August 21. They left no doubt that they sought to organise street demonstrations at any cost, although they tried to create an impression that they were warning against such actions, the report stressed.

The mass inflow of "foreign tourists" into Prague in the past few days is being regarded as particularly suspicious. Some Western news agencies carried numerous dispatches from the Czechoslovak capital.

REUTER mentioned "planned demonstrations" and said that representatives of Solidarity and the Hungarian opposition would come to Prague.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE on Sunday cited Prague rumours that police had been allowed to open fire on protesters, adding that this had caused veritable psychosis.

But, the newspaper said, Western news agencies created the atmosphere of psychosis with their reports.

The police alert, examination of cars, carried out more often than as usual, and the checking of documents on the streets, is not characteristic of the summer season in Prague, RUDE PRAVO noted.

This is only a confirmation of the Czechoslovak Government's statement that any attempt to disrupt perestroika and use democratisation for achieving anti-socialist goals would evoke an adequate response from the authorities, the paper emphasised.

CSSR Protests 'Hostile' Western Broadcasts

PM2208120189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "CSSR Foreign Ministry Protest"]

[Text] Prague, 19 Aug—CTK reports that the CSSR Foreign Ministry has issued a protest to representatives of the U.S. and FRG embassies in Prague with regard to broadcasts by Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America that are hostile to Czechoslovakia. These broadcasts are incompatible with the Helsinki accords.

It was noted that these radio stations' broadcasts on Czechoslovakia's domestic situation and foreign policy are couched in the spirit of the "cold war" and do not correspond to the aspirations of Europe's peoples to develop and strengthen the process of general European mutual understanding and cooperation.

CSSR Journal Views 'Antisocialist' Ferment

PM2208115589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Aug 89 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed article: "Article in Tribuna"]

[Text] The elimination of the leading role of the working class and its vanguard—the Czechoslovak Communist Party—and the dismantling of the socialist system and its replacement by a bourgeois system are the real aims of the domestic and external enemies of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

This was the subject discussed yesterday by the weekly TRIBUNA in an article analyzing the reasons for the galvanization of antisocialist forces on the eve of the anniversary of the provision of international aid to the republic in August 1968.

The events of the past 2 months show that this year the antisocialist campaign has been well-conceived and well-prepared, the weekly stresses. It unites the most varied people and all kinds of groupings striving to overthrow socialism in the CSSR. It is not just the fact of international assistance that is being attacked. Facts typifying development in the 1968-1969 period and the past 20 years are blatantly distorted, and the results achieved in the process of socialist building are wholly denied.

The reassessment of the development of the situation in the country during the crisis period and the rehabilitation of those who carried out the policy is the goal of the campaign launched by antisocialist forces and aimed at describing the international assistance given to Czechoslovakia in 1968 as unjustified. This reassessment is meant to permit opposition structures to be legalized and allow them to freely destroy socialism.

1968 Events in Czechoslovakia Examined

LD2208160389 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Observer Mikhail Glebov commentary]

[Text] Events of more than 20 years ago have reflected again upon today's scene in Czechoslovakia, as an estimated 1,500 people staged a demonstration in Prague to mark the 21st anniversary of the introduction into the country of the troops of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty nations. The events of those days are the subject of heated and acrimonious debates. A group of Czechoslovak citizens, including popular artists, authors, and musicians, have signed an appeal that sharply criticizes the government, and in response many papers carried letters of protests signed by other cultural figures, factory workers, and Communist Party activists. Several citizens made a statement in which they expressed their anger over the fact that although the appeal was signed with their names they actually never signed it.

The debate has gone beyond Czechoslovakia. Several days ago the Hungarian Government condemned the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, describing it as a crude violation of the rights of a sovereign state. The Polish Government passed a resolution expressing grief and sorrow over the fact that the Polish Army was involved and voiced the view that the introduction of the troops slowed down the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia. In response, the presidiums of both houses of the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia issued a statement criticizing the attitudes expressed toward the extremely complicated events of 1968 as incompetent and partial.

Our observer, Mikhail Glebov, looks at the events of 21 years ago and their consequences:

[Glebov] The national government daily IZVESTIYA in Moscow said that assessing Czechoslovak history is an exclusive right of Czechs and Slovaks themselves. Indeed, it's up to them to make judgments. Historians will, no doubt, be investigating those controversial events, but it's clear anyway that these events were more complicated than this or that type claimed at that time.

In 1968 Czechoslovakia was going through a crisis. The debate over various plans of development and models of socialism in the country marked a split in society and in the top echelons of power as well. The events were aggravated by the fact that there were many sides involved in them, and not only in Czechoslovakia. A group of people in the Czechoslovak leadership, in one of the critical moments of the internal struggle, decided to appeal to the Soviet Union for help. The troops of neighboring socialist states entered the country. At that time, relations between the Warsaw Treaty countries were based on the idea of a single model of socialism. A deviation from that model was considered a justified reason for the allies to intervene.

Another aspect of the situation was no less important. Many Western politicians perceived a reason to interfere in the country's affairs, in the internal struggle in Czechoslovakia. Many groups of opponents of socialism started getting aid and advice from abroad. In the summer of 1968, the British press reported that arms were stocked in secret places in various parts of Czechoslovakia and that some of these a.ms were Western-made. This added new elements to the overall tense atmosphere in the country and many people spoke about the possibility of a civil war. So, in a word, outside forces influenced what took place in Czechoslovakia in the spring and summer of 1968. Twenty-one years have passed since then. The march of events has logically led

to the conclusion about the multi-optional course of developments in the world at large and within the socialist system. That conclusion was expressed in one of the declarations of the Warsaw Treaty nations, that no country may dictate to another what course it should follow or play the part of an arbiter. In 1968, neither East nor West were prepared to accept that point of view.

Mazurov, Pavlovskiy Recall 1968 CSSR Invasion

PM2108150189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Leonid Shinkarev feature under the "Pages of History" rubric: "It Happened in Prague. Three Interviews Between IZVESTIYA's Correspondent and a Politician, a Military Leader, and a Soldier on What Happened in the Czechoslovak Capital on 21 August 1968"; date, place of interviews not given]

[Text] The awakened desire for justice, which extends to many pages of Soviet history, still sidesteps the morning of 21 August 1968, when troops from five Warsaw Pact states entered Czechoslovak territory. The Czechs and Slovaks themselves are entitled to assess their own past. But we want to look at the past through the eyes of our countrymen who participated in the events. Unable to speak out at the time, they kept the vow of silence which the administrative system demanded of them. The time has come to break that silence.

It turned out that for each of the three interviewees I was the first person to ask about days which cannot be brought back to life but which can be made part of collective experience. These people, who are all equally reserved characters, did not want to betray their consciences or bend with the prevailing wind. That is why the interviews, it seems to me, also give a certain impression of the range of views existing in today's society.

K.T. Mazurov

(In 1968 he was a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers).

[Shinkarev] Kirill Trofimovich, what features of the international situation in August 1968 forced the top political leadership headed by Brezhnev to send troops into a fraternal country?

[Mazurov] If you look at the past today it is hard to understand it without taking the trouble to look into the circumstances of another historical period. What is commonly called the "cold war" was at its height. Relations between the FRG and the GDR were exacerbated, the construction of the Berlin Wall had produced real hysteria in the West. The Cuban missile crisis had inflamed feelings. We had pinned our hopes on a meeting with the U.S. President, but this was wrecked by the subversive Powers flight. We had become aware of plans by certain circles to provoke a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. We did have the wherewithal to respond and pose a threat ourselves, but did we really have the numbers that they had?

In its attempts to break down the socialist community the West focused on Czechoslovakia. Located in central Europe and having rich economic and cultural traditions, the country was one of the dozen most developed states. Those wanting to increase tension did have something to go on. There was growing discontent among the population with the way in which the Soviet development model had been imitated. The mechanical copying of our methods had exacerbated the economic imbalance. One way or another we were the targets of the discussions about the victims of the repressions of the forties and fifties under Stalinism. The opponents of the new system put all the deformations down to cooperation with our country. The opposition was openly putting forward anti-Soviet and antisocialist slogans.

The Soviet leadership watched with alarm as right-wing forces in Czechoslovakia became more active. The Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee lost its grip over the mass media. This was repeatedly indicated by the then Czechoslovak leaders. In a difficult international situation we had a single desire—to rally our forces, prevent war, and survive. The clear hint from the CSSR foreign minister that Czechoslovakia might leave the Warsaw Pact came as a complete surprise to us. By then the border between the CSSR on the one hand, and the FRG and Austria on the other, was being opened up. The Sudeten Germans and their troublemakers [boyeviki] had started infiltrating the country. Observing them on the rampage in Karlovy Vary, Kosygin—who was vacationing there—cut short his vacation and returned to Moscow. As an eyewitness he confirmed the danger of what was happening.

After the CSSR leadership refused to come to Warsaw for talks with the leaders of the fraternal countries, it was agreed that a meeting would be held between the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium at Cierna-nad-Tisou. The meeting was painful. We sat opposite each other for several hours in some schoolhouse. The other side answered all our arguments by saying that we had nothing to worry about. We parted cooly. Nobody slept on the train back to Moscow: What were we to do?

A list was drawn up for the leaders of the fraternal parties based on the results of the meeting. They were constantly phoning suggesting solutions. Ulbricht and Gomulka insisted on the toughest steps. Minor differences aside, the general position was unanimous: We had to intervene. It was hard to imagine that a bourgeois parliamentary republic inundated with FRG Germans and, subsequently, Americans could appear on our borders. In no way was this in the interests of the Warsaw Pact. During the last week before the troops were sent in Politburo members hardly slept or went home: According to reports a counterrevolutionary coup was in the offing in

Czechoslovakia. The Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts had been put on the highest alert. We met in session again on the night of 20-21 August. Brezhnev said: "We'll send the troops in...."

There was a common sigh of relief: It had finally become clear what we were going to do. Brezhnev added: "We should send one of us to Prague. The military there might... Mazurov will fly there."

Obviously, Brezhnev had in mind the fact that I had experience in the Patriotic War and had good contacts with the military. This turn of events was a complete surprise to me. I went home, woke my wife, and said that I was leaving immediately for Kirghizia. The aircraft set off for Prague at 0300.

We circled for a long time over Prague Airport, waiting for the Soviet and Bulgarian assault troops—who had just arrived—to clear the runway.

When I traveled through early-morning Prague at about 0500 there were already tanks in the city and the air was thick with the smell of tanks burning. I'm a tanker myself, it felt like a war. I remembered the Politburo members' parting words to me—"Do everything to prevent civil war over there."

[Shinkarev] I've heard from our comrades who were in Prague at the time that full power was concentrated in the hands of General Trofimov...

[Mazurov] That was my new name. Wearing a colonel's uniform (my military rank) and calling myself "Gen Trofimov," I gave orders to our soldiers and civilians. Together with an adjutant I traveled by jeep around Prague and visited the Kladno metallurgy workers and agricultural areas. I spoke with Brezhnev and Kosygin several times a day, getting their advice. The main task was to protect our soldiers from gunfire. You know, I was struck by the men's restraint and the way they managed to keep their cool when rioting youngsters in the squares insulted them and threw at them anything that came to hand....

During the 7 days that I was in Prague I only slept for about 60-90 minutes a day. There was shooting at night in the city, enterprises had stopped work, stores were shut, and people were short of food. We appointed the commander of the 20th Division military commander of Prague. "Do what you like," I told him. "Drag store managers out of their apartments, but just make sure that stores are open for business and people don't starve."

I returned to Moscow 27 August. Brezhnev was euphoric: "Thank God it's all over..." He was thinking that we'd managed to avoid hostilities. But I knew that it was by no means all over. And when I got home I told my wife: "The main thing isn't that I've come home, but that I've come home without burying a single Czech...."

You may ask whether I'd agree to lead a similar operation today. No! Under no circumstances. But in the specific situation of August 1968 I acted in line with my convictions and if the situation were repeated today I'd do the same. [Mazurov ends]

I.G. Pavlovskiy

(In 1968 he was commander of the allied troops that entered Czechoslovakia, USSR deputy defense minister, and an army general).

[Shinkarev] Ivan Grigoryevich, I think it was difficult to lead an operation conducted, unusually for a general, on a fraternal country's territory...

[Pavlovskiy] I received my orders 16 or 17 August, 3-4 days before the start of the operation. It was initially planned that Marshal Yakubovskiy would lead the allied troops. He organized all the practical training. I was suddenly called by Defense Minister Grechko: "You're being appointed commander of the formations which will go into Czechoslovakia."

I flew to Legnica (in Poland) to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces. There I met with Marshal Yakubovskiy. He showed me on the map which divisions would be used and in which areas. The operation was planned to begin at 0100 on 21 August. Grechko had warned me: "The orders will come from Moscow, it's your job to make sure they're carried out."

The troops set off at the appointed time. Then there was another call from Grechko: "I've just been talking with Dzur (CSSR minister of national defense) and warned him that if the Czechs, God forbid, open fire on our troops, it could end badly. I asked him to order Czechoslovak units to stay put, not to open fire, and to offer no resistance."

Roughly an hour after our troops set off there was another call from Grechko: "How's it going?" I told him what divisions were where. In certain places people had come out to erect roadblocks. Our troops were avoiding these obstacles.... He warned me not to leave the command post without his permission. Suddenly there was another call: "Why are you still there? Fly to Prague immediately!"

...We flew to Prague and circled two or three times over the airport—there was no one around, not a voice to be heard or a plane to be seen. We landed... I traveled to meet Dzur at the General Staff along with Lieutenant General Yamshchikov, who met me. Dzur and I agreed immediately that there would be no fighting between our soldiers and that nobody should think that we had come with the object of occupying Czechoslovakia. We had sent our troops in, that's all. The political leadership would sort things out later.

We settled in at the General Staff building, sleeping in chairs and on the floor. We issued orders where I was sitting with my telephones and radio operators. I was given instructions by Mazurov.

I was instructed to meet with CSSR President Ludvik Svoboda at the Soviet Embassy. I took a Hungarian general, a Soviet general, and a German general with me... I said: "Comrade President, you know that Warsaw Pact troops have been sent into Czechoslovakia. I have come to give you my report. And since you and I are both army generals and military men, you realize that we have been forced into this by the situation."

He replied: "I understand...."

The president spoke in Russian. He had spent time in the Soviet Union, commanded a Czechoslovak battalion, turned it into a brigade and then a corps, and entered Prague with his corps in May 1945. I asked if he had any complaints about our troops. He replied that he had no particular complaint. Only that there was tracer fire at night, and that was bad. I myself did not observe such shooting. But perhaps some people did this for hooligan reasons or in order to scare someone. I assembled my commanders and ordered them to cease any shooting at night.

Kosygin flew to Prague to sign a treaty. Smirkovskiy, former member of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium, appealed to him saying: Your troops have killed all our wildlife, they are hunting pheasants and deer... Kosygin looked at me. I said: It's not true. I cannot guarantee that nobody killed any birds. The troops were stationed in and around forests. But we haven't been organizing hunting. We immediately concluded agreements with the local authorities on deliveries of fruit and vegetables, and we brought in the rest.

[Shinkarev] How many of our tanks were in Czechoslovakia?

[Pavlovskiy] Around 500... And, quite honestly, I would not say that the population's attitude toward us was friendly. Despite the fact that our Army liberated Prague and that together with the Czechoslovak troops we took part in combat operations against the Hitlerites, every Czech was entitled to be offended by us. What were we doing there? We had dropped leaflets from planes explaining that we had come with peaceful intentions. But you can understand for yourself that if I, an invited guest, come to your home and start taking over, it's not very nice.

[Shinkarev] Has your assessment of the events of'68 changed in the past 20 years?

[Pavlovskiy] You know, I remember a play about Ivan the Terrible at the Malyy Theater. A monk went to him and said that the czar dealt too cruelly with his enemies. The czar got up from his throne: Sit in my place and rule, he said, and I'll watch to see how you rule... Nowadays the fashion is to criticize everything and say that everything was different. But what if you view the matter in the light of the military-political situation that actually existed? Forgive me, I'm a man of conviction. My views have not changed. [Pavlovskiy ends]

V.V. Nefedov

(In 1968 he was a private first class in the 7th Guards Airborne Division. He is an equipment foreman at the Vnukovo Refractory Materials Plant).

[Shinkarev] Valeriy Vladimirovich, you were among the first assault troops moved into Prague on the morning of 21 August...

[Nefedov] I was 19. There were more than 20 people of my age and from my area of Odintsovo City, Moscow Oblast, in our regiment. Our regiment was a model regiment, and the company even more so. We trained hard, we ran, shot, threw knives, and made parachute jumps. We were trained to quickly seize enemy bridgeheads and neutralize them with rocket fire. We had assimilated new equipment: Assault troops had to know how to drive trucks, tanks, and light tanks.

With regard to the events in Czechoslovakia we were told at political study classes that extremists were trying to seize power, tear the republic away from the socialist community, and restore capitalism. Initially we did not suspect that this would affect us, but in early August we were suddenly put on alert, boarded trucks, and set off for an airfield. Right-wing elements in Czechoslovakia had stepped up their activities, we were told. We had to help the fraternal people.

We did not fly out just then but set up camp near the airfield. Two weeks passed. About 4 days before we flew out the command issued us with as much ammunition as we could carry. We even filled our gas mask cases with ammunition. There was no knowing what awaited us on landing, we were told. The Czechoslovak-FRG border had already been opened, we were to forestall a German invasion.

August 20 arrived. Before dinner the company commander (Lieutenant Dorokhin) issued an order: We would fly out at 0400. We settled down to rest and were tormented by the unknown—we weren't afraid, just a bit nervous, like before your first jump. We dozed... Suddenly the alarm was sounded at 10 or 11 at night. There was a general assembly in 30 minutes. We were in such a hurry that we didn't break camp. We left our tents in the forest. I never saw such an embarkation on an aircraft. Normally before entering an airplane there was a triple inspection to check how your parachute was fitted and which weapons you were carrying. You always packed your own parachute. But we were in such a rush we had to take any parachute and run to the plane. The company

commander told us that intelligence reports had established that FRG troops were preparing to cross the Czechoslovak border at 0400. Our commanders had had to change the take-off time.

A reconnaissance company had flown out an hour before us to take control of lines of communication at Prague Airport. Hardly had our aircraft touched down than we jumped out and moved to one side so as not to hinder the other planes landing after us. There was an unremitting rumbling in the sky. The company commander tasked us with taking up positions along the highway leading from the airport to central Prague. We were warned that the Czechoslovak Tank Army had passed through here on its way to exercises in the Tatra Mountains and if we were spotted some right-wing commander might take it into his head to turn the tanks on us. During this time Soviet tanks were approaching from the GDR. White triangles or circles were painted on them to prevent us mistaking them for Czechoslovak tanks. We lay in our trenches and prepared our weapons... Around 0400, blinding us with their headlights, the first column of our tanks rumbled past.

It was daybreak when the company commander ordered us to move on central Prague. We went onto the road and stopped trucks. If a Czech driver agreed to give us a lift, one of our officers sat alongside him, while the men sat in the back. If he refused—this also happened—the keys to the truck would be handed over and we would drive down the road ourselves. The company was instructed to guard the General Staff and then the Soviet Embassy building. We were surrounded by pretty Czech girls in military uniform: "Everything's OK here, why have you guys come?"

[Shinkarev] But were there times when you asked yourselves that question?

[Nefedov] Yes... Not on the first day, but later, when we'd had a chance to look around. People in the cities and villages were well-dressed, apple and pear trees were growing along the roadside, nobody would dream of stealing what wasn't theirs, the streets were clean, and there was no litter—not like in our Odintsovo... Not counting certain Czech guys who provoked clashes, the city's population behaved calmly and with dignity. Many people came up to us, told us about themselves, and were puzzled as to why we were there and why we were dealing with their problems. I saw their attitudes and how painful it was for people old enough to be our mothers and fathers, as well as for Czechs of our own age, to tell us this—my ideas got mixed up and I was ashamed. Forgive us, Prague....

One guy from the company, who was from the Ukraine, got acquainted with a Czech girl. She was pretty, with a short fringe, and aged about 19. She often visited our unit. They got on so well they decided to get married. He submitted a request to the command. And they both went arm in arm to the Soviet Embassy for permission. The order came for the soldier to be urgently sent home. I was told that when he got back to the unit he tried to do himself in. Back then it was hard to imagine that 20 years later everything would change in our lives the way it has. [Nefedov ends]

Undoubtedly, Czechoslovak and Soviet historians will get to the bottom of the quite complex and contradictory events of August 1968. We agree once again that assessing Czechoslovak history is the exclusive right of the peoples of the CSSR. The events concerned the interests of political parties, the principles of cooperation among the fraternal countries, the problems of their collective security, and the right of the peoples to independently choose their own destiny themselves. The lessons of those days of crisis give us extra strength to defend with even greater conviction the gains of new political thinking. New thinking opposes closed-door [kabinetnyy] solutions to the problems of world politics when their discussion is kept apart from the people's masses who have to pay in full for all their misfortunes. There should be no repetition of the past.

Abuses in USSR-Hungary Open Border Area Noted
PM1808143689 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 32, 6 Aug 89 p 7

[Andrey Bezruchenko report: "A Trip Across the Border"]

[Text] Since last March the inhabitants of a border area between Transcarpathia and one region in Hungary have been allowed to freely cross the Soviet-Hungarian border as often as needed. Monthly passes were issued by border representatives to almost all who applied.

This experiment could become a model for the entire USSR, where a legislative act on entry and exit must be adopted in the near future. It envisages the abolition of invitations as a necessity for private trips (see "MN" No 28). But this model turned out to be far from perfect. Why!

...For four months, March to June, the border was a hectic place. Dozens of cars with Russian, Transcarpathian, Polish and Hungarian number plates lined up daily all along the highway leading to the checkpoint in Chop. There were automobiles, trailers, excursion buses, motorcycles, bicycles and pedestrians. They started queueing at 4 a.m. Irritated Polish motorists lay straight on the highway and refused to allow passage to official and other vehicles which have permission to pass without queueing. The situation was just as bad in simplified c- ssing points (SCP) opened all along the Soviet-Hungarian border.

Only in July did things settle down: By a decision of the Transcarpathian regional Excutive Committee, considerable restrictions on free movement across the border were introduced. A corresponding resolution "on improving the procedure...." reads:

"Many citizens used the simplified crossing only to buy goods, quite often only to resell them, at working time, taking along their school-aged children. What's more, their behaviour was not always decent. The scale of manufactured goods and fuel has sharply increased in border districts."

"Before July 1, there were people who crossed the border four times per day, each time changing the established 30-rouble limit," says Mikhail Zinevich, senior official of the regional Executive Committee.

"There used to be glass here," Miroslav Cherepanin, department head of customs in Chop, Soviet city on the border, said "It was broken by the crowd on one of the days when tens of thousands of people passed through customs every day. The militia squad could not restrain the crowd of people exhausted by the many-hour wait."

A pass is now issued only for one visit a month (for one week only). The movement of pedestrians and cyclists is banned at Chop checkpoint. At the same time several trips of buses along the Chop-Nyiregyhaza (Hungary) route and a local diesel train were arranged. Now one can travel to Hungary also by taxi (four persons, 10 roubles each).

These measures have considerably stabilized the situation. Arriving at the Luzhanka-Beregsurany simplified crossing point (SCP), I saw only two cars from each side of the border, as well as Hungarian and Soviet border-guards (at the SCP they work together) tired and languishing in the heat (there are no sheltered booths there).

"Now it has become quiet at our point," says Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Shenets, chief of the checkpoint in Luzhanka. In June when long queues stood there the border post simply was not ready for such a rush. The road is narrow and there are no elementary conveniences...."

The local authorities believe that temporary SCP's must be reequipped into permanent checkpoints. But those 10-rouble notes which are collected as a duty from those crossing the border are not enough for this. Ivan Pontyo, Chief of the Visa and Registration for Foreigners Office of the regional Executive Committee, believes that everyone has the right to leave abroad, but he is worried whether his Office will have enough energy for everyone.

Difficulties have arisen with money exchange: The Transcarpathian region doesn't dispose of its own stock of Hungarian forints. They are also not available at the Vneshekonombank of the USSR, owing to the well-known disbalance in Soviet-Hungarian trade. Hungarian exchange bureaus have now stopped accepting traveller's cheques and bank cheques issued by the Vneshekonombank branches. The exchange of money for tourists leaving for Hungary has been stopped temporarily.

But for many inhabitants of Transcarpathia, especially those who go to Hungary to shop, forints are no problem. This became obvious as soon as I crossed the border and passed the Hungarian customs. A chap naked from the waist up was standing on the roadside a few dozen metres from the checkpoint in the frontier settlement Zahony. He had a thick wad of money in his hand. This is a money changer. His exchange rate of a forint is twice as high as the official rate.

"Of course, one is forbidden to take roubles through the border, but it is very difficult to control it," Major Imre Szabo, customs chief in Zahony, comments. "Money changers, many of whom are from Poland, take advantage of this. Travelling from one country to another, they play on unrealistic currency rates."

(By the way, state-run exchange bureaus, selling currency at market price, are functioning in some countries with limited currency reserve. Those who want to have more money in an honest way for a trip abroad make a deal with the state and not with money changers.)

A fairly large black market is functioning in Zahony. Parked on a specially assigned asphalted lot are dozens of cars, mainly with Polish license plates. Practically everything can be bought there—from a double-cassette tape recorder and Slava alarm clock to sunglasses and Camus cognac.

"Many cities of our country have such markets," Ferenc Szirjak, representative of the Trade Co-op firm, said. He was kind enough to accompany me in this trip. "Our country decided that it would be better to allow open individual trade under the control of the authorities. If this business is forced underground, then it would inevitably pave the way for more serious black marketing, other machinations and crimes."

Naturally, people buy goods in stores as well. Soviet citizens in Hungary buy meat, butter, soap, laundry detergents, alcoholic beverages—everything which is now often in short supply in the USSR.

The paradox is that the freer foreign travel is, the more problems arise. Travel abroad has been simplified, but the lines have become longer near the doors of the Visa and Registration offices, near foreign consulates, at railway and air booking offices, exchange bureaus, near customs and border stations. People waste days and weeks only for the process of departure registration. Besides, being abroad, they also feel uneasy with the paltry sum they have. Further simplification of the exit procedure will only aggravate the situation.

What is the solution? To restrict the right to travel? At any rate, this can't be done by administrative measures (at least, owing to the commitments taken by the USSR under the Vienna Concluding Document). Most probably, it is necessary to strengthen de jure the free travel for all. But de facto this right will probably be limited for the time being. Although naturally, with economics kept in mind.

Romania National Day Interview With Ceausescu
PM2208200589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu by Boris Averchenko, member of the PRAVDA editorial collegium, on 22 August: "A Path Chosen by the People"; place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Socialist Romania is 45 years old today. On the eve of this portentous date Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of Romanian Communist Party and president of the Socialist Republic of Romania received Boris Averchenko, member of PRAVDA editorial collegium, and during the conversation answered questions put to him. Below we publish this interview.

[Averchenko] Romanian-Soviet relations are based on a firm treaty foundation and have withstood the test of time. What is your assessment of the current state of our countries' cooperation and its prospects?

[Ceausescu] Traditional ties have existed between our countries for a very long time. In the years of socialist building they improved and developed on the basis of new principles. And although there have been, so to speak, hints of the violation of principles of cooperation, we have nevertheless overcome them and have ensured the consolidation of cooperation both between our parties and between our peoples. I want to reemphasize that the cooperation between the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] and the CPSU, and between our countries, just like, incidentally, relations with all the socialist states and with other communist and workers parties, have had and continue to have great significance for the development of socialism in both our countries.

In general we consider that relations between our parties and countries are good. And even if they were excellent, much would still have to be done to expand them in all spheres of activity. Incidentally, an exchange of opinions recently took place on the expansion of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation in the coming years, and we are firmly convinced that paths will be found toward the development of this cooperation in forms that accord with the interests of the building of socialism in Romania and the Soviet Union and which will serve the common cause of socialism and peace.

[Averchenko] The RCP is approaching its 14th congress. What issues will the Romanian Communists be focusing on at this top party forum?

[Ceausescu] The 14th RCP Congress will be held in November this year. Preparations began in May last year with the discussion by the whole party of the April Theses of the Central Committee Political Executive Committee, which contain a synthesis of the present stage of development of the Socialist Republic of Romania and its prospects.

At the June plenum this year we adopted documents for the 14th congress—the Directive Program of Socioeconomic Development in the 9th 5-Year Plan and in the Long Term Through the year 2000, and in Certain Areas Through 2010, and also the Theses on the Activity of the Party and State. They were published and are being discussed by the party and the entire people.

What do we have in mind? Proceeding from the results achieved so far—which we consider good and which demonstrate the correctness of socialism as a form of the organization of society, the correctness of our party's policy in translating these principles into reality—we plan to move on to development in accordance with new principles. Bearing in mind that next year we shall complete a great strategic task—the elevation of Romania to the level of a medium-developed country. We are setting the target of moving to a higher level—the stage of building a comprehensively developed socialist society. This presupposes that by the year 2000 we shall have achieved a growth of the national economy of approximately 80 percent and, in some spheres, even doubled it, which will lead to a corresponding increase in national income and an improvement in the conditions of people's labor and life. We are setting before ourselves the task of achieving this through building up the intensive development of all sectors of activity, improving the principles of self-management, economic self-management [samokhozyaystvovaniye], and self-financing. We plan to perfect the system of labor remuneration on the basis of socialist principles. We proceed firmly from the premise that no one can obtain income without labor, or live by exploiting the labor of others.

We have acted resolutely to prevent speculation and an increase in consumer goods prices in any form whatsoever! Over the past 5 years, although the plan provided for a certain growth—0.5-1.0 percent per annum—there has been no increase in prices. We believe that this is one of the pledges of our socialist state. We do not agree with the thesis of a so-called "free market," because this is freedom for speculation, which harms the working people, to the people! Of course all that we produce we produce for the working people and we produce it in a certain sense for the market and not for the warehouses, but we cannot leave the sale of these goods to the will of chance! We are striving to provide the people with everything necessary for a worthy life in accordance with scientific requirements, but we will not permit and we rule out speculation in any form!

We shall continue to increase expenditure on social needs so that we shall ensure by the year 2000 a more just standard of living for all citizens of the country. We want to ensure such conditions whereby there will be no "poor" and neither any "rich" living at the expense of other people's labor. We want our people to provide themselves with a worthy and abundant life on the basis of the free labor of every citizen!

We believe that only in this way can one create the necessary conditions in order to proceed further along the path of implementing the communist principles of life and

labor! This is why we are concerned about equalizing the living conditions of the working people of the city and of the countryside. We believe that not only our cities but also our communes and villages must be developed.

West Europe

Yazov on Karelia, Border Troops, Arms Control

PM2308083389 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 18 Aug 89 p 5

[Matts Dumell report: "'No Chance of Changing the Border With Karelia'"]

[Text] During his visit to Finland Soviet Defense Minister, General of the Army Dmitriy Yazov has demonstrated surprising openness.

In his talks with Defense Minister Ole Norrback he informed Finland's military leadership, as far as is known for the first time, of the number of Soviet soldiers stationed close to Finland's eastern border.

At a news conference in Helsinki yesterday he commented on Finland's hopes of one day being able to regain part of Karelia ceded to the Soviet Union after the World War II.

"On principle we do not adjust borders. If we were to go in for adjusting borders drawn after World War II, that would lead to a new war," Yazov said.

This probably means that we can end the discussion about getting back Karelia. It is hardly worth a new war.

The question is: What were Yazov's intentions in informing Norrback about the number of soldiers close to the Finnish border?

What he actually said was: "The number of Soviet soldiers in the vicinity of the Finnish border is less than the total number of Finland's military forces."

Under the peace treaty Finland is permitted a maximum of 33,000 men under arms. The Central Staff has said that in peacetime the size of the defense forces is 25,000-27,000 men.

If the Soviet Union has fewer than 25,000 men in the vicinity of the Finnish border, including Leningrad's defenses, Murmansk, and the Kola Peninsula, this could perhaps explain how it was possible for Mathias Rust to land in Red Square in May 1987.

It is therefore more likely that Yazov is making a comparison with Finland's fully mobilized wartime military forces, which are around 500,000 men according to the Central Staff.

During his visit Yazov has also discussed the sale of materiel to Finland.

"Norrback and General Jaakko Valtanen are ready to buy certain models from us. But nothing more concrete has been discussed," Yazov said.

He considers that the Finns should first make some proposals, then a delegation can travel round Soviet factories looking at the products, and only in a third phase need an order be placed.

The order is an economic question, and how advanced the models the defense forces order can be is a political question.

Yazov said that Finland's present B-type MiG aircraft are still useful in the defense context, so there is no hurry to order the MiG-29 fighter.

"If Finland so wishes, we can deliver materiel that has been developed according to the very latest discoveries of military technology," Yazov promised.

Yazov also spoke about the situation in the Baltic states and said that the Soviet forces in Estonia are not being increased despite the recent unrest and strikes.

"In themselves the strikes and the unrest are a problem which is a result of increased democracy, perestroyka, and glasnost," Yazov said.

He also criticized the Estonians' new electoral law, which does not give immediate voting rights to newly immigrated Soviet citizens.

"That is a backward step for democracy. Do you really have to live in a republic for several years before being allowed to vote?" Yazov asked rhetorically.

"I don't suppose things are like that here in Finland."

The sensitive journalists kept quiet.

Yazov thinks it right that young men from the Baltic republics should serve their military service elsewhere in the Soviet Union. At present three-fourths of Estonians, for example, are serving outside Estonia.

"Or is it right to send Russians to northern naval bases, to the GDR or Czechoslovakia, or to strategic missile bases?"

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to scrap half of their strategic missiles (1,600 units) and their nuclear warheads (6,000 units).

However, the Americans have not included cruise missiles in the strategic nuclear arms covered by the agreement. The cruise missiles have a short range and are therefore classed more as tactical or operational nuclear arms.

"We have proposed that the number of cruise missiles should be cut to 400. The Americans could, at the same time as they visit our missile factories and depots, also inspect ships and submarines and check on the number of cruise missiles," Yazov said.

The defense minister also said that the Soviet Union has equipment on board helicopters and on certain ships which can detect whether the other side's ships have nuclear arms on board.

It was thus an open Dmitriy Yazov who answered questions at unusual length. He never made excuses, claiming that he is a soldier and not a diplomat, and he also commented on the slow progress of the Geneva negotiations on strategic arms.

Unfortunately he went wrong and instead gave an answer about the negotiations in Vienna.

However, a bigger blunder was the defense minister's failure to remember correctly how much the reorganization of and the cuts in the Soviet defense forces will save on the defense budget.

President Mauno Koivisto received Yazov at noon. After talks there followed a lunch given by the president in honor of his guest.

In the afternoon Yazov visited the armored brigade at Parola outside Hameenlinna.

The general's wife, Emma Yevgeniyevna Yazov, who is being entertained by Vivi-Ann Norrback, is accompanying him on his visit to Finland.

Latvian People's Front Leaders Visit Finland

PM0708151489 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 5 Aug 89 p 5

[Bjarne Nitovuori report: "Latvia: People's Front Offered Government Posts"]

[Text] The Latvian People's Front, Tautas Fronte, has been offered two posts in the Latvian Government. The matter will be discussed by the People's Front council today [5 August], but it is unclear what the outcome will be.

"There are two lines within the front. Some people are ready to assume government responsibility, others reject all cooperation with the occupying power," said two representatives of the Latvian People's Front, Edvins Inkens and Janis Jurkans, during a visit to Helsinki yesterday.

The two men are in charge of the front's foreign relations. Inkens is also a Latvian representative in the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow.

The People's Front is, however, prepared to participate in a government after the next parliamentary elections this year or next year. The elections are expected to lead to a landslide victory for the People's Front. In the Soviet parliamentary elections this spring the People's Front won 32 of the 40 Latvian seats.

The People's Front has around 300,000 members and over 1 million supporters, Jurkans said.

The front embraces various factions—a more moderate wing and the radical independence movement. However, today the differences are chiefly about tactics, since the People's Front adopted a resolution 31 May supporting Latvia's secession from the Soviet Union.

Inkens and Jurkans were on a private visit to Finland, but they did meet with Government Office Minister Ilkka Kanerva (National Coalition Party) as well as representatives of the Social Democratic, National Coalition, Center and Finnish communist parties and the Finnish People's Democratic League.

They discussed the possibility of new contacts with Finland, particularly in the light of the fact that from next year Latvia can start to pursue independent economic policies including an independent foreign trade policy.

According to Inkens and Jurkans, it seems to be more difficult for the Finns to establish new political contacts than economic contacts with the Latvians. In their discussions with Finnish politicians the Latvians had the impression that people in Finland are still very cautious out of consideration for Moscow. This applies to the larger parties in particular.

"Sooner or later Finnish politicians should realize that a new Baltic [Baltikum] policy is needed. This need is underlined by the problems in the Baltic Sea [Oestersjoen] which also call for political efforts," Inkens said.

He mentioned three concrete issues on which the Latvians want cooperation with the Finns. The Latvians should be brought into the efforts to protect the Baltic Sea in a way completely different from their involvement hitherto. At present the agreement on the Baltic Sea is not working so well, because Moscow is one of the parties involved.

The Latvians also want cooperation to develop Latvian agriculture. A land reform is currently being planned and will lead to the creation of around 1,000 new agricultural units. A third area is the help of Finnish consultants to work on the campaign for the parliamentary elections.

Political & Social

Current Conditions Compared to Khrushchev Ouster

PM2208145089 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Aug 89 p 2

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences N. Mikhaylov under the rubric "A Sociologist's Reflections": "Is October 1964 Possible Today?"]

[Text] Probably no subject of discussion is more popular today than political predictions about the future of our society. Not the distant future measured in historical stages, still less in phases of the formation of communism, but the most immediate future that could arrive, so to speak, today or tomorrow.

What Lies in Store for Us?

That question is being asked everywhere. Opinions are expressed more and more often, in the press as well, on the possibility of drastic swings in the political course—either "to the right" or "to the left." Either in the direction of a return to a "strong hand," an authoritarian system of power, virtually a dictatorship, or in the direction of a social democratic social system with a multiparty political superstructure and a private sector in the economy. To call things by their names, instead of hiding behind euphemisms, ultimately it is a question of a political coup [perevorot], the removal of the leadership headed by Gorbachev, or at least making that leadership change course in running the country.

How realistic are these predictions?

History teaches us that any political coup (or radical change) requires the existence of at least two factors. First, there must be social forces that have an interest in a coup and are capable of accomplishing it. Second, the objective conditions must exist that create a situation favorable to a coup. (Lenin called this situation revolutionary, but it can be counterrevolutionary too.)

I wrote—"history teaches us"... The world history of coups—both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary—is indeed rich. as for our own country's socialist history, it cannot teach us anything, because from October 1917 to the present day there have not yet been any outright coups in the "pure form," so to speak, in our society.

Some people (but by no means everyone) think that there was an invisible Stalinist coup in the late twenties and early thirties, consisting in the renunciation of Lenin's concept of socialist building.

There was the attempt at radical changes made by Khrushchev after Stalin's death.

There was the CPSU Central Committee October 1964 Plenum, which removed Khrushchev from the leadership. There were the Central Committee plenums of March and April 1985, which laid the foundations for the radical perestroyka of society...

Of all these crucial events in our country's life, perhaps the only one that can be regarded, relatively speaking, as a coup (and even then it is stretching a point) is what happened in the October days of 1964, when there was a change of political leader that was planned in advance by interested forces, as a deliberate (that is, basically, a violent) act. The other turnabouts in our politics took place "naturally," so to speak. In any event, no less naturally than the death of one leader of the party and state and his replacement by another.

It is therefore all the more worthwhile to reexamine a situation that resembled a coup, however remotely—the situation of October 1964.

What Lay Behind the 1964 Plot?

The fascinating notes and memoirs published recently supposedly describe this coup, but only "supposedly." (footnote) (Some items in journals should be mentioned first and foremost. S.N. Khrushchev, "A Pensioner of Union Status," OGONEK, 1988, Nos. 40-44; A.A. Rodionov, "How Stagnation Began," ZNAMYA, 1989, No. 8; see also the newspaper articles by F. Burlatskiy (in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA), M. Sturua (in NEDELYA), R. Medvedev (in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY), and others.) Because in actual fact the authors of the memoirs are describing not the coup, not its social and political circumstances, but a plot, a procedure to replace the leader that was carried out in secrecy from the rest of the country. As a result the reader could form the impression that it was all down to the ill will of certain not very scrupulous individuals. The Brezhnev-Suslov group wanted to remove Khrushchev—so they removed him, winning over the most influential Central Committee members beforehand and enlisting the support of the then Defense Minister Malinovskiy and KGB Chairman Semichastnyy.

I am not by any means blaming the authors of these articles for this, because the subject of their reminiscences was the mechanism of the plot, not the uncovering of its social roots. But we should realize that the reasons for Khrushchev's fall cannot, of course, be reduced solely to behind-the-scenes intrigues and secret machinations in the "Kremlin court." The October 1964 coup was based on those same decisive social factors—the existence in society of forces that were dissatisfied with Khrushchev's policy and the accumulated set of conditions stimulating that dissatisfaction.

So who did not like (let us use that word) Khrushchev as a political leader, and why?

Time amends our assessments, and the authors of today's publications speak about Khrushchev with goodwill, as a rule: They assess highly his boldness in the

struggle against the personality cult and speak approvingly of his social program—increasing pensions, building housing, alleviating the life of the countryside, and so forth.

Khrushchev was indeed an outstanding leader, and the assessments we form of him today are well deserved.

But that is today. What was it like at the time? I ask my journalist colleagues: Remember your reaction to Khrushchev's removal in October 1964. Did you, at the time, regret that the Central Committee October plenum had pensioned Khrushchev off? Tell me, with your hand on your heart, who, in the society of the time, was sorry (not to say angry or indignant) that Khrushchev suddenly (and it was sudden!) was no more? As a young contemporary of those events, I can state with conviction: Practically no one. Perhaps not everyone openly sighed with relief, but the majority—yes, that is right—were confident that "things can't get worse."

And indeed, why should public opinion in the sixties have been sorry or indignant about the change in leadership? At that time the "broad public" could not know what Brezhnev was like. But they had a very good idea of what Khrushchev was like.

Let us begin with the party and administrative apparatus. Many party and soviet workers of those years break out in a cold sweat to this day when they remember the "new style and methods" brought in by Khrushchev. Take, for instance, the division of party committees into urban and rural, which entailed a shakeup of the apparatus, the reshaping of departments, the disruption of established apparatus relations and functions! The organization of the regional economic councils [sovnarkhoz] caused just as much panic. With the total domination of the administrative edict system, in conditions where regional economic accountability was beyond anyone's wildest dreams, the regional economic council decentralization (for all its positive aspects) quickly plunged the national economy into administrative chaos and confusion. Local economic leaders were literally torn between the leadership of their sector and the power of the regional economic council, circulars from ministries and regional economic councils were lost in endless coordination processes, and planning organs were in disarray.

Khrushchev's cadre policy was also unpredictable; he often used to decide the fate and career of leaders at the highest level with a wave of his hand, deciding for himself who, as he put it, should "go to the fair, and who should not go to the fair." People were also frightened by Khrushchev's promise (which admittedly remained unfulfilled) to carry out rotation of cadres by age and to establish time limits for holding high office. The situation was no better for leaders at lower levels. Each of them—whatever his sphere of activity—could at any moment be sent out to "reinforce" a laggard collective farm [kolkhoz] or open up the virgin and long-fallow lands, giving up a decent job, a familiar place, and a degree of comfort in life. Khrushchev's trips to various regions of the country were a real disaster for the management workers (and he used to travel frequently). These trips resulted in long speeches, "reprimands" for the local apparatus, and unexpected and sometimes willful directives—how to act, what to sow, and so forth. And a good many heads "rolled."

It is important to note that dissatisfaction with Khrushchev was also building up among the command personnel of the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], and the KGB. The generals and officer corps of the army were dissatisfied that as a result of the reduction of the USSR Armed Forces many military men had to retire on pensions which were severely curtailed in monetary terms. Nor did the removal of Marshal Zhukov from the post of defense minister promote Khrushchev's popularity. In short, as they used to say in old-fashioned novels, there was "murmuring among the guards."

The dissatisfaction of MVD workers was also understandable. Since, according to Khrushchev, the country was moving toward the withering away of the state and its replacement by communist social self-management, the functions of state organs were handed over to the public wherever possible. The militia and justice became at that time proving grounds, so to speak, for an experiment in the withering away of the state: It was thought that their functions could very well be assumed by militia support brigades, volunteer people's militias, comradely courts, and so forth. But since crime naturally failed to decline as a result of these innovations, those engaged in practical work perceived these novelties as wild, naive schemes and downright stupidity.

As for the KGB, its staffers were hardly likely to be grateful to Khrushchev for the fact that by eliminating the Beriya-ist leadership and conducting a cadre purge of the KGB, at the same time, whether intentionally or unintentionally, he reduced the department's once high prestige almost to zero.

Thus the country's administrative apparatus provided a well prepared social basis for a coup. Naturally, this apparatus, educated in the spirit of Stalinist discipline (don't argue, just do it!) would never have taken a step toward a coup of its own accord, but its dissatisfaction undoubtedly inspired the organizers of the Central Committee plenum.

The attitude of the workers, and of the entire urban population of the country, to Khrushchev was becoming increasingly negative as time went on. The basis for the growing dissatisfaction was the leadership's actions that struck at material well-being. Among these actions, mention should be made first and foremost of the drastic increase in prices for meat and dairy products, the abandonment of payments under state loan obligations, and regular revisions of tariff rates for the fulfillment of production norms. It was then that the first signs of

inflation appeared, and these became particularly apparent after the 1961 monetary reform. The shortage of food products was gathering pace, meat began to disappear from the store counters in many cities, and there were interruptions in supplies of other food products. The workers' dissatisfaction was indicated by outbreaks of disturbances in a number of regions of the country, which were not reported at all in the official press. One such outbreak was the events in Novocherkassk, when weapons were used against workers and tanks were sent in.

Rural inhabitants should probably have felt more grateful toward Khrushchev than anyone else, since his agrarian policy was in sharp contrast with Stalin's exploitation of the countryside—which was merciless and basically amounted to serfdom (suffice it to recall that the peasants did not even have passports).

In the fifties and sixties major capital investments were channeled into the development of the countryside, purchase prices for agricultural produce were introduced and increased, payment in kind was abolished, and monetary compensation and other benefits were introduced for kolkhoz members. Nonetheless the mood of the countryside in the early sixties was openly anti-Khrushchev. The main reason for the rural inhabitants' dissatisfaction lay in the restriction of their personal farmstead plot farming and the prohibition on keeping "extra" livestock, which substantially undermined the material living standard of country people and destroyed the age-old tenor of peasant life. This policy of depeasantization, whose consequences can be keenly felt to this day, was based on a false idea of rapidly surmounting the substantial differences between the city and the countryside.

Khrushchev was convinced that agricultural labor should be turned as quickly as possible into a variety of industrial labor, and the peasant into an ordinary worker employed wholly in public-sector production, receiving wages, and buying food products from the store. Naturally, the personal farmstead plot, with its vegetable gardens, orchards, cows, and so forth, was simply an unnecessary burden in this hypothetical system. And even the kolkhozes themselves were seen as a kind of brake on the path to the social homogeneity of society. Their mass transformation into state farms [sovkhozes] began.

Deprived of his personal plot, the peasant did not feel he was the master in public-sector production either. The countryside was still living and working under the diktat of the party and administrative apparatus, which regulated absolutely everything—from the timing of the sowing campaign to the scale of state appropriation of the output produced. A flagrant absurdity, obvious to everyone, was the campaign started on Khrushchev's personal initiative, for cultivating corn everywhere—from Arkhangelsk to Kushka. The nickname started by the people, Nikita the Corn, fully reflected the public's attitude.

The intelligentsia, as the repository of society's critical faculty, entirely shared the people's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev. But apart from the general reasons for hostility, it had its own grievance against this man. Hungry for democratic changes and political reforms, the intelligentsia very soon became convinced that its hopes were illusory. The Khrushchev "thaw" of the second half of the fifties never did turn into spring. It was obvious that Khrushchev was not about to dismantle the Stalinist political regime, that the most he was capable of was merely to soften its repressive character. The diktat of the party and state apparatus still held sway over freedom of speech and spirit. This was demonstrated as clearly as could be by Khrushchev's meetings with the creative intelligentsia in 1963, when a number of writers and artists were subjected to a gross dressing down. The struggle against Stalinism and the process of rehabilitating the victims of Stalin's tyranny were clearly on the decline. By 1964, the subject of the camps was regarded as no longer desirable in literature, the desire of writers to tell the truth was declared to be slander, and the boldest endeavors of artists and sculptors were described as formalism and ideological subversion.

All these feelings were maturing against the background of growing distrust in the declarations and promises that Khrushchev made in the party's name. Very soon it became clear that the lines recorded in the CPSU Program—"The party solemnly proclaims: The present generation of Soviet people will live under communism!"—were an impressive piece of empty propaganda, that the promise to catch up with the United States in a matter of years was no more than a political bluff, and that the longed-for abundance was a distant dream. The country felt deceived.

Sharp hostility was aroused in society by the growing eulogization of Khrushchev, the unrestrained praise of him in official propaganda, and the shameless boot-licking and toadying.

In short, by October 1964 Khrushchev's moral authority had declined to an all-time low.

It is pointless to ask now—what would have happened, had it not been for the October plenum? Most likely, for (at least) the next few years nothing would have happened, and everything would have continued as before. Of course, a revolutionary situation did not exist in the country at that time: The "lower strata" were prepared to go on living in the old way for a long time, and the "upper echelons" to manage in the old way, as was indeed demonstrated in subsequent decades. At that time there was no mass, organized social force capable of "changing" the "course of history." The party could potentially have been such a force, but party functionaries centrally and locally had not the remotest conception of appealing to the party's grass roots. Not only for fear of drastic measures on Khrushchev's part, though the fear of his omnipotence was, of course, strong. The main point was this: Khrushchev's leadership entourage and the local party governors did not

believe to the slightest extent in the party's collective intelligence and will. The party, many millions strong, was for them a colorless mass, an obedient flock to whom you could only do a great favor by giving them a new leader. And furthermore, it was dangerous to rouse the political activeness of the mass: Then there would be a reckoning, and not only for Khrushchev. Only one option remained—to organize a "palace coup," and that is what was done.

Who Will Predict the Future?

It is well known that all comparisons founder. Especially comparisons of historical situations from different times. Nothing is more illusory than to try to trace the outline of present-day realities from the events of the past. Every period in society's life is unique, determined by the interaction, the interweaving of concrete, multifaceted factors. Nonetheless, political scientists have always drawn on the experience of situations from the historical past, applying it to the events of the present and future. The founders of Marxism-Leninism also made wide use of this kind of analysis. Lenin, for instance, analyzing the situation in Russia on the eve of October, repeatedly referred to the experience of the 1905 revolution, the Paris Commune, the European bourgeois revolutions of the mid-19th century, and so forth. There is no contradiction in this, if you bear in mind the natural laws of cause and effect: A set of similar causes can lead to similar consequences. It was precisely on this basis that Lenin formulated from the experience of the past the well-known indications of a revolutionary situation that are common in principle to different periods of history. But let us note that we are talking about the possibility of similar consequences, and no more than that. How will a revolutionary situation develop under new conditions? What consequences will it lead to? "That," Lenin wrote, "we do not know, and no one can know it. Only the **experience** of the development of the revolutionary mood can tell us..." And again: "...No specialist anywhere has ever given any guarantee that a revolution will be engendered by precisely this particular war (and not the next), or by today's (and not tomorrow's) revolutionary situation."

Are we living through a revolutionary situation today? The answer is indisputable, if only because the current perestroyka has as its objective transformations of society that are indeed revolutionary: the elimination of the administrative edict system in management, the transfer of full power to the renewed soviets, a major modernization of economic relations. But here we are talking about an explosive situation within the very process of perestroyka, the degree of criticality of this situation, which threatens the possibility of a radical turnabout in today's political course.

Let me remind you that according to Lenin a political crisis is characterized by the presence of three interconnected, objective factors: 1) heightened dissatisfaction, greater than usual, with the existing conditions of life; 2) a crisis in the "upper echelons" (those in power); 3) "a significant increase, by virtue of these factors, in the activeness of the masses, who... are drawn, both by the whole atmosphere of crisis, **and by the 'upper echelons' themselves**, into independent historical action."

Let us look at today's situation in society from the viewpoint of Lenin's classifications.

Lenin cited as one of the signs of crisis the "exacerbation, to a higher level than usual, of the needs and sufferings of the oppressed classes." This sign is naturally given a wider interpretation today—it should not only be a question of the material conditions of life, but of the whole totality of the parameters of the quality of society's life—economic, social, and spiritual parameters. Note also that Lenin does not speak of an overwhelming deterioration in conditions, but of an exacerbation of needs, to a higher level than usual. In other words, living standards that were regarded in 1964 as entirely normal (or even good) are today perceived as unsatisfactory. That is only natural: Expectations have increased, the possibility of comparison with the quality of life in other countries has arisen, the sense of personal dignity has strengthened, and so forth.

But even without these stipulations, the situation in 1989 is immeasurably more acute than it was 25 years ago. In 1964 we had no inkling of the present interethnic conflicts and ecological problems, the scale of today's inflation, the situation that exists on the food and commodity market, the burgeoning of organized crime, corruption, and so on, and so forth. Social tension, far from declining, shows a trend toward intensification, as is indicated most graphically by the processes taking place in the national republics and the strikes and formation of strike committees in many regions of the country.

It is clear, however, that no society can remain in a state of tension for long. A relaxation of tension will come, in one way or another. How and when—those are the questions that only time can answer.

The second sign of a crisis situation is crisis in the "upper echelons" (those in power). First and foremost, this is the crisis that the party is going through today, and which is manifested at three levels: 1) A substantial decline in the party's authority in the eyes of the nonparty section of the population, indicated, in particular, by the marked reduction in admissions to the party, the refusal by certain workers and employees to join the ranks of the CPSU, and the increasing instances of people leaving the party; 2) ubiquitous distrust on the part of the population, including rank-and-file Communists, in the party apparatus (the most graphic evidence of this is the defeat of party workers in many of the country's industrial centers in the elections of people's deputies); 3) the growing confrontation between the party apparatus locally and the central leadership organs of the party.

Symptoms of this confrontation appeared at the CPSU Central Committee April (1989) Plenum, where open dissatisfaction was expressed in the speeches of a number of Central Committee members and oblast party committee [obkom] secretaries with what they saw as the incorrect position of the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat in the leadership of the processes taking place in the party and country. This dissatisfaction was manifested to an even greater extent at party aktiv meetings and local party committee plenums held very recently. Examples include the speeches of party apparatus workers at a meeting of the oblast party aktiv in Zaporozhye, described by PRAVDA as nostalgia for stagnation. We read in the 5 August report by PRAVDA's correspondent:

"The platform at the oblast party aktiv meeting was never empty. Speakers followed one after another, and not in order to conduct a self-critical analysis of their own work—in order to make demands on the CPSU Central Committee. 'Defend the party apparatus, if the apparatus is necessary.' 'The general secretary calls on us not to panic. He says this is inevitable. This position is incomprehensible... No, nonspecific defamation of the party must be rejected. We will be blamed for everything.' These phrases that I have placed in quotation marks are from the speech by V. Petrenko, first secretary of Priazovskiy Rayon Party Committee [raykom].

"He was not alone. L. Anisimov, secretary of the party committee at the 'Zaporozhstal' Combine, demanded that the term 'stagnation period' be removed from our vocabulary. What is happening here, he asked, addressing the auditorium. People do not understand the leaders' statements. 'Certain decisions coming from the center have proved bankrupt. The workers are saying that they do not trust Gorbachev. How are they supposed to undersatnd, when everything that was done has been slandered and vilified.' 'A delegation of workers should be sent to Gorbachev,' he proposed in the end. 'Let them look one another in the face,'"—all that is from the same report.

Remarks that were even more frank were made at a plenum of Sverdlovsk City CPSU Committee [gorkom]. Let me cite a few lines from the speech by G. Krokhin, first secretary of Ordzhonikidzevskiy party raykom: "We are forming the impression that, despite being in the same party, having the same party card with a picture of Lenin, and being guided by the same Statutes and Program, we—I mean the raykoms and gorkoms—are not on the same side as the Central Committee."

I know the article "Behind Whom Is the Vanguard Lagging" by O. Kazarov, secretary of Ulyanovsk CPSU Obkom, published in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, was received with great enthusiasm among party apparatus workers. Although the article does not mention Gorbachev or the Central Committee, its thrust is quite obvious. I quote: "Following somebody's lead (whose?—N.M.), the guilt of individual party leaders, albeit of high rank, is presented as the guilt of the whole party. With somebody's tacit consent (whose?—N.M.), in general the entire historical activity of the party and even of V.I. Lenin is called into question..." again: "The weight of responsibility for shortages now lies on local party and soviet organs, although all the fundamental (or, to be more accurate, fundamentally wrong) decisions were made somewhere at the center (where?—N.M.), without consultation with the party and the people."

That is the mood of the party apparatus in the localities today. Having lost the confidence of the "lower strata" and failing to receive, as they see it, protection from the "upper echelons," party workers (as well as many soviet, communist youth league [Komsomol], trade union, and economic leaders) would clearly not object to a change [povorot] (let us put it like that) of political course.

Many of us are asking this question today: Will the party be able to exercise control over the situation in society? The answer depends on the capability and authority of party organs, which, in turn, demands a resolute renewal of their work and their cadres.

How will the party emerge from the forthcoming report and election campaign? How will it approach the routine (or extraordinary?) 28th congress? What position will the new party committees, including the party Central Committee, adopt? You would have to be a very confident person to give unequivocal answers to these questions today.

At the same time the fate of the soviets, which should take on the full plenitude of power under perestroyka, depends to a great extent on the answers to precisely these questions. Who will be on these organs of people's power? Will the ruling party find itself left out? Will the soviets (including the Supreme Soviet), continuing the progress toward a democratic, rule-of-law state, be able effectively to regulate the processes taking place in society? Will parallel power structures spring up in the country?

This last question is perhaps the most worrying. A duality of power can only exacerbate the chaos and bring the country to the brink of civil confrontation. And from here it is not far to the introduction of a state of emergency, the formation of an emergency Committee of National Salvation (or whatever it may be called), the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of parliament, and so on, and so forth. It is not a sociologist's job to frighten people, but elements of the duality of power already exist. Alongside the official organs of power, informal associations are being set up that are prepared to assume authoritative powers—people's fronts, united councils of labor collectives, strike committees, and so forth. Regardless of the purposes for which they are set up, today they are already playing an objectively destabilizing role (a graphic example of this is the strikes). Will legislative decisions be sufficient to bring informal movements into the legal state channel? Are we ourselves creating our own illusion, that the USSR Supreme Soviet

only has to adopt a series of wise laws, and everything will immediately "turn out fine"? After all, you have to be able to put laws into practice.

In other words, we should give serious thought to the third factor in the crisis situation, which Lenin defined by the formula "significant increase in... the activeness of the masses..."

In my view it is precisely this political activeness of the masses, aroused by perestroyka, that is today the most reliable safeguard against a coup of the kind that happened at the Central Committee plenum in October 1964. It would be far more difficult for today's "plotters" to speak and act "on behalf of and on the instructions of" the people than it was 25 years ago. The times are not the same, and the people are not the same. But even today there are forces that are prepared at any moment demagogically to adapt themselves to the mood of the masses, play on the dissatisfaction, and promise a speedy solution to all the problems. Who are they? The "right"? The "left"? I think that who they consider themselves to be today is not the point. The desire for power will make them act according to the circumstances. It is very possible that those who today wave the democratic flag will tomorrow proclaim themselves supporters of a "strong hand" and emergency measures. Such things have happened more than once in history.

The 1964 "palace coup" was possible because the people were estranged from politics. Today the country is awakening to independent historical creativity. We are only just becoming politicians. It is not easy. You need experience. You need the ability to distinguish between truth and fabrication, between a constructive program and demagoguery, between the interests of groups and the interests of the country.

Strikes Erupt in Azerbaijan Over Nagorno-Karabakh

Workers Protest 'Indifference'

NC2108103189 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0340 GMT 19 Aug 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The letter sent to the USSR people's deputies by a group of workers from Baku's (?Murdemir) Rayon was published in the front page of KOMMUNIST today. The letter expresses uneasiness about the tense situation created by the incidents in Nagrono-Karabakh and on the indifference of a number of central organs toward the problem.

The letter outlines the following: The appeal we made to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Government, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet has remain unanswered thus far. In view of this, it is believed that a very favorable situation is being created for the members of the ill-reputed Nagorno-Karabakh movement and that our republic, which has coveted no one's territory and asked for no privileges, is regarded as a side which is trying to exonerate itself. All this is creating a justified anger in the multinational people of Azerbaijan.

You can read the demands put forward in the letter in the front page of KOMMUNIST.

Industrial Plants Hit

PM2208093389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent A. Dzhalilov: "They Have Stopped Work"]

[Text] Baku—On Monday, 21 August, over 20 of Baku's industrial enterprises, including the domestic air conditioner, car repair, and Lieutenant Shmidt machine building plants, stopped operating from the morning on. The strike was called by the People's Front of Azerbaijan, which is not officially registered, which put forward a number of demands, mainly in connection with the situation surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.

NKAO 'Solution' Demanded

LD2208135889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1223 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Baku, 22 Aug (TASS)—A 2-day strike declared on 21 August by the officially unregistered People's Front of Azerbaijan is continuing in Baku, the capital of the Soviet Transcaucasian Republic of Azerbaijan. According to the city party committee 25 enterprises were not operating yesterday. This represents around 10 percent of the city's industrial potential. The strikers' main demand is a very rapid solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NKAO) problem.

An unauthorized meeting is planned for this evening in Baku's central square at which the People's Front will sum up the results of the strike.

The republic faces many problems requiring immediate solutions, including the NKAO problem, but strikes are only a way to worsen, not resolve, the already complex situation in which Azerbaijan finds itself—this is the main idea in most of the reports published today on the front pages of the republics' newspapers. The republican leadership and party activists are working to alleviate the unhealthy situation in labor collectives and to explain the party's policy at the current stage, and they are canvassing people not to give in to irresponsible appeals to strike which are being made primarily by the leaders of the so-called 'People's Front of Azerbaijan.'

The papers are reporting that the founding meeting of the Karabakh Assistance Committee has taken place. Additionally, they are printing news about the money transfers to the 'Karabakh Assistance' fund which are continuing to come in from labor collectives and about decisions to work extra Saturdays and Sundays—the

proceeds from which will go to the fund to help the inhabitants of the population centers in Nagorno-Karabakh where there is an Azerbaijani population.

Azerbaijani Spokesman on Strikes

AU2208143089 Paris AFP in English 1356 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, Aug 22 (AFP)—The strike movement unleashed Monday in Baku and Sumgait in Soviet Azerbaijan is growing, sources close to the strike organisers, the Azerbaijan Popular Front, said.

"More than 100 enterprises in Baku downed tools Monday-...Some 200,000 Armenians, Azeris, Georgians and Russians joined in the movement," said Navim Raguimov.

"The movement will be even bigger on Tuesday," he added.

Five naval shipyards and two Defence Ministry installations are among those enterprises which are most seriously affected, Mr. Raguimov said.

An Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesman contacted by AFP admitted that "some enterprises in Baku" had downed tools but said he did not know how many people were on strike Tuesday.

The Popular Front called for the strike in support of "political and economic autonomy" for Azerbaijan which they say is the only solution to the inter-ethnic crisis raging between Armenians and Azeris.

Armenians are demanding that the predominantly Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh be attached to the republic of Armenia.

Since the beginning of the year, the region has been placed under the authority of a special administration committee in Moscow.

Tension between the two communities heightened over the weekend with Azerbaijani authorities demanding that Armenia stay out of Azerbaijan's internal affairs.

The Armenian daily KOMMUNIST reacted angrily by calling on Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities to ensure the safety of Armenians and to reestablish the state of siege in areas shared by the two communities.

Meanwhile the "extremist threat" in Novy Uzen in oil-rich southwestern Kazakhstan has subsided following inter-ethnic riots between Kazakhs and immigrant workers in June which left five dead and 60 injured, PRAVDA reported Tuesday.

However, an exodus of some 5,000 Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijani immigrant workers has produced serious labour shortages and threatens to aggravate an already precarious economic situation, PRAVDA Added.

"Others want to leave too, because the extremist threat has not disappeared," said one local party official quoted by the paper.

Strikers Disregard Party

PM2308102389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Wisdom and Prudence Needed"]

[Text] Baku, 22 Aug—The temperature seems to have reached its peak in the capital of Azerbaijan, but people do not talk about the weather nowadays.

Since yesterday the striking enterprises in Baku have been the hottest spots. Despite the measures taken by party and soviet workers, it has not been possible to convince all people of the perniciousness of the path proposed by the leaders of the not officially recognized Azerbaijan People's Front—the path of putting economic pressure on the authorities to settle the problems connected with Nagorno-Karabakh.

A call for a 2-day warning strike was heard at a rally held last Saturday [19 August]. Its participants, who included several tens of thousands of Azerbaijani migrants from Armenia as well as representatives of the Azerbaijani section of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, demanded the speediest resolution of the protracted problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

TASS correspondents were informed at the city party committee that 25 enterprises were not working Monday [21 August]. And the strike is continuing today.

Broad explanatory work was carried out on the eve of it. Party and soviet workers urged people to display wisdom and prudence and to be aware that strikes merely exacerbate the already heavy burden of unresolved economic problems. However understandable the motives which prompt people to hold rallies and strikes and to take other collective protest actions, it was pointed out in conversations with the local populace, it must be recognized that strikes take away more than they give.

A thousands-strong unsanctioned rally was held in the capital's central square in the evening, and its participants demanded that the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh be resolved without delay.

Baku Enterprises Resume Work

LD2208180289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Work has been resumed today at the majority of the enterprises in Baku, which were hit by the strike. Public transport, trade and services enterprises are working without interruptions. At the same time, there is still tension in the city. There are cases of violations of law, there exist attempts by irresponsible persons to sow fear and discord among a section of the population.

Some of them have been detained by the bodies of the militia. Kirimov, chief of the internal affairs administration of the city, spoke on local television and appealed to the citizens of Baku to observe public order and prudence. A constituent session of the Karabakh Assistance Committee was held.

Further on Suspension of Strikes

LD2308102589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0940 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] Baku, 23 Aug (TASS)—TASS special correspondents Vyacheslav Zenkovich and Vladimir Fomin report:

The strike called on 21 August in the capital of Azerbaijan on an appeal from this transcaucasian republic's people's front—which is not officially registered—demanding an immediate solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh has been suspended.

At a meeting organized mainly by the leaders of the people's front and attended by 100,000 people on evening of 22 August in the central square in Baku it was decided to suspend the strikes until 2 September and to use this time to organize strike committees at enterprises. There were quite a few appeals for people to be organized and orderly.

The second day of the strike did not justify the hopes the leaders of the people's front had pinned on it. As yet there are no official figures but it is known that approximately eight or nine enterprises struck (the figure on the first day was 25). Transport was not brought to a standstill. Workers in Sumgait, a center of the chemical industry near Baku, did not support the strikers. However the situation remains worrying. If their demands have not been met by 2 September those at the meeting promise to call a general warning strike not only in the capital but throughout Azerbaijan.

Tension Continues in Azerbaijan, Armenia

PM2208120989 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 4

[Reports by special correspondents O. Shapovalov, A. Bushev, and V. Aloyan: "The Situation in Transcaucasia: Situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and population centers in Armenia and Azerbaijan Exacerbates Again"]

[Text]**Baku**

A rally organized by the Azerbaijan People's Front took place on Lenin Square, in downtown Baku, on 19 August. This was the sixth rally in the last month. It reaffirmed the demands on the republic leadership advanced previously. The rally was held in connection with the deteriorating situation in the NKAO.

Many machine building plants, some light industrial enterprises, a machine tool plant, a steel foundry, and other factories in Baku were wholly or partially idle yesterday.

The situation in the NKAO and regions of Azerbaijan bordering Armenia and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic remains extremely difficult.

Yerevan

Armen, the driver of the correspondents' center Volga, spread his hands in despair.

"We'll have to go real careful on the juice today."

The wad of gasoline coupons in his hand were mere scraps of paper. Many gas stations have long been locked up. The number of cars on the streets in the Armenian capital has markedly diminished. Not just in the capital. The republic has for some days now been experiencing an acute fuel shortage. There is, for that matter, also a shortage of other essential goods, particularly construction materials. The reason is simple—rail transport has been paralyzed. Railroad workers have refused to take out trains because of increasing attacks. Freightcars were arriving smashed and with pieces missing. Attacks by hooligans have been perpetrated on railroad lines not just in Azerbaijan but in Armenia, too. An attempt was made to dismantle the track in one rayon. Traffic was resumed after measures were taken.

A session of the Armenian Communist Party Central Bureau has been held to discuss the problems of the political situation in the republic in connection with the sharp worsening of tension. The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has appealed to the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee to take urgent measures to forestall any ill-considered behavior and actions by irresponsible people aimed at deliberately stoking up emotions and passions and exacerbating the situation in the region. It was deemed necessary to ensure constructive dialogue at all levels.

Stepanakert Strike Over NKAO Abates

NC2208162889 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] An ARMENPRES reporter writes that the commotion in the streets of Stepanakert and the appearance of the municipal bus services on Monday morning have inspired hopes that the long-running strike in the oblast's capital will slacken. However, will the rest of the city's workforce follow the example of the transportation workers? This question perturbs most of all the members of the national council set up at the congress of plenipotentiary representatives of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] population. The council had called on the people to return to work. The trade sector did not fail these expectations: On 21 August both consumer and industrial goods shops opened. Builders,

spurred with responsibility toward the fate of the oblast, have commenced work in the enterprises of the oblast's capital. Regrettably, there was no resumption of work on the first day of the week at the furniture, footwear, and knitwear factories and at the Karabakh silk combine, industrial combine, electrical-technical factory, Stepanakert combine, and in the other industrial enterprises of the oblast's capital. In these enterprises the labor collectives met and decided to return to work on Tuesday.

The vacillations about the need to resume the work rhythm under the present [word indistinct] could be explained by the fact that for almost a year and a half a political decision on NKAO has been postponed and this has resulted in low morale among the population. Apparently time is needed for people to recover. However, only a radical solution to the NKAO problem could fully restore an intense creative life.

Armenian Party Views 'Tense' Economic Situation

NC1408132289 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 12 Aug 89

[Text] During a regular session, the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau discussed the republic's economic and social development in the first half of the year and the responsibilities of the party, soviet, and economic bodies in fulfilling the 1989 plan. It was indicated that the republic's economic situation remains extremely tense. The situation in the agroindustrial and construction sectors is not improving. The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau instructed the party city and rayon committees and (?grassroots) party organizations to analyze the results of their work for the first half of the year and to take active measures to improve the situation.

The session also discussed a report by the socioeconomic department and the results of a seminar held in Yerevan on the establishment of a free enterprise zone in Armenia.

Measures to obtain disposable medical items more quickly were also discussed by the bureau, which approved a joint decision of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry and the Armenian Council of Ministers.

The bureau also decided to commemorate the 1990 centennial of Austrian writer and humanist Franz Versel, the author of "40 days of Musa Mountain" [novel based on an Armenian enclave's fight against Turkey during World War I].

The session also discussed ideological, organizational, and party work and other issues related to the republic's socioeconomic development.

Update on Abkhaziya Situation 21-22 Aug

LD2208103389 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] The Internal Affairs Ministry temporary press center in Abkhaziya reports: In the last 24 hours, enterprises, institutions, and organizations have been operating at their normal pace, traffic has been moving on the roads, while public, rail, water, and air transportation have been operating normally.

On the night of 21 August, 62 people were detained by joint units of internal troops and the militia for violating travel regulations in the conditions of the special regime governing citizens' conduct. The confiscation of arms from the population is continuing. As of 21 August, 2,127 firearms have either been confiscated from citizens or else been voluntarily surrendered by them to internal affairs bodies. This includes 378 rifles. Crime detection is being undertaken by the law enforcement bodies. Investigators from the internal affairs bodies are looking into 54 incidents, including 14 that concern the illegal possession and carrying of firearms. The situation is being kept under observation by the party, local soviet and law enforcement bodies.

Anniversary of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Noted

Pact Labeled 'Null and Void'

LD2208184889 Moscow TASS in English 1811 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Vilnius August 22 ELTA-TASS—Lithuanian newspapers today published the conclusion made by a republican Supreme Soviet commission assigned to study the 1939 German-Soviet treaties and their consequences.

The commission asserts that the German-Soviet nonaggression treaty and subsequent agreements "contradicted generally recognised basic principles of international law" and declares them "null and void from the moment of their signing."

It notes that the treaties "predetermined the loss of sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Lithuania."

In the commission's opinion, the declaration on Lithuania's entry into the USSR on July 21, 1940 and the law of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 3, 1940 on the incorporation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Soviet Union "are unlawful."

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Moscow August 22 TASS—Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, who heads the commission of the Congress of People's Deputies on the political and legal assessment of the August 23, 1939 treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union, has warned against hasty assessments of the non-aggression pact.

In an interview with PRAVDA (on August 18), he said that the study of the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty had not been completed and that the commission had not yet summed up results of its work.

On debates on the non-aggression pact, currently under way in the Baltic region, Yakovlev emphasized: "It is possible to look in different ways at the August 23 treaty, but even in this case one should admit that neither the treaty nor the protocol determined the legal and political status of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The change of their status occurred due to other circumstances.

It is even more far-fetched to look for any interrelationship between the current status of the three republics and the non- aggression treaty."

Human Chain To Be Formed

LD2308111389 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Statement by Tonis Avikson on behalf of the People's Front on 23 August; place not given—recorded]

[Summary] "Estonians have not separated themselves from other nationalities or minorities in Estonia. We invite all Russian- speakers living in Estonia who agree with the Estonian people's aspirations for sovereignty and for self-determination to be recognized—we invite them all for tonight to join the human chain of the Baltic wave. You are welcome."

There will be a People's Front press conference at 1500 today in the White Hall of Estonian Radio, with more than 50 foreign journalists, and Marju Lauristin, Indrek Toome, Edgar Savisaar, Lennart meri, and Heiki Lindpere will be on the panel. "What do we want to talk about? We want all the world media, the most important media to reflect the true picture of our Estonian issues. We will talk about the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, of the pains of today's date for Estonia, of where that date propelled us, and we will also speak of Estonia's present situation. We will talk about the attacks of Moscow against Estonia, about the attacks of journalism."

If the foreign press sounded hostile when there was an outbreak of strikes immediately after the electoral law was adopted in Estonia, then that has recently ceased to be the case. Now, along with the views of the Intermovement it is also stated that what Estonians want is self-determination and a right to live as free people in a free country.

Intermovement Holds News Conference

LD2308112789 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Excerpts] A news conference to discuss what the activists of the Intermovement think about the situation today in Estonia and how things are at the moment began at 1000 today at the Mayak club in Tallinn. Ain Saarna has just returned from it.

[Saarna] A surprising number of journalists, particulary from abroad, gathered together. I would not dare to guess how many of them understood all of this, because the inter movers forgot to organize translation.

Naturally the journalists were primarily interested in Intermovement's attitude toward today's planned Baltic chain. Are there plans to organize any kind of counteractions? Yevgeniy Kogan and Yuriy Rudyak tell me there are no actions planned for today. They say: We do not wish to exacerbate the situation. We understand to whom an exacerbation of the situation would be profitable. There will be no actions taken against the chain, even if the idea of a Baltic path separate from the other USSR peoples is deeply alien to us.

The journalists also attempted to peer into the purse of the republican strike committee, because as we know the Intermovement is closely linked with the recent strike movement. Yuriy Rudyak has the following to say:

[Rudyak, in Russian] You can imagine that Intermovement has succeeded in Moldavia, Lithuania, and Latvia, and our strike (?fund) has been supplemented by tens of thousands of rubles. The workers collected that money [words indistinct]. Apart from that, you know a group of our comrades appeared on Leningrad television and a delegation of the strike committee has been to Moscow; it also informed the public at large of the situation in our republic. Voluntary donations from the people have created this strike fund.

[Saarna] In conclusion one can say that the news conference was calm but there was little mutual understanding.

Call for 'Full Sovereignty' Issued

LD2208154989 Hamburg DPA in German 1331 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The head of the Baltic reform movement the Estonian People's Front, Rein Veidemann, is insisting that the Hitler-Stalin Pact, which was concluded 50 years ago, be annulled. "Without this step there will be no state under the rule of law here. Mistakes which were made in the past should now be rectified. The pact is a crime against all Baltic peoples", Veidemann said in an interview with the BILD newspaper.

In response to the question of what concrete changes to the Estonian economic system were proposed, the head of the Estonian People's Front said: "We want our own

currency—and within the next 5 months. Moreover, we want to open up the whole internal market of the Baltic states." The people in the Baltic states were now wanting to go "from socialism in the direction of Western capitalism", but "on no account" did they want "to repeat the mistakes that Western capitalism had once (made)". Instead, "the creation of genuine socialism" was wanted. In this respect, Sweden and Finland, for example, served as a model.

On the question of political freedom, Veidemann said that economic and political freedom were interdependent. One could not exist without the other. What was wanted was a treaty which legally established the Balts' relationship with the Soviet Union. "Until now, Moscow was the master and we were the servants. That is now to change", Veidemann, who is also the editor-in-chief of the newspaper VIKEGAARD RADUJA [as received], explained. He said it was "premature" to talk "of total independence". "We do not believe that there is immediate integration into Western Europe. But I repeat: The Baltic region can only be of use to East and West if it has full sovereignty."

(The interview, which will appear in the 23 August edition of the BILD newspaper, has been prereleased to DPA).

Sajudis Chairman on Pact

LD2108113889 Vilnius in English to North America 2200 GMT 17 Aug 89

[Excerpts] [Announcer] We must be composed, resolute, and united. This was the main message of a speech made by Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sajudis Seimas Council, last night in an address to the Lithuanian nation on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The entire Lithuanian nation unanimously condemns the pact as well as the secret protocols signed by Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany, and regards them as invalid from the very moment when they were signed. But we want this to be recognized by both the superpowers at least 50 years later, (?which) struck a deal sanctioning the dismantling of Lithuanian statehood. For this reason quite a large number of Lithuanian viewers last night might have felt somewhat disappointed hearing Vytautas Landsbergis say that we should be cautious not to overestimate the significance of 23d August. We should not view the pact as a legal document which when annulled or revoked (?will) change the legal status of Lithuania. The most important thing is to name a crime a crime. This act will produce a kind of guarantee that such crimes will never again be repeated. Vytautas Landsbergis:

[Begin Landsbergis recording in Russian fading into English translation] We shouldn't have been crestfallen and our hopes should not be blighted if the superpowers, the states which concluded the pact, do not denounce it by 23d August. They can either condemn it or not. (?First) they must hold a rigorous test which will reveal (?their) standpoint with regard to Stalinism and their attitudes to one of the greatest Stalinist crimes, which regrettably has not yet been undone. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] We should not expect the battle for restoring an independent Lithuania to be an easy one. We must be ready for the unexpected. But are we prepared for this? Are we spiritually strong and unyielding? Once again, Vytautas Landsbergis:

[Begin Landsbergis recording in Russian fading into English translation] The time may come when we will be told that our newly adopted laws are no longer valid, but our answer will be that in this country, that is in the Lithuanian Republic, only those accepted here are effective. Such a conflict undoubtedly will sooner or later erupt, which wil be followed by various attempts to intimidate us and to break down our resistance. Nevertheless, everything will depend on us, on the determination, choice and will of the Lithuanian people. But for this we must be all united. Unity and strength is what we need when economic hardships are deliberately forced onto us as soon as we start to build the economy of a sovereign Lithuania. We must be prepared for this and we should not deceive ourselves that after the new year our economic situation will suddenly improve or that it will be very simple to regain our independence. We should not deceive ourselves that certain deadlines or dates be of great significance; nor should we assume that if we don't achieve a certain goal by a fixed date that we have lost. Nothing of the kind. Maybe we'll be rewarded with instant success in achieving our ultimate goal, but it can also happen that our fight might be prolonged. This does not matter so long as we have sufficient endurance and are united. We are currently organizing the Baltic Wave action. Just imagine if people of three republics all form a human chain holding hands and singing songs. Of course on such a day our songs will be not borne of happiness and joy. There will be rituals and prayers, maybe even consecration of roadway crosses and erection of new monuments. What we must feel and show to the world on that day is that we are all as one, that we have a common goal and common will. [end recording]

[Announcer] We still have a lot to learn (?what) unity is all about, said Vytautas Landsbergis, and we must also learn to realize what we are and what we want to be. That we seek independence we have already made known to the whole world, but in order to be worthy of independence we must work for its sake.

We have just read you an abridged version of a speech made by Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Sajudis Seimas Council, in his TV speech to the Lithuanian nation.

Latvia's Vagris Notes Anniversary

LD2108173689 Riga in Latvian to Europe 2005 GMT 20 Aug 89

[From the "Amber Coast" program]

[Excerpts] Thinking at the present moment about the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which will come around in a few days on 23 August, we must recognize that the assessments about this event are being expressed here at several levels of generalization.

First, the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the division of Europe into spheres of influence, and its influence also upon the political structure of the Baltic states.

Second, in today's discussions in which the situation surrounding the pact's conclusion is the point where the diverse standpoints of historians and politicians intersect, certain facts are being discovered anew in the world.

Third, mention of the pact itself and the marking of its anniversaries has its recent history, which began 2 years ago, or perhaps a little longer.

The recordings included in today's "Amber Coast" will refer to the last two levels. It would be normal if the first level also could be influenced in such a way.

At present, significant social events cannot take place without their attitude to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 being mentioned. This also was proved by the recent plenum of the Latvian Communist Party [LCP] Central Committee. In his report at the plenum, Janis Vagris, first secretary of the CP Central Committee, expressed his opinion about the relations between the Soviet Union and Germany. We include in the "Amber Coast" an excerpt from the Janis Vagris' report at the plenum:

[Begin Vagris recording] Essentially, here is our principled approach, namely: We took a stand for insuring the freedom and independence of a realistic scientific research for social sciences specialists, so that political determinism, dogmatism, and apologetics be overcome in social sciences. This will promote realization of the truth of life which, in its turn, will be an important factor in a cardinal improvement of the party's ideological activity under the conditions of restructuring.

A few more words about history: Without depriving researchers of their work, we nevertheless are not able to bypass two anniversaries in our political calendar. First of all it is the question of (?1939)-1940. The mutual relations of the great powers, their role in causing the tragedy of World War II, and the fate of small states, also of Latvia, in these collisions. [passage omitted]

Comparatively extensive information on the course of the commission's work and its first results, about which a member of the commission, People's Deputy Comrade Kezbers, reported to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session, is already at our disposal. We also expect qualitative and significant results from the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet commission for evaluating these problems, which was set up at the July session. [end recording]

However, it must be recognized that the approach to these international historical entanglements at the highest levels in Latvia has not always been as scientifically formulated as it is today.

The beginning of a new period in the more recent history of the August events was the year 1987. Then the events at the liberty monument in Riga were given the most diverse assessments. In their context, the "Postscript to 23 August," broadcast on Latvian television, was even more balanced in its position than the condemnation campaign in several press publications. At that time, Janis Vagris, chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, also participated in the broadcast:

[Begin Vagris recording] I think that there is no need for one to be a special clairvoyant in order to predict that the centers of Western ideological subversive activity and their local assistants will not restrict themselves only to 23 August. They surely will think up other pretexts and find other dates, all the more so because the events of 14 June and 23 August showed that a piece of string only has to be jerked and agitators, although without a mark of quality, are nevertheless to be found.

Therefore our joint task, in the interest of cultivating political culture, is to explain these dirty endeavors and methods in an all-around manner so that everyone may form his own personal, conscious attitude toward them. Reasoned explanation and persuasion is the primary way of attaining this goal. [end recording] [passage omitted]

It appears from the formulations offered by Peteris Lakis that the activity of organized groups should be analyzed today. Being aware of the People's Front of Latvia's intentions to form, together with the people's movements in Estonia and Lithuania, a Bal[illegible] concept of 23 August, one can talk about purposeful activity with a symbolic meaning.

'Vremya' Explains Pact

LD2108202589

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1430 GMT on 21 August, in its "Vremya" newscast presented by V. Kondratyev, carries a 4-minute report about the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Kondratyev explains that on 23 August it will be the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact, which has gone down in history as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

Over a background video of old maps of Germany and old footage of Chamberlain and others engaged in diplomacy with Germany, Kondratyev says that in August 1939 war was about to break out, the Munich deal had not tamed, but only whetted the Nazi's appetites, and the invasion of Poland was scheduled for the end of August. He states that Germany was trying to neutralize potential enemies; the USSR, England, France. Goering was going to fly to London if contacts with the USSR failed, when the USSR suddenly agreed to the German foreign minister's voyage to Moscow.

Kondratyev says that the USSR decided to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. Such pacts were a normal thing at the time and England and France had signed them with Germany already. He continues, saying that the Third Reich offered Moscow an additional secret protocol, normal in the West but not in the USSR, which adhered to Lenin principles rejecting secret diplomacy. He says that the secret protocol was to tackle the problems of the restrainig influence of Germany on Japan, which threatened the USSR to the East, and guarantees of the security of the Baltic states. But Hitler and Ribbentrop proposed their own draft on demarcation of spheres of mutual interest. Kondratyev notes that the originals have not been preserved. The video then shows West German archives and copy of the secret protocol in German. He states that the FRG Foreign Office archives have a copy of it.

Kondratyev then states: "Today in the West and in our country there are ambiguous assessments and opinions on the pact and its protocol."

He continues: "Admitting that which we previously categorically denied, namely the fact of the secret agreement, we denounce the political and moral costs. The unprincipledness of the Soviet leadership of the time damaged the international authority of the country and party. At the same time one cannot help admitting that the Soviet Union received a respite of nearly 2 years and avoided a war on the two fronts, as the Japanese lost confidence in the Germans. A barrier was put up against the expansionist advance of German troops further to the East. If the Soviet Union had not concluded the treaty it could have been left on its own against a powerful enemy which influential forces in the West would have liked to make into a tool to crush the Bolshevism that was so hateful to them. Of course, in the FRG and in the West in general they treat the articles of the secret protocol on spheres of influence in their own way, but this was not what played the fundamental role in the postwar structure of Europe and the outcome of the war itself, paid for in millions of lives of Soviet people."

Roundtable Discussion Examines Pact

LD2208043789

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 21 August carries a roundtable discussion program titled "Lessons of the Past, Conclusions for the Future" dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. The participants in the program are: Feliks Nikolayevich Kovalev, chief of the Historical-Diplomatic Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary; Aleksandr Semenovich Orlov, senior research fellow at the Institute of War History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and candidate of sciences (history); and political observer Dmitriy Dmitriyevich Biryukov.

In a short preamble, Biryukov says that foreign historians seem to be more level-headed when approaching the issue of the causes of World War II than their Soviet colleagues, and invites the participants to give their view on whether the USSR had any alternative to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or freedom of choice at the time.

Kovalev takes up the subject by outlining Soviet efforts to curb the advance of Fascism, for example, by signing accords on mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. Regrettably. All these efforts were thwarted by the Munich treaty and various prevarications by Western countries. Biryukov suggests that Western countries were more afraid of the growing influence of left-wingers than of Fascism. Orlov contributes to the discussion by giving more examples of Western treachery.

Returning to the Soviet-German treaty of 23 August 1939, Kovalev says that at the time the USSR already had a serious conflict on its hands, with Japan at Khalkhin Gol. As Hitler was obviously going to invade Poland and continue into the Baltic states, the Soviet Union had no other option but to sign the treaty with Germany. "According to the agreements attained in August 1939 and then somewhat specified in September 1939, the so-called demarcation line was established, a line which German troops should not have trespassed in Eastern Europe after the German-Polish conflict started. It was important for us to stop the Wehrmacht's advance 200-300 km away from our strategically important national centers, such as Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, or Minsk. Anyway, not only Moscow but the West, too, was absolutely convinced that the setting up of this barrier, this line beyond which German troops should not have advanced further East, later had a serious impact upon the course of the World War and the Patriotic War. At the same time, concluding these accords with Hitler, Stalin, of course, allowed himself to indulge in great-power reasonings about a territorial and political reshaping of Eastern Europe; and however one looks at it, the formulations which were put on paper in the Soviet-German accord caused serious damage to the sovereignty of the independent states of Eastern Europe

at the time. There is no way they can fit in the framework of Lenin's foreign policy, and, what is the most important, they cannot be justified ideologically or ethically."

[Biryukov] In general, I get the impression that the Soviet side made a certain retreat between 23 August and 28 September. As is well-known, the first accord did not mention the inclusion into the Soviet Union of the states situated east of the stipulated line.

[Kovalev] Absolutely right. During the signing of the accord in August 1939, the primary goal was to establish, in my view, a definite limit for German-Fascist expansion, as I have already said. It was not implied at the time that, say, the Baltic republics would be included in the composition of the Soviet Union later. What happened in 1940 in relations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic republics and what happened within the republics themselves should be studied separately, first of all. It is very interesting, there are concrete documents.... I have here with me a manuscript of Molotov's instructions to our representatives in the Baltic republics, and there are vey many such instructions. They meant to say that the Soviet garrisons in the Baltic republics following the accords on mutual assistance concluded with them in late September-October 1939 should by no means interfere in those countries' internal affairs. The policy of the time was that any Sovietization of those republics was out of the question. If you permit me, I will read one or two of those telegrams. I will read them from my notes so as not to read from the manuscript. [video shows Kovalev with a manuscript and notes on the desk before him, then a close-up of a page from the manuscript]

[Kovalev] Here is an instruction to (Nikitin), people's commissar of foreign affairs, USSR ambassador to Estonia, from 23 October 1939. "You have not understood our policy in Estonia in connection with the Soviet-Estonian pact on mutual assistance. It follows from your latest coded messages that you have been carried by the wind along the channel of the Sovietization of Estonia, which fundamentally contradicts our policy. You must understand at last, that any encouragement of those feelings related to the Sovietization of Estonia, or even simple non-resistance to those feelings, plays into the hand of our enemies and anti-Soviet provocateurs. By such wrong behavior you are confusing the Estonians, too. You must ensure that our people, including our military in Estonia, fulfil precisely and conscientiously the pact on mutual assistance and the principle of noninterference in Estonia's internal affairs. In everything else, in particular"—this telegram was caused by the fact that the foreign minister of the then Stonia wanted to make a speech at a solemn rally devoted to 7 November. Molotov is practically forbidding the ambassador to organize such speeches. [Kovalev resumes reading from the note] "In everything else, and, specifically, on 7 November, You should not exceed the routine framework of the Embassy's work. You should remember the main thing: To ensure that there is no interference in Estonia's affairs. In connection with this, I make it incumbent upon you, first, to prevent meetings between marine crews and units of ground forces with workers and other Estonian delegations." Well. I will omit here for brevity's sake. "Fourth. I make it incumbent upon you to cut short all loose talk about the Sovietization of Estonia as, at the moment, it is only to the benefit of provocateurs and enemies of the Soviet Union."

Well, there were very many telegrams of this kind. At the time, the policy was to preserve the independence of the three Baltic republics and by no means to interfere in their internal affairs. Of course, it would be naive to assert that the Soviet garrisons stationed there had no influence on the internal political life, by the simple fact of their presence. Of course, those garrisons' presence brought about a situation in which forces of the left and the democratic circles of the three Baltic republics stepped up their efforts, which eventually resulted in the events of 1940.

But in my view, the main thing that we must keep in mind is that at the time the population of the three Baltic republics—not only the working masses but much broader strata of the poulation, too, even the government—faced a very clear choice—this word crops up very often today—and this choice was: the Soviet Union or Hitler?

Well, later in the same year, and in 1941, the population of the three Baltic republics, its fairly broad strata, became victims of Stalin's repressions as well as the whole Soviet people; but all this happened later, whereas at the time Norway, Denmark, Holland fell, Paris fell in June 1940, and the Baltic population saw that it could not keep its position of neutrality in the conflagration of the great war that was raging in Europe and it had to finally choose between Hitler and the Soviet Union.

Orlov switches the discussion to the political situation in Europe on the eve of the war, describing behind-the-scene British-German contacts. He maintains that the Soviet Union had no choice in the given situation but to sign a nonaggression pact with Germany. However, Kovalev adds that not all the opportunities were used at the time, in his view. For example, no attempts were made to reach agreement with Poland allowing Soviet troops to pass through Polish territory to attack German troops. Both the British-French and the Soviet sides failed to show sufficient flexibility in developing a joint policy towards Hitler. Orlov continues by saying that the view that the Soviet-German treaty of 1939 prompted Germany to invade Poland is untenable and gives his analysis of the situation.

Answering a question from Biryukov on the secret protocols that accompanied the 1939 treaty, Kovalev says that the maps accompanying the protocols were published in central newspapers at the time and there is no real secret about them. He shows a map marked "gez. J. Stalin" and "gez. Ribbentrop" and says that this is the same map that was recently published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA as a great sensation, whereas the map, in fact, is not secret

at all and does not prove anything, either. It was attached to the treaty on friendship and border of 28 Sepember and shows the line delimiting the state interests of the USSR and Germany that were published in Soviet newspapers of the period are much more interesting to historians. He shows some newspaper clippings with maps. One of them allegedly shows the demarcation line as of 23 August 1939, which is completely different from that on the map published on the 29 September, the latter being a copy of the large map displayed earlier. The issue of the division of Poland's touched upon briefly in connection with the maps.

The discussion concludes with the participants expressing their views on the difference between the treaties of 23 August and 28 September. Orlov says that the treaty on friendship was completely immoral, giving more detail of how the accords were prepared. Kovalev agrees that this treaty was shameful because it pledged friendship to an aggressor and turned the USSR into a partner of Fascist Germany. Biryukov concludes by saying that both treaties lost their validity on 22 June 1941.

Effect of Pact Noted

LD2208173989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] And now, a notable historical date. On 23 August—tomorrow, in other words—it will have been exactly 50 years since the day when the nonaggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union was signed. Arguments are raging and lances are being broken over that historic document now, but listen to what our correspondent, Heimar Lenk, has reported from Tallinn in this regard:

[Lenk] As is known, this treaty, especially its secret supplementary protocols, is of direct importance for the history of the Baltic republics. Therefore, the newspapers of Estonia, for example, in recent days have been full of material devoted to the events of half a century ago. The authors, most of them historians, are expressing the most varied views regarding the documents signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop. Of course, the Baltic question also is being raised in the newspapers.

Many authors express the view that if the accords of 1939 are deemed invalid from the point of view of international law, then Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are automatically released from union-republic status, but it must not be forgotten here, other authors stress, that the document on security and cooperation in Europe, which laid down the inviolability of the frontiers formed as a result of the World War II, was adopted in Helsinki in 1975. So, as you can see, there are the most varied approaches.

However, I have to say that there have been no slogans about the republic's departure form the USSR at the meetings that have been going on in Estonia in recent days which were organized by the People's Front. People's Front representatives have stated repeatedly that they see Estonia's future only within the USSR, Estonia as a sovereign union republic within the Soviet Union.

So, in my view, no extreme events are foreseen here. There will be, so to speak, a peaceful demonstration in defense of the right of peoples to determine their destiny and their future for themselves.

'Lessons' of Pact Viewed

PM2208141989 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 First Edition pp 2, 3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences O. Rzheshevskiy: "Moscow, August 1939"]

[Excerpts] Over the last few months and weeks the Soviet-German nonaggression agreement of 23 August 1939 has become the kind of epicenter of trenchant debate, which is, of course, not only connected with the 50th anniversary of its signing. People ask the following question over and over: How far was the socialist state's pact with the strike force of world imperialism justified? What did this pact represent—a measure dictated by the need to safeguard the USSR's national security or the manifestation of "imperialist leanings" in Soviet foreign policy?

The debate has been intensified by the interest in the so-called secret protocol, which was, in effect, not reported in our press until recently. Although there is nothing remarkable in its existence. Secret additional agreements or supplements to open agreements were employed in international relations both before and since. Our country was frequently the object of secret deals among Germany, Britain, France, and Poland.

The descriptions of the Soviet Government's decision to accept Germany's proposal to conclude a nonaggression agreement vary from the positive to the categorically negative. There is no need to demonstrate how hard it is for the casual reader, especially young people, to grasp this kind of "pluralism."

As is well known, a USSR Congress of USSR People's Deputies commission to provide a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonaggression agreement has been set up and is in operation. Its aim, as A.N. Yakovlev, the commission's chairman, stressed during a conversation with a PRAVDA correspondent, is to restore the unvarnished, unabridged truth and reveal the mainsprings behind the processes that occurred in 1939 It is too early to talk about any final conclusions, but I will venture to express my viewpoint on certain questions linked with the "Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact." [passage omitted]

The 23 August nonaggression agreement envisaged that the USSR and Germany would pledge to refrain from any violence and any aggressive action against one another either individually or jointly with other powers. The agreement was concluded for a period of 10 years.

As far as one can judge from diplomatic sources, the agreement had a secret supplement (protocol). The original copy has not been found. However, subsequent events provide no objective grounds for casting unqualified doubts on the content of the well-known copies of the protocol (stored in FRG Foreign Ministry archives), which enshrined the Soviet-German accords: The sides' interests were delimited and a maximum limit for German expansion eastward established. Ultimately Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Belorussia, the Western Ukraine, and Bessarabia were specifically allocated to the USSR's sphere of interes, thus preventing their occupation by fascist Germany.

The documents that we have at our disposal at this time illustrate that the German side was responsible for the idea of demarcation. If we are giving a political assessment of the content of the secret protocol, it did not conform with the principles of the sovereignty of a number of countries. Its adoption represented a departure from the Leninist norms of foreign policy. The protocol was not discussed by either the government, the Supreme Soviet, or the Politburo.

It may be noted that in concluding the nonaggression pact with Germany 23 August, the Soviet leadership considered the consequences of the inevitable defeat of a Poland deprived of British, French, and, by its own rulers, Soviet aid and deemed it necessary, if events took this turn, to prevent at any cost a move by the Wehrmacht to the Soviet borders and to restrict the limit of its eastward aggression.

One cannot fail to take into consideration that in the spring and fall of 1939 the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic had repulsed aggression by Japanese invaders in the Far East. In short, the danger of war on two fronts and, in the worst scenario, also against other imperialist states was a harsh reality. It was a question of life and death for the Soviet state.

This in effect, regardless of the remaining solutions, gave the USSR definite guarantees of national security and protection for its Western borders along with temporary neutrality in the impending war, but it contained the inevitable consequences of compromise with the piratical Hitlerite regime—negative phenomena of a political, ideological, moral, and military nature.

Calculations as to who ultimately gained more from the Soviet-German accords are hypothetical. Germany had created the most favorable conditions by June 1941 for its offensive against the USSR—the implementation of the main program target of Nazism. The USSR gave itself almost 2 years to strengthen the country's defenses, having concluded a neutrality agreement with Japan, which was of the greatest significance in the first, most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War.

I think that the events we have examined should be assessed on the basis of the real situation at the time and with full consideration for both the egocentric and in many cases unprincipled policy adopted by London and Paris, which won support in Washington, and the negative aspects of the course of the incumbent Soviet leadership led by Stalin.

The world is united and the linkage between states is indissoluble, however powerful and influential they consider themselves. The world was interdependent in 1939, and that is why attempts to found security on unilateral principles at the expense of other countries' security ended in world conflagration. That is the main lesson that should, in our opinion, be derived from the events of 1939 that are now under examination.

Reportage Continues on Strikes in Estonia

Estonian Strike Media Coverage Hit

PM2208140389 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 3

[Special correspondent M. Rostarchuk report: "Tallinn: Before and After the Strike"]

[Text] Tallinn—A detached observer who did not read the newspapers might perhaps not have noticed that the Estonian capital has been through many days of political strikes: They were staged in such a responsible fashion by the strike committees. There were worker security guards, enterprises' vital activities were ensured, and all the strikers were at their workplaces.

Feelings ran high at the republic strike committee and behind the plant gates, where every morning started with a rally. Incidentally, on the first few days the Estonian press and television hushed up these feelings, presented the strike leaders and strikers in a highly negative light, sowed rumors claiming that Moscow was supplying the strikers with instant coffee and refrigerators, and in every possible way smeared the press, which was allegedly engaged solely in whipping up conflicts.

But it would be probably be unfair to accuse local journalists writing in Estonian of prejudice: They carried out the orders of those circles who have been manipulating the press for many months now, exerting strong pressure on the republic's leadership and the native population's public opinion. How did they present the strikers to the public?

It turns out that they were people deceived by the leaders of all-union enterprises, the leaders of the International Movement, and the association of Great Patriotic War, Armed Forces, and internationalist servicemen veterans. In their own interests these "evil people" (some so as not

to lose their position, others out of nostalgia for Stalinism and the period of stagnation) on orders from the center decided to economically undermine the implementation of the economic concept of Estonian republic economic accountability. That is, to ultimately sabotage perestroyka in the republic, which has already outstripped all others in this respect.

That was the entire discussion. There was no mention of the problems of the ethnic minority, nor of the infringement of its civil and political rights as a result of the "strong-arm" vote in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet in favor of the unconstitutional law on elections to local organs of power and the enforced implementation of the state language law—a law that is unrealistic in terms of its timetable and its material and technical backup.

Nor, it turns out, did the many months of psychological pressure on the Russian-speaking minority through the press, rallies, and social movements—whose leaders made no secret of their hostility toward this minority—actually take place. Nor was there any connivance in this from the republic's leadership, which ignored the growing sense of socioeconomic and political vulnerability felt by more than 40 percent of Estonia's population.

The meeting between the leaders of the People's Front of Estonia and the Moscow deputies' group demonstrated once again that from the People's Front standpoint the strike was just a ruse concocted by Moscow and its placemen in Tallinn. The People's Front campaigners for democracy and full sovereignty, who already live to all intents and purposes in a multiparty situation whereby the Estonian Communist Party is split over the nationalities principle, believe that it is not only possible but desirable to violate the present Constitution simply because some parts of it are not as nice as they would like.

And if the Russian-speaking residents of Estonia cannot keep up with the steamrolling Estonian national-democratic process so much the worse for them those uninvited guests. The People's Front has prepared another role for the hired workers. The Front is persistently palming its Russian-speaking fellow-citizens off with the idea of "cultural autonomy." Sounds nice, but what is it? Estonian education and culture will be financed by the state, while Russian-speaking education and culture will be financed out of social funds—money collected by social movements and donations.

Now let us ask the question: What is left for the poor Russian-speaking residents of Estonia? Strikes and stoppages? They, of course, are a powerful but highly unconstructive means of defending what people now want to remove, as well as of protecting the future—their own future and that of their children. That is why other ways are being sought. For instance, the idea has been put forward of holding elections on the production principle. That is why the United Council of Labor Collectives views union enterprises' fixed capital created by "migrants" using funds drawn from the entire country as a material basis for the Russian-speaking population's existence. Together with the strike committee it is striving for legislative guarantees that republic economic accountability will not be used for purely nationalistic goals and that the transfer of union enterprises to republic jurisdiction will not be to the detriment of the interests of Russian-speaking labor collectives.

Did the strikers accomplish anything? Yes, they achieved their main aim: The news blockade was broken and the carefully suppressed problem of the Russian-speaking minority became public knowledge. Sympathies in the country and abroad were on the minority's side. One other point. Russian-speaking residents of Estonia felt that their protection was not in Moscow but here, on the spot, in the form of the working class.

Of course, the strike brought about certain losses. According to figures from the republic's State Planning Committee, they run to R4-5 million. But who will calculate the damage done to perestroyka in Estonia by this willingly or unwillingly provoked political strike? Indeed, democratic forces in Estonia did not see the Russian-speaking working class as an ally and did not realize that it too had started to become politicized—albeit not as rapidly. And that these Russian-speaking "migrants" and even "occupiers" were not temporary residents. They do not consider themselves to be guests on Estonian soil but responsible residents, albeit without such ancient roots. They want to participate equally in legislation and in building a full, beautiful, and rich life.

That is why there is one way out. Recognition of the fact that Russian-speaking residents of Estonia are allies and equal partners. A search for consensus.

As of 23 August you can still buy in Tallinn's kiosks for a Russian ruble a card depicting a hammer, a sickle, and a swastika on a red banner. The caption is: "50 Years of Soviet Occupation." Incidentally, the strikers presented one to V. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, and E.-A. Sillari, first secretary of Tallinn party city committee with a request to investigate this "extraordinary occurrence." However, the card is still on sale and this cannot fail to be seen as an attack on the memory of the millions of Soviet people—Russian and Estonian—who died in the terrible last war, and on the courage of those who defended Estonia and Russia from the fascist barbarians. Even when condemning the immoral pact between Stalin and Hitler nobody has the right to spit on sacred graves.

Strike Situation 'Returning to Normal'

LD2108213789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Aug 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by Tallinn correspondent Heymor Lenk—identified by caption]

[Text] Today it is possible to say that life in Estonia is returning to normal. The strikes have been halted and all enterprises are working at full capacity. As you can see, Tallinn city transportation also is functioning normally.

The interruptions in the movement of buses, which have lasted more than a week, had a notable effect on the life of the people of Tallinn. Drivers who arrived from other cities and rayons of Estonia and who sat at the wheels of buses, the normal drivers of which were striking, helped to stabilize the situation to some extent.

Of course, it is still early to speak of the political situation in Estonia having been completely normalized. Talks between the strike committee and the country's leadership are continuing. A crisis of confidence of the nonindigenous population toward the leaders of Estonia is perceived. The Estonian-language population, however, is perplexed about the strike committee's demands about restoring the losses incurred by the strike with funds from the republican budget. So the problems remain, for the present, but almost all the inhabitants of Estonia feel that political strikes are not the key to solving them. This key has to be sought in dialogue between the different groups of the population of Estonia.

Tallinn Rail Strike Viewed

18290262 Moscow GUDOK in Russian 18 Aug 89 p 1

[Article by GUDOK special correspondent F. Ovechkin in Tallinn: "The Sensible Way Out"]

[Text] **15 August** The strike is continuing at the Tallinn station of the Estonian Division of the Baltic Railroad. The collectives of the Nuuga and Yulemista stations recently joined the strikers. They fully support the demands of the strikers, but the railroad workers from the Tapa station are continuing to work.

As was reported by Yu. Koll, deputy chief of the Estonian Division of the Baltic Railroad, regarding the condition of sectors of the Tallinn rail junction, 20 freight routes were dropped, 10 trains were left at stations, and the division could not accept 11 trains from the October Railroad and the Riga Division of the Baltic Railroad. Fourteen hundred rail cars for Tallinn stand unloaded. This situation results in problems with the safety of freight, the traffic capacity of the junction worsens, and breakdowns begin to occur in the provision of commodities for the population and necessary freight for enterprises.

E. Sillari, first secretary of the gorkom [city party committee], in an interview with the Estonian Telegraph Agency, declared that the strike at the stations today is one of the most serious sectors for the city, because it can disrupt all railroad freightage.

The railroad workers understand clearly the seriousness of the consequences of the actions they have undertaken. However, they do not intend to withdraw their demands, which have a totally political character. As was declared by A. Maslov, a member of the strike committee at the Tallinn Station, the statement of the transport workers is an integral part of the general wave of strikes that have involved a majority of the Russian-language collectives of Estonia. A republic strike committee was also set up that works around the clock. According to information from it, there has been a partial or complete cessation of work in more than 40 industrial enterprises, transport, and construction involving tens of thousands of persons.

Their main demands can be summed up in suspending the operation of laws adopted by the Estonian Supreme Soviet on language and elections to local soviets which, in the opinion of the strikers, discriminate against the non-indigenous population of the republic. Thus, for example, if the elections to the soviets that are scheduled for the beginning of December will be held in accordance with the just adopted law, about 100,000 citizens will be deprived of the right to vote and to be elected deputies.

The present railroad strike is a continuation of the one that started on 27 July. At that time, demands that were drawn up by the republic council of the striking committees were presented to the Estonian Supreme Soviet. They were accepted for study, and, therefore, the strike was interrupted on 27 July. However, shortly after the session of the Supreme Soviet was convened, the opinion of the Russian-language minority of the republic's population was completely ignored, and the Law on Elections was adopted by the session without changes. This served as a reason for renewal of the strike on 9 August, and it is continuing to this day.

Without a doubt, fuel was added to the fire by the decree of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet—"Concerning Measures for Ensuring Legality and Law and Order in the Republic"—that was published in the republic's press on 11 August. In it, strikes are declared to be acts directed against the Estonian SSR Constitution and law and order. It was proposed that the prosecuting attorney's office institute administrative and criminal proceedings against persons participating in such actions. The illogic of such a decree was immediately spotted by the public, inasmuch as the basis for the decree was not the law, but the draft law "On the Procedure for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes." This is why the decree is viewed by the strikers as a rejection by the government of Estonia of democratic negotiations in favor of forceful pressure measures.

This not only does not promote the search for mutually acceptable resolutions, but, on the contrary, it increases tensions in the republic. As a result, after the decree the strike committees began to refuse to make contacts with the republic organs, and they agree to conduct negotiations only with representatives from Moscow.

But in the meantime the tension mounts with each day. In the words of M. Lysenko, chairman of the republic strike committee, the activity of the committee is entering a new phase. In response to the adopted Law on Elections, the committee is conducting intensive preparations for alternative elections to the local soviets, which will be held according to the industrial-territorial

principle. If the republic organs do not recognize the results of these alternative elections, the strikers intend to raise the question of autonomy.

Analysis of information in the local press and on radio and television indicates a growing political crisis in the republic. The way out of it can only be found through restraint, prudence, and thorough consideration of the interests of all peoples. That is why the workers of Estonia place such great hope on the commission of the USSR People's Deputies that has just arrived in Tallinn.

16 August Thus, a commission of the USSR People's Deputies has arrived in Tallinn at the request of the strikers. It includes G. Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission on National Policy and International Relations of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and also people's deputies V. Babich, E. Zhakselekov, A. Borodulin, and V. Vasiliyev. Consultations and negotiations have begun both with leaders of the republic and with representatives of the strike committees.

It is assumed that in the end a way will be found for a compromise resolution of many painful problems. The first symptoms confirming this have already appeared. Thus, for example, on 15 August at a meeting of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, a decree was proposed about the formation of an expert group from among the USSR People's Deputies and deputies of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet about taking into account the point of view and interests of the Russian-language minority of the population of the republic.

A clear desire to arrange a dialogue with the strikers also pervades the speech on Estonian television by E. Savisaara, deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers. Devoting his speech to Estonia's shift to cost accounting, he attempted to prove through argument that the impending structural changes in the industry of the republic will not make life difficult for the Russian-language population who are employed mainly in enterprises of union subordination, and that the reprofiling of some of the enterprises will not result in unemployment, although many people will have to change their place of employment. E. Savisaara did not give a direct evaluation of the demands of the strikers not to transfer enterprises of union subordination to the republic; however, one can clearly see the idea in his speech that absolutely all enterprises located in Estonia must switch to republic cost accounting, and that they must work first of all to satisfy the internal requirements of the republic.

Caution is evoked by that part of E. Savisaara's speech in which he literally said the following: "In the period of stagnation, only the Estonians were supposed to adapt to the process of the disappearance of nation in the republic. Estonians were not supposed to protest in this regard... A sense of constraint began to grow and take hold in the conscience of the people, and today it is difficult to restrain people's expression of the wrongs that have accumulated.."

How these "wrongs" are expressed in practice can be seen everywhere in Estonia: Russian translations of Estonian names of settlements are painted over, buses appear with labels of a sketch of the USSR state flag marked with the fascist swastika, kiosks everywhere sell covers for passports on which not the USSR but Estonian Republic appears (the words Soviet Socialist are omitted), the newspapers publish proposals on the adoption by the Estonian Communist Party of its own program, and it is proposed that the entire territory of the republic be declared a border zone, in order to close off entry to all "outsiders."

I cite these facts to emphasize again that not intensified confrontation and not the maintenance of former wrongs but only constructive dialogue and mutual understanding can lead the republic out of the complicated political situation in which it finds itself.

The strikers are waiting for the specific results of the commission's activity. It is supposed that they can be an assessment of the USSR Supreme Soviet of those laws which were adopted recently in Estonia. But in the meantime the committees are continuing their fight. According to the most recent information, the rayprofsozh [rayon committee of the trade union railroad transport workers] of the Estonian Division of the Baltic Railroad allocated about R10,000 to the striking railroad workers. Money is also coming in from other enterprises and from private persons.

17 August A rally was held at the Tallinn Station at which a resolution was adopted to continue the strike. More than 500,000 railroad workers are now taking part in it.

The losses in shipping in the junction and some stations because of the strike have exceeded 100,000 tonnes. More than 50 trains have been left standing on the Baltic and October railroads.

Strikes at Enterprises Detailed

18001536 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 26 Jul 89 p 3

[Report by F. Kaazik, V. Syrnikov, V. Tsion, A. Chaplygin, and L. Sher (ETA): "The Strike: Facts and Opinions"]

[Text] From the staff report of the republic council of strike committees: On 24 July at 1530, the Tallinn ship repair plant struck; at 1600, the RET association; on 25 July at 0830 the Baltiyskiy ship repair plant struck; at 0900, the head enterprise of the Elektrotekhnika NPO [scientific production association]; at 0930, the seventh branch of Tallinnavtotrans; at 1300, a rally began at the ship repair plant of the Estrybprom association; at 1100,

at the Kh. Pegelman Electrical Equipment Plant, including workers of the Tallinn Aeroflot service; at 1400, the Dvigatel association began a strike.

The occasion for the strike, as was already reported, was the discussion at the 24 July session of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of the draft law "On Elections to Local Soviets of the Estonian SSR," which was regarded as a rejection of the demands adopted at the rally on 21 July. The draft law and certain preceding laws and legally binding instructions were interpreted as discrimination against the Russian-speaking population, and this is the way it was brought to the attention of participants in the rally by its organizers—the coordination council of the Estonian SSR Intermovement, the Estonian SSR OSTK [United Labor Collective Council], the republic council of Armed Forces veterans and international military servicemen, and the republic council of strike committees of enterprises. There, at the rally, they called for a strike. Nonetheless, when it began it was completely unexpected by the Estonian SSR OSTK.

The general director of the Dvigatel association, chairman of the presidium of the OSTK, V. Yarovoy:

"As director, of course, I am against the strike, which, naturally, will cause economic harm. But I fully support my plant's labor collective. I think that on 14 March, when the first rally took place and the strike committee was created, we, within the framework of the OSTK, took the initiative ourselves so the people would not go out into the streets and would not begin a strike. Now that the situation has turned out in such a way that the workers themselves have decided to strike and we, one might say, have lost the initiative, since our opinion was not taken into account at the session, we must side with those enterprises who have taken this initiative."

The OSTK operations meeting began at 1000. For many of its participants the news of the wave of strikes that was gathering force in Tallinn was completely unexpected. One could sense confusion and a certain amount of passivity in the words and actions. Participants in the meeting stated that the OSTK had lost control of the events and that the Republic Council of Strike Committees had taken all of the initiative although, in the opinion of many, the strikes were premature and not well prepared for. Everyone was speaking about the fact that it was necessary to take measures to get out of the situation that had been created. But which ones? It was decided to support the strikers, at least morally and materially. And the rest was left up to the discretion of the labor collectives.

The speech at the meeting by one of the leaders of Estonian SSR Intermovement, O. Morozov, was not without interest. He said that the introduction of a residency requirement into the election law would deal a blow not so much to OSTK members as to the administrations of enterprises. At a rally on 21 July this same O. Morozov stated something else and stressed the limitation of the rights of the entire Russian-speaking population.

Curious details were also presented in a conversation with an ETA correspondent by a member of the strike committee of the Elektrotekhnika NPO [scientific production association], V. Alekhin. He reported that the main events are expected on 26 July. Thus it is as though the OSTK planned them.

As we know, on 26 July the USSR Supreme Soviet will discuss the draft law concerning economic independence of Lithuania and Estonia—republic economic accountability [khozraschet].

The Baltiyskiy Ship Repair Plant

It is 0730. Workers who have arrived at the enterprise are in no hurry to get to the shops and sections—they are going to the square in front of the plant administration building where a rally is beginning.

One after another, workers and representatives of the trade union organization and the administration go to the microphone. They are speaking about the points of the law on language that restrict the rights of the Russian-speaking population, the draft law on elections to local soviets, and the organization of higher education in Estonia for youth who speak Russian.

By an overwhelming majority of the votes—and more than 1,000 people had gathered on the square—a decision was made to begin a political strike. True, there were also those who were not afraid to express their disagreement about striking and the expediency of this extreme measure of the working class' struggle for their political and economic rights. But their ideas were not accepted by the majority.

The ship repair workers discussed in detail which parts of the plant's life support system should operate, and it was also decided to complete the repair of the BMRT Rikhard Mirring by 25 July and turn it over to the Estrybprom production association. With regard to those few who did not want to support the strikers and decided to go to work, it was announced: This is inexpedient because for the sake of a couple of workers operating machine tools it will be necessary to provide lighting for entire work bays and the electric energy that will be expended will be greater than the daily output.

On the whole the workers approved the demands set forth by the republic strike committee, but the group under the plant strike staff that was created immediately after the rally began to develop its own demands for the BSRZ [Baltiyskiy Ship Repair Plant]. Schedules were drawn up for picketing the entrance and the gates of the enterprise and groups for maintaining public order began to function. The strikers were concerned about having the dining room operate continuously.

The strike staff was quartered in the assembly hall of the administration building next to the enterprise party committee. From here they would use the radio to make various announcements and give information about events on the territory. It was possible to enter and leave through the entrance gate only with the permission of the staff.

The ETA correspondent heard the most varied predictions about the dates of the strike: The chairman of the republic strike committee, Ye. Kolesnikov (he is also the leader of the plant staff) presumes that it will continue for several days. The secretary of the association's party committee, S. Smolyakov, announced that it was a preliminary political strike and would last no more than 2 days.

The RET Production Association

On the doors to the entrance of the head enterprise of the RET association there is a fresh poster. Fresh both literally and figuratively. The inscription says: ENTRY FORBIDDEN: STRIKE IN PROGRESS. There are no analogs in the plant's history to the events that have developed recently.

It really was impossible to get into the territory. This was the decision of the labor collective and it was strictly obeyed. But it was possible to call plant representatives to the "revolving door" at the entry and speak with them about the situation in the RET. The delegation's only condition was that everything they said had to be conveyed to the press verbatim.

The first to speak was the chairman of the plant committee for fighting for the rights of the workers, Petr Volobuyev.

"On 24 July there was a meeting of the republic strike committee at which it was decided to wage a republic strike. The reason is that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Commission for Legislative Proposals did not take into account the demands of the Russian-speaking population expressed at a rally on 21 July. The idea of the demands was not to consider the draft of the Law on Elections until the proposals of the Russian-speaking population, submitted to the republic supreme soviet, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, and the Council of Ministers, were taken into account. The suggestions and additions were to have been considered and published and there was to be additional discussion of them, after which they could be sent to the Commission for Legislative Proposals and then to the Supreme Soviet. This was not done. As of today everything is proceeding not only as though there had been no meeting, but as though the Russian-speaking population did not exist. All this is alarming. Incorrect statements from "highly placed" comrades and the failure to take into account the opinions of the Russian-speaking part of the population have led to mistrust of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the government, and even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia. After the meeting of the republic strike committee there was a meeting of our plant strike committee at which it was decided to support the decision of the republic committee and to appeal to the workers for a political strike for the rights of the working class of the Russian-speaking part of the population. At the initiative of the association's general director, Comrade Plyushchayev, on 24 July there was an expanded meeting of the enterprise's STK [labor collective council] in conjunction with the party committee, the trade union committee, and the committee for fighting for the rights of workers. In his statement the general director was categorically against the strike, the reason being the association's bad financial and economic position. The conference was begun in a disorganized way and there was no vote. The director did not provide an opportunity to vote, saying that he had gathered them there and he would dismiss them. But in the statements that followed the director's speech, all but one were in favor of calling the strike. After that, at 1600, the plant strike committee requested that the workers think about everything and the next day at 1100 express their opinion at a rally. Even before the rally there was strong pressure on the committee for fighting for the rights of workers from the director and the administration. There were threats of reprisals against workers who were not working and had already started to strike. For example, the chief of the sales division, Comrade Dontsova, today came to the striking packers threatening to charge them with absenteeism and then find them and force them to work. It would have been more correct, in my opinion, for the administration to join our strike committee, to take charge of the situation, and not to allow the strikers through gates of the plant. Not allowing the strike to go beyond the gates of the plant was the main thing that bothered our strike committee. Even before the rally it was clear that the opinion of the workers is simple: to hold the strike and condemn the actions of the general director.

At the rally held at 1100 on 25 July, the workers of the leading enterprise of RET were in favor of holding a political strike. Moreover, by a decision of the plant labor collective, the plant sales manager was fired because of her actions, which were discussed by the chairman of the committee for protection the rights of workers, Volobuyev.

Branch No 7 of Tallinnavtotrans

Our discussion with the strikers began in a somewhat unusual way:

"Tell us, is it possible to speak with the director?"

"Right now we do not have a director—just the title. The chairman of the strike committee, Pankratov, has all the information."

There are 400 motor vehicles serving, in particular, the Kopli-Tovarnaya station that have not left the territory of the automotive base since the morning of 25 July.

"We are supporting the demands made by the republic strike committee and expressed at the rally on 21 July," says the chairman of the strike committee of the automotive base, P. Pankratov. "We are supporting those plants that began to strike yesterday and today—as it were, out of solidarity with the republic working class. We think that our rights and the rights of the Russian-speaking population are being encroached upon—particularly by the law on elections to local soviets and the Supreme Soviet."

"But the law on elections to local soviets had not been adopted yet and the other does not yet exist...."

"Yes, they put off the adoption of the law for a couple of days—throwing in a few crumbs to break the intensity of the movement of the working class. But it is our unanimous opinion that the law will be adopted anyway, as has happened repeatedly."

"How long does the collective intend for the strike to continue?"

"We have discussed this question. The opinion is unanimous: until they meet our requirements."

"And now, if I may, this question: All of us live on wages. Has the strike committee thought about the economic basis of the strike?"

"Both we and the republic strike committee have given consideration to this question. Of course this will hit us in the pocketbook. But we, the Russian-speaking population, have no other way of making ourselves heard. It is annoying because in our session the rally on 21 July was not mentioned once and yet Kallas in Moscow spoke about some 7,000 extremists. We are not extremists and we are supported by all the Russian-speaking population except those whom Shepelevich at the rally called "lackeys."

The "Dvigatel" Association

The work day of the first shift on 25 July in the Dvigatel association began as usual. The only thing unusual was the morning rounds of the plant shops by the chairman of the Dvigatel STK, Comrade Rudenya, and the announcement on the in-house radio system that at 0830 in the propaganda corner of one of the shops of the plant there would be a joint meeting of the STK, the chiefs of the shops and divisions, and the leaders of the plant party committee and trade union committee.

Those who met decided to suggest that the plant labor collective support the appeal of the republic strike committee to conduct a political strike and to hold a 1-day warning strike at 1400 on 25 July. It was suggested that workers wishing to participate in the strike remain in their places in work clothing, that the plant's voluntary police take measures to maintain law and order and control over discipline on the territory of the enterprise, and that the trade union committee look for money to pay the strikers the amount of their wage and to continue the work in the shops with closed working cycles and the services that keep the plant in operation.

It was further suggested that the plant strike committee consist of 11 people: representatives from STK, the party committee, the trade union committee, and the plant administration.

At 1400 at the rally held on the territory of the plant, workers and employees of Dvigatel were informed of these proposals. The proposals were accepted. The speakers called for defending to the end the demands made at the rally on 21 July, and for all workers of the republic to rally together in this struggle and to heap disgrace upon strike breakers for whom money is more important than civil freedom.

The Elektrotekhnika NPO

The leading enterprise of the Elektrotekhnika scientific production association. At its entrance are workers with signs: "Equal rights for all ethnic groups!" "Protect our rights!" In the entry way there are also workers with red streamers; the entry to the plant premises is closed, but exceptions are made for journalists who present their press cards.

The strike committee is working in the trade union office.

"Yes, we have declared a strike beginning at 0830," says V. Alekhin, a member of the strike committee. "The decision to strike was made at a general meeting of the collective of the enterprise. We shall strike until all of our demands are fully met. These demands were set forth at a recent rally in front of the city hall."

"But the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet postponed the adoption of the Law on Elections to Local Soviets."

"Yes, but when the session is continued they can still put into effect the law on strikes which prohibits political demands."

The Tallinn Ship Repair Plant

Only workers of the enterprise are allowed into the Tallinn ship repair plant, which began its strike at 1530 on 24 July. Judging from the fact that they let me through the picket line only because I was a TASS correspondent, the strikers do not have any faith in the local mass media or in representatives of law enforcement agencies either—the police captain was not allowed to pass the picket line.

Incidentally, order is being maintained on the territory: Nothing can happen without its being sanctioned by the strike committee. For example, nobody would allow me to go to the director's office, since meeting with him was prohibited by the representatives of the plant and republic strike committees. I was told that the director did not support the strike—which, obviously, was why they did not wish for anybody to have the opportunity to hear his opinion. Incidentally, at the rally yesterday morning two more workers spoke out against an indefinite strike and suggested that it be limited to 1 day. But the rest, as the chairman of the plant strike committee told me, consider it necessary to refuse to begin work until all the demands in the resolution from the 21 July meeting are satisfied. Judging from what the workers told me, most of the dissatisfaction was caused by the instructions from the republic state committee for labor and social problems, which allegedly makes it possible to fire people who have not mastered the Estonian language well enough, and also the residency requirement in the Estonian SSR law "On Elections to Local Soviets of the Estonian SSR."

The Tallinn Maritime Trade Port

INTERVIEW WITH THE PORT CHIEF, A LUKOSHKIN, AT A MEETING OF THE ESSR OSTK

"It seems that everything is calm in your port...."

"I have not been there since morning. To be honest, I cannot guarantee that nothing has happened in the port during this time. I hope that everything is calm. But, like the chairman of our labor collective council, I think that it is possible to begin any resolute actions only when we are completely certain of what is going on. And so far we are not: The session of the republic supreme soviet decided to postpone discussion of the draft of the Law on Elections to Local Soviet of Deputies of the Estonian SSR."

"I see that you have come here with the chairman of the labor collective council. Are you acting as a unified whole? I have seen that at certain enterprises it is almost as though the directors are under arrest."

"We have no disagreements with the labor collective council either concerning the question of the strike or the evaluation of the political situation in the republic. We are acting in unison."

"How did it seem to you at today's conference—do many people share your viewpoint?"

"It seems to me that the majority are inclined to think that it is necessary to make changes in the Law on Elections, but they want to wait for the final result before they take decisive action."

"Have representatives of the republic strike committee visited the port?"

"There have been telephone calls but as far as I know no representatives have come here. And we do not have our own strike committee."

"But what will happen if the strike committee posts a call for a strike on the doors of the port?"

"First of all I shall remove it. Nobody has the right to post such appeals here without the sanction of the labor collective council and the administration. We are not a bulletin board for posting declarations, and whether or not to strike will be decided only by our labor collective. Let the strike committee go to the labor collective council, the party committee, and the administration—and we shall decide all of this together."

The Tallinn Party Gorkom [city committee]

A conference of the first secretaries of the raykoms [rayon committees] and secretaries of party committees of enterprises under union jurisdiction began at 1500. It was opened and conducted by the secretary of the Tallinn party gorkom, P. Panfilov.

Leaders of party organizations of the rayons of the city familiarized those in attendance with the state of affairs in their rayons and clarified which collectives intended to support the strikers. Additional information was given by the secretaries of the party committees of the enterprises.

The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, N. Ganyushov, participated in the conference and spoke.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia

At 1600 there was a conference of leaders of enterprises and organizations under union jurisdiction. The conference was led by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, N. Ganyushov. The situation that had developed in the enterprises as a result of the strike was discussed. Participants in the conference discussed ways of normalizing the situation and exchanged opinions. It was noted that up until the present time the strike council had not yet submitted their demands to the republic management organs. There were cases of misinformation of the strikers and the dissemination of incorrect data concerning the striking collectives.

N. Ganyushov spoke at the conference.

Deputies Cite Reasons For Strikes

18001535 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 26 Jul 89 p 3

[Report by A. Podvezko: "It Was Necessary To Wait for the Continuation of the Session"]

[Text] At a 21 July mass meeting, it was proposed to the deputies of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet that the draft of the Law on Elections to

Local Soviets be stricken from the agenda of the impending session; otherwise a number of the republic's enterprises would declare a political strike.

And the strike did indeed begin. Why? Deputies to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet express their opinion on this.

A. Lukoshkin, chief of the Tallinn commercial seaport:

"The strike did not begin because of any order from above. To a certain degree, it was even unexpected by the leadership of the OSTK [United Council of Trade Unions]. The demand to put it into action immediately came from "below," from among the workers who felt that the republic's Supreme Soviet had completely ignored their opinion. Although in actuality that is not quite the way it is.

Indeed, the appeal of the 21 July mass meeting participants to the republic's Supreme Soviet was not discussed at the session. Perhaps these issues are being discussed somewhere, in offices or lobbies, but the people do not see that. And naturally it seems to the people that their opinion is not being taken into consideration. In my opinion, this is the first thing that provoked the strike.

The second thing: Having received their instructions from their electorate, the deputies attempted to turn the attention of the Supreme Soviet toward the problems troubling a significant portion of the republic's Russian-speaking population. This was quite apparent to anyone observing the course of the session. We held discussions in which we expressed our opinion to A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to secretaries of the CPE [Communist Party of Estonia] Central Committee, and to E.-A. Sillari, chairman of the Supreme Soviet. And after the session's conclusion, a group of deputies that also included members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet discussed the matter of the residency qualification for voters and candidates. As a result of all this work during the session, possible compromises were outlined. And at least the fact that the adoption of the Law on Elections, this "stumbling block," was postponed for 2 weeks is an example of this. That is, there were compromises and understanding at the session, but apparently not enough.

It is clear, of course, that not all of our critical comments will be accepted and taken into consideration in the draft's reworked variant. Thus, heated discussion will also take place at the next meeting of the session.

Yet many perceived this postponement to be a standard ruse directed toward beating back the strained passions, and then passing the same draft by majority vote.

The strike is an extreme measure. I feel that it was necessary to wait for the continuation of the session to see what its results will be.

All that has happened is a good lesson. It testifies to the fact that the issue of developing the legal mechanism for considering minority opinion has long since matured. I still do not know what this mechanism should be. But it is necessary to solve this problem in short order, if, of course, we want to build a rule-of-law state."

P. Panfilov, second secretary of the Tallinn city committee of the CPE:

"First of all, I would like to note that the results of the completed session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet are not the only cause which has impelled the working ranks of Tallinn's enterprises to begin the strike. This was only the straw that broke the camel's back." To a certain degree, the spontaneity of the strike testifies to this.

Mistrust of the actions of the republic's guiding organs, which until now have ignored the opinion of a portion of the workers—it does not matter whether this opinion is correct or not—emerged among these people long ago. While people are discussing any sort of draft law and sending in their suggestions, and then it turns out that nobody needed their opinion, that their opinion is incorrect, and no one explains why it is incorrect, the absence of response is not only offensive, is also irritating and puts one on guard.

The workers had long been inclined to strike. Recall the events of 14 March! But then the necessary lessons were not taken from the past. Nor were the resolutions of the 21 July mass meeting regarded with the necessary attention. And as a result they formed the foundation of the demands expressed by the strike committees today. They include striking from the agenda the cardinal revision of the draft law on elections, suspending the action of the Law on Language, condemning the activity of the "Committee of Citizens of Estonia," establishing such a system of adopting laws as will allow the Russian-speaking population to participate more broadly in the development of draft laws, as well as socioeconomic demands (improved labor and living conditions, etc.).

I would call the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet that began yesterday a breakthrough in the sense that the mechanism of decisionmaking by majority vote practiced until now was not set into motion this time. The minority opinion was heard out and a compromise decision was made. The substantive comments on the draft law on election to local organs of power developed by the OSTK and Intermovement impelled the deputies to postpone consideration and the final decision on this issue.

Apparently a positive role was also played here by the work experience of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet where in the voting the Baltic delegations frequently turned up in the minority. And all the same, their opinion was carefully heard and taken into

consideration. Having been through this in their own experience, in their own Supreme Soviet, they started to regard the opinion of the minority more attentively. In any event, this is to be hoped.

In addition, when the compromise decision was made on the matter of the draft law on elections at the meeting of the session which took place, a concrete step was made toward the creation of a permanent deputies' group which would more effectively express within the EsSSR Supreme Soviet the opinion of the republic's Russian-speaking population.

But apparently not everyone has understood the essence of the compromise which has come about. All the more so because it was expressed in an unclear form: During the discussion of the agenda, it was proposed that the issue of postponement of the decision on the draft law on election be considered after the discussion of the draft itself. This made many suspect that they were coming up against a standard ruse, an attempt to "drag through" the given draft law.

I have always been of the opinion that it is impossible to conduct effective policy in a republic where the population there has two large ethnic groups while primarily taking into consideration and relying upon the opinion of only one of those groups.

A concrete attempt at mutual understanding was undertaken at this session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. It was timid, pale, and apparently not open enough, but it took place all the same. And as I have already said in this regard, I consider the session a breakthrough. If, of course, this was not the usual tactical step. In that case, we will not arrive at anything positive. But all the same, I have my hopes for the common sense of both the workers' and the deputies.

Estonian Deputy Made Comments on Nationalism

PM1808080889 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Aug 89 p 2

[USSR People's Deputy Tiyt Made "Column" article: "Speaking Out"]

[Text] Even Vladimir Lenin wrote about great-Russian chauvinism and said that it clearly gives rise to nationalism. The Soviet Union is a country with many different ethnic groups. National questions are therefore of great interest. The issue is that even in times of glasnost some people have the freedom to do more than others. The small ethnic groups are constantly being reminded of their place and of what can be said. However, in the euphoria of perestroyka we can easily forget this.

I was so bold as to express a few thoughts about great-Russian chauvinism in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. Why precisely in that newspaper and not in one of the central papers in Moscow or somewhere else? Because in the last 2 years SVENSKA DAGBLADET has interpreted the Estonians' problems in a very balanced way and has sought more or less neutrally to make clear to its readers what the central issues are for us Estonians. It has been almost impossible for us Estonians to present these issues in the central Moscow press. I became aware of this through LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, for example, which interviewed me during the Congress of People's Deputies. I answered six questions. My answers were shortened—for reasons of space?—but subsequently publication did not take place. The view was taken that somebody else should write about the Baltic states and Armenia—not people from them. It is difficult to get a chance to speak in the central Soviet press when your views are different from those accepted by central power.

As a former embassy employee, I know that the best way to reach the central decisionmakers is to get publicity in the foreign press. Every morning the TASS and APN correspondents abroad translate articles and send the material to Moscow. Especially material touching on the Soviet Union in some way. This duly happened to my article on great-Russian nationalism. Unfortunately, the article reached the Russian reader through a chain of several translators. The content of the article that reached the newspapers in Estonia was very different from my version. Those who had "passed on" this content had made their interpretations. Through the efforts of someone or other an opinion totally alien to me on relations with Russian women found its way into the article. Nevertheless I would like to apologize that such an opinion was disseminated in the translation of my article.

I hope that TASS correspondents in Sweden will pass on this apology to the readers through SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. It is totally pointless to try to discover in which stage of translation—from Estonian to Swedish, then into Russian, and thereafter into Estonian—the distortion occurred and the content of my article was altered. Looking back, it is difficult to say whether this was intentional or unintentional. There are also some incomprehensible errors—for example, the assertion that Arvo Valton's article in VIKERKAAR was a novel is clearly wrong.

My intention was to put forward my own views, and no one else's. I must concede that the tone of the article proved to be difficult to accept. For this reason I understand the insults the readers felt. And it goes without saying that insults do little to solve problems. Here my critics are probably right. But the Estonians and the other Balts were deeply insulted at the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow. Rasputin, the writer, and Chervonopiskiy, the Leninist Communist Youth League official, did so in the most blatant manner. Estonians have been insulted by being called fascists in their own country, their country has been despoiled, people do not listen to their views. Estonians are deeply insulted by the degrading activities of Interdvizheniye. But who wants to understand this? We are a small people, and therefore we have to take

other criteria into account. We cannot meet insults with insults. Politics is a complicated business. Experience comes with time. Unfortunately stumblings and falls do sometimes happen.

Some thoughts on Harry Schein's articles on nationalism in DAGENS NYHETER which were prompted by my column. Presumably Estonia has become better known to the writer. Harry Schein: It must be the case that Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Armenians, and other peoples (Basques, Kurds, Palestinians) have a right to self-determination and independence. Olof Palme stressed this in his day, and Swedish politicians continue to affirm this today. The Estonians have a desire for independence in their bones. I really believe that the Swedes understand this and give us at least moral support.

We find ourselves at a crossroads. The Estonian people are becoming a minority in their own country, where they have lived for over 5,000 years. We are worried that our culture is withering away and our language disappearing. We are unable to offer our children a reasonable future. We are actually fighting for our existence. This is due to the immigrants and the present bureaucracy. Recent immigrants feel themselves to be the masters. They demand the idealization of their own culture and their own language. Yes, Harry Schein, it is true that the Russian people also suffered because of Stalinism. But the Estonians have felt the effects of their Eastern neighbor for centuries.

Schein informs DAGENS NYHETER's readers that today's immigrants in Estonia immigrated 50 years ago. Perhaps I might be allowed to pass on the information that in 1939 more than 90 percent of Estonia's population were Estonians. Between 1976 and 1988 alone around 200,000 new inhabitants immigrated from the Soviet Union and now over 40 percent of the population is non-Estonian. It is voices from this group which are ever louder in demanding their rights and are fighting against glasnost and perestroyka in Estonia. Estonian is heard less and less in Tallinn. Perhaps we do have good reason to be worried? It is perhaps easier to understand the problem if I make a comparison with Sweden. Imagine that there are 550,000 foreign troops stationed in Sweden and that the Swedes only number 5 million of the country's total population of 8.4 million. Communication between population groups would largely take place in a language other than Swedish. Such is the situation in Estonia today.

The Estonians have had many masters in their house: Teutonic Knights, Danes, Swedes, and Russians. Things have been like that for centuries. Nevertheless the Estonians have a moral and legal right to live independently. For that matter, people still talk positively about the "Swedish era." The Swedes founded our university, built up the school system out in the villages, encouraged cultural development. Between the wars independent Estonia also had very good contacts with Sweden. That is why we now want to reestablish contacts with Sweden and come to Sweden to learn how a well organized society works. Swedish businessmen are ready for cooperation when that day dawns. Sweden is appreciated in Estonia because of its generosity in giving somewhere to live to the tens of thousands of Estonians who left home fearing the terror of the Stalin era.

The Estonians are not aggressive by nature, but they have nevertheless an ability to stand up for themselves. We are daily confronted with contradictions. We are tired of asking Moscow how we should live, interrelate, what we can build, what we should produce, what we should think, or what we can say. Sometimes you just want to draw yourself up to your full height and speak out.

Estonian Deputy Made's Actions Criticized

PM2208103589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Aug 89 Second Edition p 4

[Special correspondent V. Pyankova report: "Who Is This Professor Made?"]

[Text] Tallinn-Moscow—This question was asked in many letters received by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA following the publication on 5 August of an article by USSR People's Deputy Tiyt Made from Estonia's Rakvereskiy Yuzhnyy Okrug No 475 entitled "All... Russians Are Under Suspicion," which had been published on 24 July in Sweden's SVENSKA DAGBLADET, and commentaries on this article by Siberian scientist A. Yanenko and Swedish journalist H. Schein.

Judging by the comments—and there have been hundreds of them—the article hit many Soviet people as a stunning revelation.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA has already printed a statement by the USSR people's deputies from Estonia in which they condemn what T. Made said about the Russian people and in effect distance themselves from Made himself. A little later our newspaper's editorial office received another statement. We quote:

"The representatives of Estonia's public movements and organizations at the consultative council sitting condemned Tiyt Made's article published in Sweden's SVENSKA DAGBLADET on 24 July and also in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on 5 August.

"The consultative council states that none of its members has convictions that coincide with many of the views expressed in the article. In the opinion of the consultative council, Tiyt Made's article is misanthropic, incites hostility between peoples of different nationalities, and is an insult to the Russian, Estonian, and other nations.

"The consultative council confirms its members' desire to develop joint work with all democratic forces both within and outside Estonia irrespective of national affiliation."

This statement was signed by representatives of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Central Council of Trade Unions, the Estonian Union of Labor Collectives, the Estonian People's Front, the "Green" movement, the academic society of lawyers, the "Tkhemis" democratic association, the Estonian "Memento" union of the illegally repressed, an independent information center, the IME (economically accountable [khozraschetnyy] Estonia) problem-solving council, the Orthodox Church, the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, the Medical Workers Union, the Artists Union, the Jurists Union, the Vironmaa Foundation, and the Estonian Creative Union's Culture Council.

So, who is this man, one of the country's people's deputies, who advocates national hostility and has been categorically condemned for his views by representatives of the Estonian people? Let us turn to the testimony of those people who are well aware of Tiyt Made's personality.

At the 12th Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet session in Tallinn on 8 August, Deputy T. Kork described him in the following fashion:

Tiyt Made is "a man who has done this kind of thing before and has ventured to do it in print. He was expelled from the leadership of the 'Greens' and excluded from the group of people who elaborated IME, and he succeeded in isolating himself from our group of deputies in Moscow. His philosophy is that of a crook..."

These words are not those uttered in the heat of emotion. We have materials at our disposal that enable us to affirm that the charges leveled against Tiyt Made from the rostrum of the Estonian Supreme Soviet session are well-founded.

The republic party newspaper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA reprinted on 4 May a translation into Russian of an article by the same author from Finland's 21 April edition of HELSINGIN SANOMAT entitled "Homo Sovieticus Has Been Created in the Soviet Union." Here are a few samples of this—if it may be so called—political journalism:

"...The new man already exists. He roams our streets and avoids normal work, he is evil and disillusioned, prone to vile deeds and envy... Homo Sovieticus may be compared to a drug addict who is no longer capable of answering for his actions and even less of deciding what to do next... Homo Sovieticus' way of thinking is not molded naturally by history or culture but by the state on the basis of monopolized ideology. Such people are the property of the state. I do not believe that the creation of the new man will be abandoned under perestroyka..."

Then T. Made intimidated Finnish readers with the following statement:

"The Soviet man or citizen wants to feel at home throughout the Soviet Union and throughout Europe. Remember this and draw the appropriate conclusions!"

A peculiar view, to put it mildly, of a now-generalized image of Soviet man, a peculiar stance for someone who had already been elected a USSR people's deputy by the time the article appeared in HELSINGIN SANOMAT. However, there was a discrepancy with the article about "Homo Sovieticus." Following the publication of the translation in SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA Estonia's independent news center told this newspaper's editorial office that the author had arranged M. Nutta's article from Estonia's LOOMING journal No 2 for 1989 "to suit his own voice." However, T. Made was not at all sorry and gave an interview on this subject. But not to SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, as would have been logical, since it had carried the revelatory commentary, but once again to a foreign newspaper—Finland's KANSAN UUTISET. With enviable persistence he championed the right to plagiarism:

"In Estonia... it is hard for us to distinguish who says what. In 1985 I spoke at a lecture on the subject of Homo Sovieticus and no one wrote anything about that then. Yaan Kaplinskiy and Arvo Valton also spoke on this question. My mistake was that I did not cite them in my article, but no one in our country does that..."

Here T. Made voiced the suspicion that reports of plagiarism were leaked with the help of Edgar Savisaar, one of the chiefs of APN in Estonia and a USSR people's deputy, and surmised that Savisaar is a member of Interdvizheniye—"although I did not see his membership card..." Moreover, he announced that his ideas of Gorbachev changed during the Congress and that he was no longer convinced that Gorbachev was the best man from the Estonian viewpoint.

However, T. Made took his mistakes into account and, writing in the Swedish newspaper on 24 July, referred to the fact that he had borrowed many of his ideas from an article by the writer Arvo Valton in the fifth edition of VIKERKAAR magazine for this year.

But even before then T. Made was well known in the republic as a specialist in plagiarism. Let us turn, for instance, to the article "When the Author Is a 'Fake'" by Toomas Alatalu (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 29 June 1989). This article reports that the Estonian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade told the USSR People's Control Committee the following on 20 April 1989: "Having studied the question, the interdepartmental commission of experts set up by the Estonian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade has concluded that... this is not the work of the author." The item referred to here is the reference work entitled "International Organizations" [Mezhdunarodnyye organizatsii], which was published in 1985 and whose cover bears T. Made's name. However, the undeserved fee of

R3,000 was not reclaimed from Made. Moreover, T. Alatalu cites data to the effect that T. Made was severely punished according to party procedure for failing to pay membership subscriptions totaling R12,000.

"...His actions can even be said to have been covered up by the press—it has just been revealed that he was given even greater television coverage and given an opportunity to speak on the radio from dawn to dusk. He is an able speaker, so the audience was not aware that T. Made was not a member of the working group of specialists elaborating the IME program and that, although a social scientist, he works as **associate professor at the Teacher Training Institute Labor Instruction Department....**

"...Of course, I am horrified to think that this kind of man has become a USSR people's deputy.... In my opinion, he is not a man who can—in terms of his moral qualities—express and champion the interests of **the people**," is the conclusion drawn by T. Alatalu.

In the same edition, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA asked T. Made for explanations. However, this man, who has spent a considerable part of his time abroad, preferred to make statements over there. First the interview with the Finnish newspaper and then the article entitled "Great Russian Nationalism" in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. When the scandal began to break, notably in the Swedish press, the resourceful author put his latest opus in the same SVENSKA DAGBLADET on 16 August under the headline "Being Frank." The topic was the same:

"...I took the liberty of voicing certain ideas about Great Russian chauvinism... Why precisely in this newspaper rather than in one of Moscow's central publications or somewhere else? ...As a former embassy staffer I know that the best way to put forward one's viewpoint to those people who make the decisions at the center is to get published in the foreign press... That also applied to the article about Great Russian nationalism. Unfortunately, en route to the Soviet reader the article went through a whole series of translators... Someone else took pains to ensure that an attitude to relations with Russian women which is alien to me crept into my article. Nevertheless I want to apologize for the fact that this view became widespread via the interpretation of my article... I aimed to expound my own views rather than those of anyone else. I must admit that it is hard to reconcile oneself to the tone of the article. That is why I understand readers' feelings of resentment. But... Estonians were offended because they were described as fascists in their own country, because their country has been despoiled, because their opinion is not heeded. Estonians are profoundly insulted by the humiliating activity of Interdvizheniye. But who wants to understand that?..."

Explaining his racist—as Swedish journalist Harry Schein accurately defined it—article in SVENSKA DAGBLADET in the same vein, T. Made then bowed and scraped to H. Schein himself in an attempt to win approval with a set of his customary maxims about the grievous fate of the Estonian people struggling against the "enslavers" in the shape of the immigrants and the incumbent bureaucracy.

"The new immigrants consider themselves the masters. They demand the idealization of their culture and their language and want to make all the decisions... It is voices from this group that are demanding their rights increasingly loudly and combating glasnost and perestroyka in Estonia..."

This can mislead only people who are unfamiliar with the real situation in Estonia, where the wave of strikes arose because the Russian-speaking population has recently lost virtually any right to a voice in resolving questions of the most essential significance for the republic's life. But what does the truth matter to T. Made! We can see that the condemnation of his journalistic activity both in Estonia and Sweden made no impression on him. Tiyt Made insists on his views and is seeking to circulate them.

Well, everyone today is free to say whatever comes into his head wherever he likes. But, first, why did T. Made need to present himself as an associate professor in world economics at a fictitious Tallinn university, as he did in Finland, and as a professor of some unknown science, as he did in Sweden? His status as a USSR people's deputy gave his statements enough sensationalism and zest, to say the least. Or was he at the mercy of the "crook's philosophy" here too? Second, it would be interesting to know how the independent "professor" intends to explain himself to his own people, whose opinion Deputy T. Kork voiced at the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet session: "I cannot imagine that anyone could shower the Estonian people with more filth than this man who describes himself as a professor..."

Russian Writers Appeal Against Estonian 'Discord'
LD2308084289 Moscow TASS in English 0735 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 23 TASS—"We call upon all citizens of Estonia, irrespective of their nationality, to show political vigilance and rebuff those forces that are seeking to drive a wedge between peoples, stir up ethnic discord and use it for their own purposes," says an appeal published in today's LITERATURNAYA GAZETA by the secretariat of the board of the Russian Federation Writers' Union.

"We call on all working people of the Soviet Union at this complex moment of our history to rebuff attempts to destabilise the situation in the country and to break up our great multiethnic state, our common motherland".

The appeal points out that a critical situation has developed in Estonia. "The Estonian people's righteous striving for the growth of national awareness, and for the defence of their distinctive cultural values and language

has been exploited by nationalistic forces for attempts to place one nationality above another and infringe the political and social rights of the Russian-speaking population of the republic where hundreds of thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, Tatars, Poles, and members of other nationalities have lived and worked for ages."

"The adoption by the Estonian Supreme Soviet of a discriminatory electoral law, which runs counter to the constitution of the USSR and to major international covenants on human rights, was the extreme manifestation of such attempts.

"The establishment of residence requirements is the most flagrant violation of political rights and freedoms. It gives rise to legitimate indignation among Russian-language citizens of Estonia. Such a development of events should not be allowed and one should not trail behind them, for equal fraternal peoples and equal rights are our achievement," the authors of the appeal emphasise.

"It is necessary to prevent critical situations now threatening in the Baltic region, Moldavia and other regions of the country.

"It was precisely a long wait, non-intervention by central authorities, quiet behaviour of other republics, and connivance at the nationalistic forces that prompted the offended Russian-language population of Estonia, primarily the working class and factory intellectuals, to resort to strike action—an extreme protest measure.

"We urge the Estonian Government and lawmakers to act to regain the trust of the republic's Russian-speaking population and abrogate the discriminatory law which contradicts the interests of the Estonian people themselves. The inciting of ethnic discord has always brought only misfortune and suffering to ordinary people," the appeal says.

Estonian Monument to Fascist Accomplices Unveiled
LD2208081489 Moscow TASS in English 0646 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Tallinn, Estonia, August 22 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Karchenko:

A monument to an Estonia-based Nazi fifth column group, which operated during World War II, was unveiled in the Estonian town of Kautla a few days ago.

It was built at the site of a former monument to the group, built in 1942 when Estonia was occupied by Fascist troops.

The group, ERNA [Fascist Estonians], was set up in April 1941, two months before Fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union, near Helsinki, and commanded by Colonel Hans-Enn Kurg, commander of a regiment of the 20th Estonian SS (Blackshirts) Division. In July 1941, the group infiltrated Estonia where the agents committed atrocities against local authority representatives and Soviet soldiers.

The group left a grizzly trademark on their unfortunate victims: They cut the letter "E" on the bodies and left a blood-stained Finnish knife nearby. The group was later broken up.

The recent unveiling ceremony was attended by some 500 people, including former ERNA members. One of them, Arvola, urged Estonians to follow ERNA's example to "free Estonia from the Reds": and spoke highly of the interaction with German fascists in "combating Stalinism".

The local authorities have so far remained silent on the ceremony.

Lithuanian Sajudis Accused of 'Hypocrisy'
LD2308084589 Moscow TASS in English 0820 GMT 23 Aug 89

["PRAVDA Accuses Lithuanian Group Leaders of Hypocrisy"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 23 TASS—When the Sajudis movement for restructuring was forming in Soviet Lithuania, its leaders declared support for perestroika started by the Communist Party. They stressed the inadmissibility of a split in Soviet society and emphasised the urgent need to consolidate all its creative and healthy forces to overcome stagnation.

An article published by PRAVDA's ideological section today points out that these declarations often ran counter to several extremely tendentious comments in the Sajudis "independent" press. The movement's ideologists often used insulting words, such as occupiers and migrants, with regard for the non-Lithuanian population and described the Soviet Union as an empire.

The facts and quotations taken by PRAVDA from Lithuanian publications indicate that articles distorting history and the speeches of some of the Sajudis leaders became much more tendentious during the spring and summer of 1989.

There is also an obvious contradiction between Sajudis' real political activity and the official statements of its leaders elected as USSR people's deputies, The Lithuanian deputies, who spoke at the congress watched by millions of TV viewers, made different statements and launched different calls, outside the union parliament.

USSR people's deputies Bronislavas Genzialis and Romas Gudajtis spoke insultingly of the Soviet Communist Party, its founder Vladimir Lenin and the current party leaders at the June plenum of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

The Sajudis leaders have got in touch with foreign Lithuanian organisations—the Supreme Committee for Lithuania's Liberation, the League for Lithuania's Liberation and the Lithuanian Activists' Front, which collaborated with Nazi occupiers during World War II. Some of the Sajudis leaders now openly call for secession from the Soviet Union.

It's time to think over these questions. It's time to begin telling the truth to each other. This double stance only leads to mistrust, deadlock and crisis, PRAVDA concludes.

Lithuanian Deputy Premier Prunskene Interviewed
PM1108113989 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 28 Jul 89 p 1

[Interview with K. Prunskene, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, by ELTA correspondent B. Buchyalis on 27 July: "Hard Path to Autonomy"; place of interview not given; first three paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA LITVA introduction]

[Text] For 1 and ½ days the USSR Supreme Soviet examined the draft law on economic autonomy for Estonia and Lithuania submitted by the supreme soviets of those republics. The day before they had been joined by Latvia, which intends to adopt a similar decision at the Supreme Soviet session which began 27 July. You can learn how the discussion proceeded from the report published in today's newspapers. Incidentally, this is perhaps the first time that TASS has prepared a report making it possible to have an idea of what is taking place in the auditorium.

Kazimera Prunskene, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers, was one of the most committed among our deputies' group and was among those present at the sittings of the republic's leaders. She was the first of our deputies to come out in defense of the draft.

The talk with K. Prunskene took place on Thursday [24 July]—before and after the voting. The results of the vote are known. A majority of votes (35 deputies voted against) accepted the resolutions confirming the principles of republican economic accountability [khozraschet] and economic independence and committing the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, the government of the country, and the republics' governments to submit, together with the deputies of the sides involved and with a consideration for the comments made, a draft law for examination by the next session. Normative acts should be prepared at the same time. But what was taking place in the corridors? How should the debates be assessed as a whole?

[Buchyalis] The arguments of those who voted for our draft are convincing while those of its opponents are by no means so. Where do its opponents see the greatest danger?

[Prunskene] Some are frightened by the interpretation of the principle of ownership, others by the possibility of the introduction of our own money. For instance, V. Vorotnikov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, complained that we are demanding reliable centralized supplies of raw material and equipment but are not guaranteeing a return product. But he has simply not read the text. There were more such cases. But the main thing is that you can sense a blatant reluctance to recognize the republic's autonomy: Things may be worse but they should be worse for everyone—that is the opponents' main argument.

[Buchyalis] Does it not seem to you that their arguments were perhaps most aptly described by S. Fedorov: It comes from slavery. After all, a slave cannot tolerate someone else being free, he wants him to remain a slave.

[Prunskene] I fully agree. It seems to me that at the start of the sitting attempts were even made to organize an onslaught by the slaves: They were not very eager to allow our supporters onto the rostrum and many proposals met with a hostile reception. Characteristic in that respect were the rejoinders of a deputy from Estonia, Ye. Kogan, one of the leaders of the local International Front.

[Buchyalis] To wit?

[Prunskene] The Lithuanians and Estonians, he said, are seeking what are by no means economic goals. They are cunningly concealed political intrigues.

[Buchyalis] M. Gorbachev did not take part in the discussion and what not at the evening sitting at all, he was meeting with E. Batmonh. Knowing that Gorbachev is directing the auditorium you could conclude that his absence was also a position.

[Prunskene] We very much wanted him to be there all the time. Alas, business got in the way. I can say one thing: During the time he was in the chair the situation began to turn in our favor. A little later we had a talk with him lasting nearly 30 minutes. It seems to me that if there had been just us and Gorbachev the problem would have been resolved far more simply. In brief, his attitude toward us is good....

[Buchyalis] But Yu. Maslyukov and L. Abalkin.... Does it not seem to you that their position is also the position of N. Ryzhkov and N. Slyunkov? That it is the position of the Central Committee and the majority of the Politburo?

[Prunskene] I think it is the position not of Ryzhkov but rather of the Politburo. Incidentally, about Yu. Maslyukov. At the committee and commission sittings he agreed with most of our arguments but at the session started to say something completely different. Surely this

ill becomes a member of the government who, moreover, holds such an eminent post? It seems to me that pressure is being brought to bear on him and on several members of the government.

[Buchyalis] The deputies were issued with an alternative version of the draft law. It later emerged that many people did not even have time to read it. What document is this? Those same old "general principles," only with a few cosmetic changes?

[Prunskene] Basically yes. They are a little similar to our draft. The document was prepared on the eve of our session. I am sure that this document was intended in a certain sense to block ours. Here we are, they would say, wasting time on individual republics when we have a document suitable for the whole country.

[Buchyalis] But after all everything is not determined by their wish, it is decided by the deputies and their opposition is quite powerful. And, moreover, it is not homogenous....

[Prunskene] I would conditionally divide this opposition into three groups. The first consists of those who are struggling for power and have good ties with the central leaders. Letting go of the reins of rule is for them tantamount to losing everything. The people from movements who oppose the national fronts in the republic are as it were satellites of this group. Even when they are not members of the Supreme Soviet they come to the sittings of commissions or committees with a view to "exposing" us. That is the second group. The third group consists of those who have not yet realized the need for perestroyka, who are satisfied by traditions which have accumulated over decades, who are still in the power of the center. But the process of differentiation is also proceeding among them. I think that the documents adopted today will make many of them think differently.

[Buchyalis] Are you pleased with the session's decisions?

[Prunskene] We have achieved two-thirds of what we were seeking. My colleague from Estonia, Academician M. Bronshteyn, asserts that three-fourths of their intentions were defended. And that gives a real opportunity for persistently seeking the ultimate goal. At the session which will begin in October there will be so-called second readings. By then we will have polished our formulations and prepared the necessary documents. I believe that we will succeed in defending much more. After all, the law comes into force in the new year. There is only just enough time, but there nonetheless is time. Some deputies are even now wavering between the Balts and their opponents. But if you bear in mind that nearly all republics are also preparing seriously for this economic step, in the course of joint work with their representatives we can acquire an increasing number of supporters.

Lithuanian Social Democrats Declared Legal

LD2208131189 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0000 GMT 19 Aug 89

[Summary] A declaration on the legalization of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party was announced by 172 delegates who gathered at the Hall of the Academy of Sciences in Vilnius. The statute of the party was adopted and the draft program was also discussed.

The Lithuanian Social Democratic Party was founded in 1896 in Vilnius. Today the main objectives of Lithuanian Social Democrats are: the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, the implementation of principles of freedom and justice, and the creation of a democratic and socially prosperous society.

At present, the party will be active within the framework of Sajudis because the most pressing tasks of Sajudis and the Social Democrats coincide.

A representative of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in exile in the United States was also present at the conference.

It has been decided to hold a congress of Lithuanian Social Democrats on 28 October of the current year.

Lithuanian Party Official Criticizes Media

LD0308105689 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0000 GMT 20 Jul 89

[Report by Pranas Karlowas]

[Excerpts] PRAVDA, the central daily in Moscow, has not had a correspondent in Lithuania for 6 months now. The former correspondent, D. Sniukas, is currently chairman of the Lithuanian State Committee for Radio and Television. Several candidates for the post of PRAVDA correspondent have been nominated. However, the CPSU organ found that none of these people could be trusted to serve the readers of PRAVDA in the USSR.

And yet PRAVDA writes about Lithuania, although these occasions are very rare. And almost every time this is followed by expressions of discontent by the population of Lithuania. Lecturing on what should and should not be done and how to do things have become customary both to PRAVDA and other Moscow media. People all over the country are misled by the biased reports, and this causes mistrust.

The Baltic countries have become the source of new ideas and new initiatives and this is not to everybody's liking. Recently I talked to Gesdiminas Kirkila, an official at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, in our program and he said then that the administration of some republics regard the ideas of restructuring coming from Lithuania and the Baltic republic in general as a political infection. Today I invited him to the microphone again. At the Central

Committee Gediminas Kirkila deals with problems concerning nationality relations. What is being done to prevent the truth about the republic being distorted so that people from other areas of the USSR will also know the truth?

[Begin Kirkila recording] Yet again our declarations and aspirations for independence are rejected. On many occasions and at various levels suggestions have been expressed that the work of the mass media should be radically corrected. So far, there has been no more or less serious reaction to this.

Unfortunately, the all-union mass media presents our problems in a rather subjective way, despite the fact that we supply them with all the information there is. I personally had a chance to talk to them, to give an interview, and Comrade A. Brazauskas has also been interviewed. However, when this material reached the reader or the viewer, then it was truncated and the main ideas and thoughts were distorted.

What have we proposed? We offered very concrete suggestions. For example, that certain pages in the all-union press should contain materials prepared by our journalists or other from the Baltic republics and it should be neither abridged, twisted, nor cut. It seems that this is the only way to present objective information. This is not intended to provide us with the opportunity to advertize ourselves in the USSR—it is necessary to provide the all-union reader with objective information. Folklore, anecdotes, and so on are already current in the various republics and in Moscow and other cities as well concerning the Baltic Republics. [passage omitted] [end recording]

According to G. Kirkila, the information about our republic is not exhaustive, of low standards, and is often taken from the Yedinstvo pubications. And this is done with the aim of discouraging the things which are taking place in Lithuania or in other Baltic republics from occurring in other places. All of this is regarded, G. Kirkila said, as national egoism. For example, the weekly magazine OGONIOK, published in Moscow, and the information bulletin ARGUMENTY I FAKTY which had published interviews with Algirdas Brazauskas, have been sharply criticzed by the Ukraine, because a considerable number of ideas expressed by A. Brazauskas have been adopted by the Ukrainian People's Front as their slogan. [passage omitted]

G. Kirkila said that one of the channels of central television should be given to the union republics and the programs should be prepared by local journalists. [passage omitted]

Latvian Party Central Committee Plenum Outlined
LD2108123489

[Editorial report] Riga in Latvian to Europe at 2005 GMT on 13 August carries an 8-minute feature from the "Amber Coast" program presented by program editor Janis Udris, who discusses the latest Latvian Communist party [LaCP] Central Committee plenum. Udris begins by saying that to deny the existence of two opposite trends in the LaCP would be to shut one's eyes to present-day realities. However, he says, it must be concluded that there is no split along ethnic lines but "according to the attitudes toward restructuring and the revolutionary processes in our country". Udris notes that this is also the description given by LaCP Central Committee member Janis Peters, head of the Latvian Writers Union, who addressed the plenum. There is then a recording of the speech given by Peters, as follows:

"In order to revive, the LaCP must obtain the rights of independently forming relations both with the CPSU and also with political parties of other countries, by considerately and in a really principled manner renewing contacts with West European left-wing and workers' parties, and also by forming new ties with other political parties and organizations. "Struggle for, and not against, the interests of the people of Latvia must become the political theme of the LaCP, which must become an organic and necessary component of the people's movement, along with official and unofficial movements. Otherwise the party membership list could become a mere shadow.

"The LaCP has a great goal ahead of it. On the basis of the declaration of Latvian sovereignty of 28 July, the republic's changeover to economic accountability must be furthered, the election of the very best representatives of the people to the parliament of Latvia must be ensured, a fight must be waged for a decentralization of Latvia as an elimination of the consequences of the state's incorporation, by forming, instead of the hypertrophied army, territorial units of armed forces of citizens of Latvia of all nationalities and basing this policy on the consistent struggle of the CPSU for large-scale disarmament, especially in the Baltic.

"The republic's demilitarization could be a principled step forward in the restoration of historical justice, in a painless dismantling of the deformed consequences of the Hitler-Stalin pact by not connecting this action with a betrayal of the socialist orientation of Latvia—quite the opposite—bringing this orientation closer to those ideals for which Latvian communists and social democrats fought during the time of independent Latvia and who had no kind of connection with Stalinism.

"If we do not want Latvia's indigenous inhabitants of all nationalities to increasingly leave the party or the party to change into an alien, unassimilated formal party members' register, we must encourage a restructured LaCP register with Latvian citizens—but only those who recognize the declaration of Latvian sovereignty and the rules and program of restoration of the LaCP.

"The question arises: But, what to do with those party members who do not recognize Latvian statehood, the rights of self-determination of our nation, and the

LaCP's sovereign political rights, not excluding the common strategic duties toward the CPSU? Whether to force recognition of all that? No, on no account. That would be an absurdity, and it would be undemocratic.

"I propose that those Communists to whom the action of the LaCP, as the protector of the Latvian people and of Latvian citizens of other nationalities, is not acceptable, become registered either in some other republic or at the center, pay their membership fee into the corresponding organization's cash-office, and express their opinions in accordance with that organization's documents, but not turn against the policy of the LaCP.

"I am, however, convinced that an absolute majority of rank-and-file LaCP members of all nationalities will find in the restored, independent LaCP everything that corresponds to our era—an opportunity to fight for a politically, economically, nationally, culturally, purely human free development in Latvia."

Udris says that these opinions are not to the liking of many people—something which Peters takes into account in his speech. The recording of Peters' speech then continues as follows:

"I realize, of course, that this speech of mine will be criticized—first, by the conservative apparatus of the party leaving the stage, second, by the new political intriguers who have become bold in the perestroyka sunshine, and, third, also by some more stagnant editors in the West.

"All the same, I believe that the LaCP will find in itself the strength to become renewed and to prove itself as well at the elections of USSR people's deputies, and to be everywhere where all the democratic forces in Latvia, regardless of whether they represent official or unofficial organizations and persons, are fighting for a humane life.

"One more minute. Does it not bewilder us that in the LaCP there are, evidently, considerably fewer revolutionaries than party members? This is logical, when for many years admission to the party was also according to the negative selection principle.

"Can the justice of the minority not be the justice of the era? It can. This is testified to by the victories of social democrats in winning freedom and social justice for West European peoples. Justice of the minority ensures today a higher ethical quality than the arrogance of the majority.

"I personally believe that in this period of history the stability of Latvia's development will be decided by the closest rapprochement of Communists and social democrats. We were separated by Stalin. Today, the left-wing forces must not again become victims of that provocation which set the peoples against each other, annexed states, formed administrator peoples and tribes of slaves, and consolidated both an ultra-leftwing and an ultra-rightwing totalitarianism in Europe and in other continents".

Peters goes on to say that on 14 July he had the honor to attend the French Revolution anniversary celebrations in Paris. He mentions that the main conclusion that he drew was that the main task of the revolution had been not to chop off the king's head, but to save it and to make it think the people's thoughts.

Udris says that the LaCP plenum was in adjournment while the final version of the LaCP action program was being worked out. He states that urgent problems and a tense political situation remain, but expresses his belief that these 2 days of the plenum have increased the trust of Latvians in the brights forces of the LaCP, and especially in the newly elected rural rayon leaders.

Latvian Central Committee Discusses Laws

PM0808094789 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 14 Jul 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has been in session. It discussed a number of questions, including those which will be raised for discussion at the forthcoming session of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet. Namely, the draft law "On the Elections of People's Deputies of Local Soviets of the Latvian SSR," the draft law "On the Elections of People's Deputies of the Latvian SSR," and the Latvian SSR draft law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Latvian SSR."

The Bureau assessed these documents as vitally important. It stressed that their adoption could have a substantial impact on the sociopolitical situation and interethnic relations in the republic.

The bureau session supported the proposal to conduct the elections separately: The elections to local soviets of people's deputies in November this year and the elections of Latvian SSR people's deputies in February 1990. It is important, the session said, to have a full complement of local soviets of people's deputies before 1 January next year. With the republic's national economy operating in the conditions of full economic accountability, independence, and self-financing, authority must be transferred to them.

These questions will also be discussed by deputies at the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

At the proposal of T.I. Savitskaya, deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the discussion of the draft laws was conducted article by article. Many specific amendments were made.

At the same time, there were not ready-made solutions to every problem. That is understandable. Are elections from labor collectives and social organizations possible, can labor collectives and organizations give financial support to a candidate for people's deputy? The session decided that these and other questions must be worked out at sessions of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet commissions.

The session discussed the draft Latvian SSR law "On the Elections of People's Deputies of the Latvian SSR." Here, too, a considerable number of substantial observations were made. It was proposed that the draft law be elaborated and then discussed at one of the sessions of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and that fundamentally important questions be clarified, such as: Is the republic to elect a Congress of Latvian SSR People's Deputies or a Supreme Soviet, how many deputies will be released, and others.

During the discussion of the draft Latvian SSR law "On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Latvian SSR," the main debate centered on the question of the right to veto USSR laws and legal acts passed by bodies of USSR state authority and management. Their effect, the bureau session said, may be restricted or suspended by a Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution in cases where there is a clear infringement of the republic's rights or where normative acts of USSR ministries and departments conflict with the republic's rights and interests.

The session also discussed the draft Latvian SSR Law On Latvian SSR Citizenship. The Central Committee Bureau noted that, if we are building a rule-of-law state, such a law is needed. It will really help to reduce migration. But it must take account of the interests of all groups of people living in the republic. It was stressed in particular that any discrimination against citizens on the principle of nationality runs counter to the USSR Constitution and international acts—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Final Declaration of the Vienna Conference.

It was recommended that the draft Law On Latvian SSR Citizenship be elaborated, discussed at a session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Constitution Commission, and several alternative versions published in the press for general discussion.

The Central Committee Bureau session also discussed the questions of staging events dedicated to the 125th anniversary of the birthday of Ya. Raynis and Aspaziya, the publication of a review of the Latvian press in Russian, "Latvia Today," and an information bulletin, "Vestnesis" or "Vestnik," by the Latvian SSR Union of Journalists, and other questions.

Latvian People's Front Discusses Citizenship Law

PM2208102589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by "our correspondent" Irina Litvinova under the rubric "Direct Link; IZVESTIYA Correspondents at the Teletype": "Discussion on Citizenship"]

[Text] Riga—The draft of the "Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Law on Citizenship" is one of the legal acts recently submitted for discussion by the republic's inhabitants. A number of its clauses are debatable. The Latvian People's Front duma has voiced its attitude toward the draft law.

The duma resolution states that while defending the idea of creating a rule-of-law state, the duma nonetheless considers the discussion of the Law on Citizenship unacceptable. In the duma's opinion "only the legislative organ of a sovereign state has the right to grant citizenship after the adoption of the independent state's constitution." The Latvian SSR, the document notes, "is in fact still not constituted as a sovereign state" and "without being de facto sovereign cannot ensure the legal, political, and economic defense of its citizens outside the republic's territory." The duma designated as the main task of the Latvian People's Front "active participation in elections in order to achieve the election of a supreme organ of power which would embark on the restoration of an independent Latvian state."

The Latvian People's Front duma also voiced its attitude toward the citizens' committees whose activity the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium has deemed unconstitutional. The duma believes that the registration of citizens and candidate citizens is determined by democratic laws and is a matter for the free choice of the inhabitants of Latvia. It is planned to include fully empowered representatives of the People's Front in the temporary coordination center of committees of Latvian citizens. The duma has called on the sociopolitical organizations taking part in the work of the temporary coordination center to express their opinion regarding the criteria which they defend as the necessary prerequisite for granting the right of citizenship to candidate citizens.

Militia Guards Take Down Latvian Flags

LD2308110289 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] Today the national flags of Latvia have been hoisted with black ribbons in some places, including at our radio house at the Doma Laukums.

Shortly before the start of the working day we experienced some upsetting moments. At the instruction of (Galiy Asanov), deputy commander of the militia guard subunit, the guard workers took down the flags of the radio branch of the People's Front.

True, after communicating with (Gennadiy Indrikov), Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic deputy minister of internal affairs, who replied that the guard service had acted willfully, we found the (?hidden) flags. They are again flying, testifying to the horrible mood of the day of 23 August.

Problems Facing Latvian Communist Party Viewed
PM2208110589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Aug 89 Second Edition p 3

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondents O. Meshkov and A. Chernenko: "Alternative. Reflections on the Political Situation in Latvia"]

[Text] Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]—It was with mixed feelings that we observed the line outside an ordinary Riga photographic studio—its agitated movements obeyed the same laws as operate in lines for soap and detergent, sausage and fashion footwear. But for photographs? Are they in short supply, too?

Yes, apparently....

At the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee one got the routine explanation: "There is no shortage. They are making up 'Latvian resident calling cards.' People are in a hurry to obtain them because soon you will not be able to buy anything to speak of in a store without one."

So there you have it: While the theorists and the practical experts, members of people's fronts, and party leaders (central and local) wrangle over various issues of interethnic contacts and the principles of building a union state and argue about federation and confederation, a "new-style coupon" has been printed in Latvia which puts residents of the republic in a special position in relation to visitors.

"Is it democratic?" We asked the question of a Latvian Communist Party Central Committee official.

"It is one way of protecting the interests of the republic's inhabitants from 'raiders' from areas where products are hard to find," he replied. "Although," he added, "it is somewhat inconvenient."

Inconvenience is just something you feel. A "calling card" is something concrete. A document! Bearing a photograph and an official stamp and signature.

This document is a kind of currency. Incidentally, the talk about Latvia's introducing its own currency is becoming more and more persistent.

"Our economists believe that such a measure would by no means lead to separatism, which is what some people are trying to ascribe to us," A. Gutmanis, first deputy chairman of the republic's State Planning Committee [Gosplan] stated frankly. "The need to introduce the currency is dictated by the discrepancy between the quantity of money and the amount of goods on the republican market. Indeed, to some extent, the introduction of the cards is the first small step on the path to a regional currency."

So there you have it. Quite unequivocal.

It cannot be denied that there is much evidence of a lack of economic independence and of "republican economic sovereignty," as they put it these days. Local experts calculate that over 80 percent of finished products made in Latvia are not sold through the market but are "creamed off by the center." But a USSR Supreme Soviet decision has now been adopted to grant the three Baltic republics the right to take radical measures—to introduce regional economic accountability (in Lithuania and Estonia, as is known, economic independence has also been granted!). Create, work, and take a chance.... So why do they need their "own" currency? Would it prevent an economic crisis? Would it not cause the kind of confusion that thousands of economists would be unable to unravel? Why the emergency plans for "residential qualification"?

Indeed, the draft law on Latvian SSR citizenship talks unequivocally of such a possibility. For all the arguments and debate, the reality is that a draft envisaging a "residential qualification," if one wants to be recognized as a citizen of the republic, has been presented for discussion.

According to one version, one would be required to have lived there for at least 10 years; another version stipulates 5 years....

The possible outcome of this has been demonstrated by events in Estonia, which caused considerable economic damage and contributed to an exacerbation of interethnic relations.

You read these "versions" and you try to imagine the reaction of someone who was "recruited" 10 years or so ago in the Vyatka or Tver regions by a ministry and has given all his effort and knowledge, youth and vigor to Latvia, but is suddenly faced with the real possibility of becoming a second-class person. And he will not be alone....

The political abstractions and various hypotheses put forward over the past 12-18 months by the leaders of a number of public movements, perceived as a debate "in the spirit of pluralism," have acquired a stark concreteness. Isn't this going to happen to the "political hypotheses" that are being discussed today?

"The economy's transition to the model of regional, republican economic accountability and the political reforms are inevitably geared to a certain change in the status of citizenship," Anton Gruduls, chief of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Ideology

Department, said. " 'Residential qualification' is a different matter. I think that the 'zero option,' which, incidentally, is envisaged with the others in the draft, is unacceptable. Common sense must prevail here."

"And what is the 'zero option'?"

"Under it, all those who are at the moment officially local residents must also obtain a new type of citizenship. But subsequent settlement in the republic must be accompanied by a strict trial period—a long one, I would say. Otherwise we are not going to halt the process of central departments' 'demographic aggression.'"

It seems reasonable. But the mass press and other media have been rather unforthcoming about the "zero option." Only Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary I. Kezbers has spoken publicly about it, stating very clearly: I am an advocate of the "zero option."

But the public consciousness of a considerable proportion of the republic's inhabitants has been geared by the media to the published draft's "tough options." This has raised the temperature among the non-indigenous population. (Anyway, it is certainly a controversial draft. Under it, prostitutes, drug addicts, alcoholics, advocates of "Stalinism and chauvinism," and participants in the repressions alike forfeit the right to citizenship.... They are placed on a par with selfless, utterly unblemished hard-working people who have not acquired the "term of residence" necessary to win the republic's trust.)

Indeed, one is increasingly encountering yesterday's abstractions, which have now acquired very concrete form. Not always de jure, but now everywhere de facto.

As well as the examples involving the "calling cards," which have already isolated the resident of Latvia from other fellow citizens of our state and the demeaning (in our view anyway) package of draft restrictions on granting citizenship to people already living in the republic, there are examples which are at first glance more trivial and not so fundamental.

Take the elderly man in a paramilitary cap similar to the one worn by the chasseurs of the German "Edelweiss" division. On his chest he sported a filthy, abusive caricature of the head of our state....

In another country he would have been fined for this, but not here—he just stood there at the crossroads casting ironic glances at staring passersby. This old man is a kind of barometer of the political atmosphere in the republic, which is characterized at the moment by a distinct outward tolerance of any extreme behavior. However, it is not just the president of the state who is being abused, but the leader of the party which started the perestroyka we have been struggling for!

Perhaps we are not entirely right, but the feeling is that the quintessence of life—the plant, the street on which the picket stands in his cap, the student auditorium—has been abandoned to the informals. Let them fight it out, so to speak!

This strange feeling occurs when one compares the rhythms at which the Central Committee, the Communist Party city and rayon committees [gorkom, raykom], and the informals are living today. We deliberately fail to distinguish here between the People's Front and Interdvizheniye [International Movement of Working People]—they are both dynamic and energetic. Even the rhythm at which the actual Central Committee apparatus is living is highly variable. While the secretaries dash about the republic and are actively involved in the political dialogue, the "executive component" is inert. It is clearly suffering from a fear of crowds, shunning contact, discussion, and debate, giving this right to the Communist Party leaders. But there are obviously not enough Central Committee and gorkom secretaries to do the work. "Top man" Vagris, Central Committee Secretary Kezbers, Riga Communist Party Gorkom leader Klautsen, and Riga Mayor Rubiks cannot be everywhere at once.... So one gets the feeling that cracks and gaps have appeared in the party's activity, which are being increasingly filled by a "new breed of ideologist" with his concepts of "separation," "secession from the USSR," and so on.

"Perhaps the most grievous legacy of stagnation," I. Kezbers, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretary in charge of ideology, said, "is the fact that there is an acute shortage of party fighters. In the actual apparatus. There are not enough independent individuals. Capable individuals who are hungry for and do not fear dialogue with any opponent.

"But you would not say that about Communists working in the People's Front and Interdvizheniye....

"Clearly, they are being scared off by the apparatus' conservativeness and tendency toward stereotyped thinking and actions. It seems to me that our Communist Party is not the only one with this problem.

"But it is not enough just to state it. It is important to have a real perestroyka process....

"I believe that the thesis that you have to overhaul the apparatus and then step onto some kind of political running track and overtake the informals is profoundly mistaken. Nor is it even a question of the big gulf that separates us at the moment. The main thing is to get rid of the accursed 'us' and 'them.' We should not be racing against one another, but carrying the burden together—the burden of problems facing Latvia."

Admittedly, the way the secretary for ideology thinks and acts has a disarming consistency. He was among the initiators of the convening of the enlarged Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum which has now started, following a pattern that is highly unusual as far as the "orthodox" people are concerned. Over 400 party members, People's Front and Interfront members, agriculturalists, and "industrialists" of authoritative status in the most diverse social and ethnic groups in the republic were invited to attend the first 2 days. They were given 2 days to debate, then there would be a 10-day break to analyze the speeches, and only then would the Central Committee members assemble and elaborate a decision binding on all Latvian Communists, based on this wide-ranging debate and subsequent deliberations.

Time will tell what the outcome of the plenum will be. What is more important is the fact that there has been a democratic debate on party premises. The Central Committee has tried to build bridges by destroying the organizational stereotype. There was a direct relay on radio and viewers were able to see excerpts in the evening. There were over 40 speakers during the 2 days. It is important now to study and consider—not formally either!—every proposal. This is what the representative commission elected at the plenum is doing during the break. It will also carry out the requisite work analyzing the debates. Let us repeat that we will know in the very near future whether this has helped or not. But it is clear that the republic's Communists have been waiting for this for a long time. Indeed, it is against the background of the Central Committee's sluggishness in assessing particular issues in the republic that there has been a very fierce clash of ideas, opinions, concepts, big and small groupings, and new "parties." Official and "independent" Latvian publications are full of various controversial items of an interethnic nature, in some cases provocative historical studies; authentic and objective items appear pale and dull amid this hum of information.... All this contributes to people's disorientation—particularly young people. And this gives rise to mutual recriminations, distrust, and the most absurd accusations.

"There is a problem," the Central Committee secretary agrees. "It is fundamentally important now to purge the party press organ of the short-termist element. The party organ must unequivocally reflect its position. It is time to stop its erosion. The party is obliged to uphold it. In fact, it is obvious that the majority of the 'informals" slogans are just the cream skimmed from the party's program. Is that not true?"

True. But it is also true that the Communists' long period of inaction not only enabled certain people to "skim the cream" but also deprived the party organization itself of a deserved advantage, because authorship is ascribed to anyone you care to think of except the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. So it is not impossible that other political structures gathering force in the republic could again claim as their own the good and constructive ideas devised by the plenum.

It is principally a question of the citizens' committees that are being formed at the moment in Latvia, (whether legally or illegally) but above all in an extremely consistent and persistent way, ignoring the authorities' negative attitude to this. Their functions in the future will be to wield the kind of power that is invested in the soviets at the moment. This is the essence of the matter, for all the political cosmetics.

In this connection one recalls an episode from the plenum's work. Latvian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Ya. Vagris was giving replies to memoranda from the auditorium. One of them concerned the activity of the so-called citizens' committees, which are arbitrarily registering "true" Latvian citizens—the qualifications are very tough: You can only be registered if your parents or you yourself were living on Latvian soil before the restoration of Soviet power in summer 1940. In the future the committees plan to hold a congress of all such Latvian citizens and decide Latvia's political future at it. The republic's Supreme Soviet seemingly deemed these committees unconstitutional, creating, as they do, an effective diarchy. But the "nonrecognition" remained on paper. This prompted a plenum participant to ask: Why are unconstitutional committees continuing their freewheeling activities, giving rise to various rumors and uncertainty by the very fact of their existence. The gist of Ya. Vagris' reply was that it is no crime to collect signatures.

Of course, this specific question must be tackled by lawyers amd law-enforcement organs on the basis of existing laws. They are being so evasive at the moment.... The servants of justice have been virtually silent on the subject of the committees and have therefore encouraged their activities. But common sense suggests that the "noncriminal lists" are dividing the inhabitants of Latvia and are grist to the mill of nationalist intransigence.

...On two occasions our conversation with Ya. Vagris has been postponed, and not through PRAVDA's fault. The first occasion was in March. The second in August. (In both cases there were apparently objective reasons). A great deal has happened in the intervening period: Life itself has answered the questions we submitted to Comrade Vagris. Here they are, the aforementioned committees, marking the appearance of a diarchy—and that on the eve of the local soviet election campaign (a difficult one as it is)....

By their very nature the perestroyka processes cannot be unambiguous. But they must not go unappraised by the ruling party—in this case its republican component. In our history we have made too many appraisals after the event. We are too late too often. And we are paying dearly for it....

Let us take another look at the economic and law-enforcement statistics. Nearly 6 months ago, when we were working on the article entitled "Boundary," we noticed that the increase in public activity had been

accompanied by some increase in the number of offenses. It is clear now that there has been a major increase. The rate of economic development is not good. The housing problem is still acute. That is, the "intellectual ferment," bold slogans, concepts, and ideas in general have not provided anything to speak of in real life. **Indeed, that is probably impossible without the consolidation of all forces, in the conditions of confrontation and given the split that is occurring on, for example, civil rights....**

From conversations with many Communists we get the feeling that they are coming to realize this. But the "fronts'" current orientation toward confrontation has erected a barrier between them, which can only be surmounted on a party platform. How one would like the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum to make a breakthrough in this respect.

One of our interlocutors at the Central Committee said: "Both the Latvian People's Front and Interdvizheniye are attracted by the same common human values—a sense of dignity and the sovereignty of the individual. They are like two parallel straight lines, which, as you will recall from your mathematics, are nonetheless bound to meet at infinity...."

Nicely put. But what worries one is how distant that "infinity" is. How much longer is the overt confrontation between the two powerful fronts, which incorporate the main ethnic groups in the republic, going to last? Are abstract mathematical hypotheses in fact applicable to the politics of today—ambiguous, contrasting, on occasions toying with human destinies.... Will the plenum answer these questions?

Baltic Journalists Comment on Regional Problems

PM2108160889 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 31, 30 Jul 89 pp 12-13

["Roundtable" feature compiled by special correspondents Yuriy Bandura, Grant Gusakov, and Vladimir Shevelev: "The Baltic Region, Summer 1989, as Seen by Journalists in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A team of "MN" special correspondents recently journeyed to the three Baltic Republics to sample public opinion at all levels. The last stop was Riga and a "round table" where "MN" met with : Ayvars Baumanis, head of the Latvian department of the Novosti Press Agency (APN), board vice-chairman of the Union of Journalists of Latvia; Aleksandr Gelbakh, deputy editor of "SOVETSKAYA LITVA" (organ of the CP [Communist Party] Lithuania Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]); Vladlen Dozortsev, editor-in-chief of the monthly "Daugava" (the magazine of the Writers Union of the Latvian SSR), board member of the duma of the Popular Front of Latvia; Daynis Ivans, journalist, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the Popular Front of Latvia; Abram Kletskin, assistant professor on the journalism faculty of Latvian State University; Myart Myuyur, board Chairman of the Union of Journalists of Estonia; and Algimantas Chekuolis, editor-in-chief of "Gimtasis Krashtas" (organ of the Society for Cultural Relations with Lithuanians Residing Abroad, council member of the Sejm of the Sajudis Association).

Three Republics—What They Do And Don't Share

[Correspondents] But why actually, the Baltic region? Why not each of the republics in particular?

Dozortsev: The processes taking place in all the three Republics are identical and synchronic. With minor exceptions (e.g., in the ideology of the popular fronts, in their interrelations with the republican authorities).

Chekuolis: One can't just speak about Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians - one must speak about Baltics. A Baltic is a Soviet citizen, but one who realized the need for perestroika about 30 years earlier and is now from three to five years ahead of the all-union process of democratization.

[Correspondents] Isn't this an exaggeration? Isn't this arrogance? Isn't this a claim to some "special position"? Accurate or not, this claim indicates that the peoples of the Baltic region have their own reasons for considering themselves particularly sensitive to perestroika. During all 45 years of their membership in the USSR - until April 1985, Moscow viewed the indigenous peoples of the Baltic republics as "unreliable". With all the consequences arising from this status. The Centre's suspicions - from Stalin to Brezhnev - were also fuelled by the recent bourgeois past of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Suspicions were sparked by the abundance in these republics of "relatives of the enemies of the people" - Those who had fallen victim to Stalin's reprisals. Suspicions were kept alive by the fact that many citizens admitted to having relatives abroad. All these circumstances branded natives of the Baltic region as "inferior citizens".

Baumanis: After the 20th CPSU Congress, during Khrushchev's "thaw", we finally started recovering from the blows dealt by Stalinism. There was hope that the Latvian nation would be reestablished in its rights, that normal conditions would be provided for its existence and development. The language problem was recognized as was the need to grant a worthy political post to native Latvians. But at the plenary meeting of the CP Latvia Central Committee in 1959 these hopes were dashed: Any chance gaining a legitmate place in the land of their ancestors, all changes in this direction were labelled "manifestations of bourgeois nationalism" by the Stalinists Pelshe and Voos. Purges and persecution followed. The "struggle" against this bogey helped promote the policy to dissolve the indigenous nation - Latvians - into the mainly Russian mass of the republic's population.

Hence the construction in Latvia of industrial enterprises which should have been located in totally different regions of the country (knitted goods factories, for instance, which should have been built in Central Asia, where cotton is grown and where today there are problems with job placement). Meanwhile, the enterprises needed workers and - between 1959 and 1989 - about 800,000 persons came (with a total population of 2.7 million) from other republics. This created housing problems - those coming to new construction projects were, as a rule, given housing ahead of Latvians, many of whom had to wait 20 to 25 years. Moreover, every Latvian had to learn Russian or else not be promoted, whereas those coming from Russia did not have to study Lettish. You will agree that, this being the case, social justice and democracy were out of the question.

[Correspondent] Similar things happened in Estonia, and with slighty lower costs, in Lithuania. By April 1985, the atmosphere in the Baltic region was very strained. Perestroika was met with great hope, and the indigenous peoples of the Baltic republics got down to vindicating democratization on their lands with great energy. Declarations, amendments to the constitutions of the republics, laws and bills, platforms and programmes came down in torrents. Hence the conclusion that democratization in the Baltic region is ahead of all-union democratization. Sometimes - considerably ahead. At times - without in-depth conceptualization, under the impact of emotions rather than common sense.

A radical idea such as the secession of the Baltic republics from the Soviet Union also arose out of this torrent. Today it is, perhaps, the most dramatic political problem in the region. Moreover, it embraces many of the other problems and therefore deserves to be the focus of attention

Secession or the Threat of Secession?

[Correspondents] From the press:

"Sometimes one hears it said that sovereignty can be achieved and realized in two ways: being a member of the USSR or outside the framework of the USSR's statehood...the board of the Popular Front of Latvia's [PFL] duma puts forward a question of vital importance for our people for discussion in PFL groups and branches: The entry of the Popular Front of Latvia in the struggle for Latvia's political and economic independence" (from an appeal of the board of the PFL Duma on May 31, 1989).

Gelbakh: Regrettably, even in Lithuania more and more people are gravitating towards secession from the USSR.

Myuyuv: In Latvia the question of secession is the most sensitive, as I see it, in Lithuania it is calmer, and in Estonia it is calmer still. Although it could always heat up. The threat from extreme political forces—on the left and on the right—has been growing.

[Correspondent] In the Baltic region, public opinion has been offered the chance to discuss the question of seceding from the USSR. The offer has been made in sufficiently clear and unambiguous terms. This question bears upon the entire Soviet Union: What is at stake is not only 3 per cent of its population or 1 per cent of its territory, but three of its 15 union republics.

How serious and how real is the prospect of the Baltic republics seceding from the USSR?

Dozortsev: Recently I spoke to the chairman of Sajudis—he is fairly radically-minded regarding the movement's objectives. He and I came to the conclusion that none of the Baltic republics had anticipated all the consequences of secession from the USSR. We blocked out different scenarios. In the end I asked: "What is your ultimate demand? Are you for withdrawal from the USSR or aren't you?" I heard in reply: "What do you mean? What withdrawal? The maximum for us is a confederation."

Myuyuv: The question of secession from the USSR is no cause for joy. The Baltic republics' economic relations have been shaped in the framework of the union and they retain their federal character. But who will need us in the West—with our goods, with our costs and our prices? According to my observations, the people do not see secession as necessary.

Chekuolis: The increase in separatist tendencies gives me the jitters. After all, over 200 products go from Lithuania into the all-union economy. If it were to come to secession virtually the entire Soviet tractor and automobile industry would come to a standstill: Some of the most important parts—capacitors—are manufactured only in Lithuania. The situation is much the same with trains.

[Correspondents] The dependence of the Baltic region's industry on the all-union economy is equally high, if not higher.

From newspapers:

"Half of Latvia's electricity is supplied by other regions of the USSR. Latvian enterprises get about 180,000 parts of different descriptions, completing articles, etc., from 3,000 enterprises belonging to the all-union economy." (CINA, July 18.)

[Correspondents] Thus we can conclude that: At the level of mass consciousness the idea of seceding from the USSR enjoys broad and growing popularity. At the level conceptualizing this idea, however, even among its emotional supporters it encounters serious counterarguments to which the advocates of secession from the USSR have no convincing answer. The separatists sentiments in the Baltic region have not yet become a material force. But it is impossible to guarantee that this will not happen in future. The situation is at a crossroads as it were and

susceptible to influence. Much—if not everything—will depend on how effectively the causes of the desire for secession are dealt with. What are the causes?

Roots of Separatism—Old and New

[Correspondents] Trying to understand what, in the fifth year of perestroika, triggered the eruption of separatist sentiments in the Baltic region, one may conclude that the vulgar, extremist nationalism is not the only cause (though it mustn't be disregarded, remembering that the intensity of mass nationalist sentiments in any country depends on everyday realities). What in this case springs from life?

1. Insufficient Understanding of the Baltic Region's Local, Regional Problems at the All-Union Level

Dozortsev: The desire to secede from the USSR was strongly affected by the reluctance displayed at the Congress of People's Deputies by the conservative majority to discuss the problems of our republics in earnest. How, for example, did it respond to the proposal that parliament should discuss the attitude towards the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact? With shouts: "No need! We already know everything!" But what can they know about the feelings experienced by the indigenous peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia towards that treaty? Or, perhaps, they can cancel these feelings with a decree? After all, were it not for Gorbachev, the commission on the pact would never have been set up. It is this indifference of the majority for the Baltic peoples' interests that fanned the flames of sentiment. For the inhabitants of the Baltic region no "blank spots" remain in their grasp of the recent past. In Moscow, however, and even at the all-union level, many of the most dramatic problems of the Baltic peoples' historic self-cognition have not yet been understood and remain something alien and of third-rate importance. This lagging behind only complicates things. The centre must give a political assessment to the truth about the past - the truth which the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have known for a long time, but which is still not recognized elsewhere.

Myuyuv: We are often offhandedly accused of separatist ambitions. Take, for instance, the concept of republican cost accounting. Where did it come from? About two and a half years ago we were suddenly told: According to the USSR's interterritorial turnover, Estonia's contribution to the common weal is assessed at roughly 2.5 billion roubles a year, whereas Estonia receives roughly 3 billion from the other republics, or from the union as a whole. We thought: What happened? It seems that we work normally, but we are told: "Badly" (since we owe a debt to the union). Our scientists wrote a letter to Gorbachev, trying to prove that we didn't owe anything to anyone. After this, they sent experts to us and they ascertained that we owed no such debt and that there is such a method of estimation according to which all the union republics, except Armenia, owed such a debt. We felt offended, which is why we started enlarging on the idea of republican cost accounting, taking the whole responsibility for our economy on ourselves. But we hear from every side: "What are you bent on achieving? This is nationalism, pure and simple, meaning that you are splitting away." But such reproaches merely add insult to injury.

[Correspondents] Quite a few such remarks - about misunderstanding the problems of the Baltic regions outside its confines - resounded at the "round table". Standing out is the urgent need - common for our country - to overcome the low level of culture in interethnic relations, meaning the often elementary lack of tact, lack of compassion and the desire to sweep your neighbour's problems aside for the sake of solving your own problems sooner.

Ivans: The central authorities, including even the Congress of People's Deputies, have consistently avoiding these radical issues. The most serious thing, I believe, is that the present-day Soviet Union is a state that has been formed in a violent way. And if the Baltic republics have hatched an idea about the need to gain state independence, it is not because we are separatists motivated by national egoism. We are for self-determination, for making sure that the ties between the republics, between sovereign states, as the constitution calls them, are voluntary.

[Correspondents] How many MN readers prepared to accept the contention that the USSR is an entity formed in a violent way? In the Baltic region this contention is already deeply rooted in the public consciousness and had become a factor not to be ignored. It is easy to pretend that the concept of the "Soviet-occupied Baltic region" doesn't exist. And once again dismiss those who say it does exist as "bourgeois nationalists". Both methods will only create a stalemate. The theory about an "occupied Baltic region" should either be refuted in a convincing way or accepted, even if in modified form, in order to start a dialogue with the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia from new positions. And primarily - with their indigenous population which, in posing the question of the republics' independence and substantiating the presentation of this question by the "occupation of 1940", is striving, it seems, not so much to secede from the USSR as to transform the relationship between the union and the Baltic Republics on the basis of reconcluding the treaty of affiliation, in which the will of the peoples should be expressed openly and unequivocally.

There are quite a few similar questions requiring serious discussion. But the possibilities for this seem to be limited in the Baltic region today - which brings us to the next reason for the spread of separatist sentiments.

2. Inadequate Discussion of the Baltic Processes in the Central Mass Media

Myuyuv: Ours is a multinational country, yet our mass media are not all-union, but central. Why? I for one would like to watch TV programmes from Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, to know what Kamchatka thinks. In this

context, the question was recently raised of publishing a 16-page newspaper, not a central, but all-union one: with one page going to each republic. But we heard in reply: "And what are we going to do with Russia's people? They are the greatest number of all, meaning they need more space in the paper, too." In short, again this humiliating play at percentages, at "big" and "small" peoples, when the republics disappear as equal and sovereign states.

Gelbakh: Lithuania has proposed publishing special pages in central newspapers such as PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA for contributors from different republics—selected not by the editors, but by the republics themselves. Needless to say, the paper could criticize any republic's view. Yet this would be a truly equal dialogue. What we have now is unilateral action when a special correspondent from a central newspaper drops into a republic for two or three days and jumps to hasty conclusions, which the republic itself often sees as simply provocative.

Kletskin: The tone alone—of articles in the central press about the Baltic region—is noteworthy. Everywhere there is this implication: "Look, look—something wrong is going on there."

Baumanis: there are over 20 own correspondents from the central mass media in Latvia, but only three or four of them are Latvians. The rest have been appointed from the center, and often fail to reckon with the realities of the Baltic region. At the latest congress of the republic's Union of Journalists we called upon Moscow to at least consult us in appointing its own correspondents in order to ensure competent, unbiased coverage of the goings-on in Latvia. And what happened? PRAVDA's correspondent was crossed off the register at our organization and was then registered in Moscow....

[Correspondents] The question of glasnost at the republican and all-union levels, we believe, is especially pressing today and can be properly resolved since an understanding on this score evidently exists in Moscow as well.

3. Collisions in the Republics-Centre Direction

[Correspondents] The lack of significant change in the relationship between the republics and Moscow and the omnipotence of the union ministries and government departments hindering further democratization in the republics are promoting separatist sentiments—generated as they are by disillusionment in the capabilities of perestroika.

Kletskin: The key problem, as I see it, consists in the fact that the centre—whether at the level of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers or the Supreme Soviet—has shown no readiness for frank and equal dialogue with the republics. It stubbornly believes that it alone knows what is right and what is wrong. Unless such a dialogue is organized, an explosion may occur. Something like what happened in the Kuzbass, and in the coal industry overall.

[Correspondents] This isn't a question of an abstract urge for equality between the "centre" and the "periphery". This is a question of regaining the sense of being the "master in one's own home". Today such feelings are up against a wall of centralized economic relations.

From the press:

In Latvia the power of republican ministries and government departments extends in full measure to only 22 per cent of the basic production assets and to none of the 28 per cent of the assets coming under the union jurisdiction. In Lithuania the assets under the union jurisdiction account of 32 per cent.

[Correspondents] the question is not only: "To whom power belongs in the Republic!" Economic control from a single all-union centre spells distortions for the republics, which they see as devoid of any real meaning.

Myuyuv: Estonia generates twice as much electricity as it consumes. The cost of one kWh is roughly two kopeks. But someone at the top—not in Estonia, of course—has decided that this commodity—electricity—should be sold below production cost. The result is: Latvia pays us 1.7 kopeks per kWh, and Pskov—0.95 kopeks. But it is Estonian consumers that have to pay for this mechanism of price formation imposed from above: They are charged 2.4 kopeks per kWh. The republic's electric power stations lose up to 125 million roubles annually. Why should they be the losers? And what incentives can one speak about given this sort of management from the centre?

Chekuclis: In Lithuania this rule by fiat has meant that the republic has had to sell its milk to other republics for less than the cost of Borzhomi mineral water. Meanwhile tyres, which cost 10 rubles to produce, are sold to us for 110-115 roubles. How can we help vilifying the bureaucratic-command style?

[Correspondents] The legal recognition of the republican cost-accounting concept, drawn up by Lithuania and Estonia, makes it possible to hope for the normalization of economic relations between the republics and the USSR. But hopes grow dim with time: The working out of the draft law in the Supreme Soviet is proceeding at a snail's pace, the draft itself is being modified, whereas the deadlines for putting the new model into commission are drawing nearer. And much in the public mood of the Baltic region will depend on the kind of economic model with which it will enter the year 1990: If the republics don't get a viable model, separatist sentiments are bound to flare again. And, naturally, vice versa: The adoption of a law, taking cognizance of the interests of both the republics and the union as a whole, would help ease the tensions.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

[Correspondents] Many other sensitive issues were touched upon at the "round table" in Riga. Mention was made of the difficulties in relations between the Russian-speaking and indigenous populations of the republics: It was noted that in the Baltic region overall these relations were being stabilized, though their aggravation could not be ruled out. Mention was also made of the reserves in normalizing relations: For the interfronts - renunciation of the power methods of pressure, all the way to the threat of political strikes, refusal to key up passions with calls for the imposition of an emergency situation in the Baltic republics for the popular fronts - giving closer attention to the concerns of the nonindigenous inhabitants of the Baltic region, verbal restraint, a more benevolent attitude towards the calls of the interfronts to work together wherever a consensus exists. The discussion of this question indicated the possibility for constructive action serving the common good.

Such reserves also exist on the strategic line of advance - in the question of retaining the Baltic republics' membership in the USSR.

Our team of MN special correspondents concluded that the situation in the Baltic region has been developing on the whole along the lines of perestroika - with all of its achievements and blunders. Placing the idea of secession from the USSR on the agenda essentially has the same roots as the situation in Soviet mines today: The radicalization of a considerable part of the indigenous population in the Baltic region looks like a response to what the republics' public opinion sees as unsatisfactory progress of perestroika. What specifically is this lack of satisfaction expressed in!

Chekuolis: Economically and politically the centre usually does too little too late, running behind events rather than ahead.

[Correspondents] The consequent desire is not "to get rid of the centre", but to obtain guarantees of Moscow's devotion to the ideals of perestroika.

Myuyur: We are well aware that we can't have a normal life without the centre - if it has a healthy competent leadership. The main thing is to prevent conservatism and prohibitionism from coming to power. If this happens, everything will go down the drain. And not only in the Baltic region - everywhere in the Soviet Union.

[Correspondents] From such attitudes one senses that it would be wrong and even dangerous to label the idea of secession the product of exclusively anti-socialist, nationalist and extremist forces alien to Soviet society. Today the question of seceding from the USSR is by far not a foregone conclusion in the Baltic region, and the keys to its solution are in the hands of the country's leadership. This idea resounds even in the words of the leader of Latvia's Popular Front, the same person who in may 1989 put the question of seceding from the Soviet Union on the agenda of that mass organization.

Ivans: If we want to exist normally in the framework of the union, we must build our relationships on compromise. We need a parity-based, equal union. We need a permanent council and permanent discussion among the sovereign republics. Unless the centre ensures such a discussion, it will lose prestige in the public eye.

[Correspondents] Another crucial factor here is time: It isn't unlimited.

Dozortsev: The next major stage in the Baltic region's political life, I believe, will be the coming elections to the local and republics' Soviets. They will most likely produce a national composition capable of adopting any decision. Including that of seceding from the USSR. Whether to pose this question in the top bodies of the Baltic republics has not yet been determined. Much here will depend on the positions and actions of the centre. The more sovereign rights the republics have by the time of the elections, the lower will be the chance of the USSR's being caught in an accident, and the fewer grounds everyone will have for asking the question: "But what if...?" In this case the centre will be able to retain its coordinating influence. Otherwise destructive processes are inevitable.

[Correspondents] The more rights the union republics have to decide their own problems, the fewer grounds will be left for reflecting on the theme of whether "to go or stay": There is no escaping from oneself. This lesson from the Baltic situation applies to the other Soviet republics as well

Supreme Soviet Resolution on Wage Taxation Cited

PM1108112889 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: "On Taxation of the Labor Remuneration Fund of State Enterprises (Associations)"]

[Text] In view of the situation existing in the country concerning monetary circulation and the exceptional significance of the problems of restraining inflationary processes, in accordance with decisions of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To implement in the 4th quarter of 1989 and in 1990 measures aimed at stabilizing monetary circulation.

To ensure, beginning in 1990, a balance between the current monetary income and expenditure of the population, and to achieve radical improvements in the state of affairs in the consumer market. The USSR Council of

Ministers is to make provision for the necessary measures in the draft State Plan for Economic and Social Development of the USSR and the draft USSR State Budget for 1990.

2. From the 4th quarter of 1989, the setting of a normative correlation for enterprises (associations) between the increase in average wages and the increase in labor productivity is to be abolished.

From 1 October 1989, a system is to be introduced for taxation regulation of the resources of state enterprises (associations) channeled into labor remuneration, regardless of the forms of economic accountability used. It is stipulated that for an increase in excess of 3 percent in resources channeled into labor remuneration, enterprises (associations) pay a tax into the state budget out of the resources of the labor remuneration fund (material incentive fund) on a scale of rates in accordance with the appendix.

With a view to stimulating increased consumer goods production and sales of services to the population, it is stipulated that the said taxation system does not apply to an increase in resources channeled into labor remuneration arising from an increase in the production and sale of these goods and services.

The USSR Council of Ministers is to lay down a procedure and conditions for granting other tax benefits to enterprises (associations).

3. The USSR Council of Ministers, in conjunction with the union republic Councils of Ministers, is to prepare and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on measures for regulating resources channeled into labor remuneration by cooperatives in the production and service spheres, organizations of lease operators, and enterprises of other social organizations.

4. The USSR Council of Ministers is to draw up within 2 months and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals on measures to preempt inflationary processes on the basis of curbing unjustified price rises. [Signed] M. Gorbachev,
chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Moscow, Kremlin; 3 August 1989

Appendix

Scale of rates governing the tax on the increase in resources channeled into labor remuneration [in the following table, Column A represents "Growth in Resources Channeled into Labor Remuneration (as a percentage)," and Column B "Tax Payable Into the State Budget (in rubles, for each ruble of increased labor remuneration)"]

A	B
Up to 3	Not applicable
Between 3 and 5	1
Between 5 and 7	2
More than 7	3

Resolution on Extraordinary Sessions of Soviets

PM0808113389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 1

["USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Holding Extraordinary Sessions of Soviets of People's Deputies"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] 1. The USSR Supreme Soviet notes that accelerating the implementation of the planned measures to broaden the real rights of local soviets and increase their attention to the resolution of urgent questions linked with people's working, living, and recreational conditions, establishing the requisite law and order, and strengthening state and social discipline must promote the full use of the opportunities that have emerged under conditions of perestroyka for overcoming difficulties in economic development and assimilating all reserves in order to improve services for the population and help relieve tension in socioeconomic, environmental, and interethnic relations.

2. To this end the USSR Supreme Soviet recommends that extraordinary sessions of soviets of people's deputies be held in August-September 1989 with reports from their executive and managerial organs in order to thoroughly analyze the specific situation that has taken shape in every republic, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, rayon, and city, drawing particular attention to the fulfillment of the socioeconomic programs that have been mapped out, the perestroyka of the structure and activity of organizations and services under the jurisdiction of the corresponding soviets, and measures to resolutely overcome everything that undermines people's faith in perestroyka.

The USSR Supreme Soviet considers it advisable for executive and managerial organs to deliver reports at sessions of soviets of people's deputies—ranging from rural and settlement soviets—actively including labor collectives, public organizations, mass movements, and citizens' assemblies in their preparation, constantly strengthening the ties and cooperation between the soviets and the working people, organizing a joint quest for ways to resolve pressing questions, and providing the population with extensive information about the practical work of the soviet representative organs of state power. [Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Moscow, Kremlin, 1 August 1989

Officials Reprimanded Over Soap Shortage

PM2308090589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "The Guilty Are Punished"]

[Text] By way of monitoring the fulfillment of adopted resolutions and in connection with workers' continuing complaints, the question of supplying the population with detergents was examined thoroughly on 21 August at the USSR Council of Ministers. It was noted that the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, the state "Agrokhim" association, and the state agro-industrial committees of the union republics have not yet rectified the situation as regards fulfilling the population's demand for detergents and household and toilet soap.

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Kazakh, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics are not taking the necessary measures to make use of the available possibilities to increase the production of soap, and in some cases they are even allowing production volume to go down. The permanent organs of the USSR Council of Ministers have not achieved a timely breakthrough in eliminating the shortage of detergents which has arisen.

The USSR Council of Ministers dismissed deputy minister V.P. Ivanov for his irresponsible attitude toward fulfilling tasks to increase the volume of production of detergents, which led to a shortage of these essentials.

N.V. Lemayev, minister of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry, was informed of the need to urgently adopt measures to develop the production of detergents and fully satisfy the population's demands for these products in the near future.

A.A. Petrov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex, was reprimanded for failing to adopt measures to increase production of detergents on time and controlling the process inadequately.

The councils of ministers of the union republics were instructed to adopt urgent measures to provide the population with soap by the maximum use of local raw material resources, and the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex (V.K. Gusev) was instructed to correct the current situation in the provision of detergents to the population.

People's Deputy Criticizes Yeltsin in Letter

PM2308091189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Aug 89 First Edition p 2

[Letter from USSR People's Deputy Lieutenant Colonel B. Pylin to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Proof in Action"]

[Text] Esteemed editorial office! I was perplexed by B.N. Yeltsin's interview with Italy's CORRIERE DELLA SERA (the text was translated in the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 27). His dissatisfaction with his post in the Supreme Soviet is frightening. He was dissatisfied with his work at the USSR State Committee for Construction and during his short period in the post of USSR minister the volume of unfinished construction in the country increased by tens of billions of rubles. Admittedly, Boris Nikolayevich shifted the responsibility for this onto other people's shoulders. You cannot help thinking: Will the newly elected chairman of the Committee for Construction and Architecture Questions have an incentive to even ensure the speediest resolution of the housing problem? For then the dissatisfaction of millions of Soviet people would subside, and that is the cornerstone of the political struggle mentioned in the interview. Will people's most vital needs turn out to be a constant gamble in attaining ambitious aims? Our scientists and USSR people's deputies now have concrete proposals regarding a fundamentally new approach to the solution of the housing problem. But whether these are introduced and how quickly depends on the committee which the Supreme Soviet has entrusted B.N. Yeltsin with heading.

You begin to assess certain events in the recent past in a new manner. What is the true reason behind Yeltsin's withdrawal from the Politburo? What aim was he pursuing then? For, by remaining in the Politburo and heading the Moscow party organization, he could have really advanced perestroyka and improved the state of affairs in the capital at least. But then social tension would have been relieved and not only B.N. Yeltsin's positions, but also those of M.S. Gorbachev would have been strengthened. Is that perhaps the explanation of his bold action? V.I. Lenin once warned the party of the danger posed to the country by I.V. Stalin's capriciousness and intolerance, but doesn't history tend to repeat itself?

Of course, things were hard for B.N. Yeltsin, not everything turned out as he would have liked, not all the stagnant and antiperestroyka forces laid down their weapons as a result of words alone. But one cannot expect anything else in a revolutionary situation. A concrete political struggle was needed—not between the supporters of perestroyka but against its opponents. Gradually, surmounting the difficulties, incomprehension, or overt opposition, it was necessary to create conditions for a change for the better in the situation and surround oneself with true like-minded people. But that is an art. The art of achieving strategic goals by the consistent resolution of a whole series of tactical tasks. A politician cannot exist without that. It is always easier to criticize than to act for oneself, you only need to have the requisite courage, and you cannot deny that Boris Nikolayevich has that.

It also takes considerable courage to voluntarily abandon privileges, as mentioned in the interview. But my voters see as privileges above all the opportunity to obtain a prestigious apartment in the capital, rest in sanatoriums, and have a personal car. Unless Comrade Yeltsin has deprived himself of these benefits, perhaps we have had enough loud talk? Perhaps it is time to really prove what

each is capable of in concrete work? Boris Nikolayevich has this opportunity. The people are choking as a result of very grave housing conditions. If we do not immediately embark on truly revolutionary changes in the whole system of housing construction, we will soon find ourselves politically bankrupt. I hope that no one in the Supreme Soviet wants this and everyone will do everything in their power to ensure that people have a better life and that there is no cause for dissatisfaction.

[Signed] USSR People's Deputy Lieutenant Colonel B. Pylin, Volgograd

New USSR Foreign Travel Regulations Drafted

LD2208151189 Moscow TASS in English 1451 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—A number of documents considerably simplifying the procedure of Soviet citizens's exit from the USSR and foreign citizens' travel over the Soviet territory have been drafted in the Soviet Union for the purpose of bringing the USSR legislation in the area of people-to-people contacts in keeping with international obligations. These documents include the legislative act on the procedure of exit from and entry into the USSR, envisaging the right of every Soviet citizen to leave his or her country and return to it, in accordance with the international covenant on civil and political rights and the final document of the Vienna meeting, a briefing at the USSR Interior Ministry was told today.

Rules for the stay of foreign citizens in the USSR have also been drafted and will shortly be submitted for the consideration of the USSR Council of Ministers. Under these rules citizens of socialist countries are to be given the right of free travel over the territory of the USSR open to foreigners' visits, while citizens of other countries are to be given the right of unrestricted travel within the limits of a union or autonomous republic, territory or region where they are registered.

The briefing was told that a number of specific measures aimed at the further widening of contacts of Soviet people with citizens of foreign countries have been implemented in the USSR of late. All restrictions on the number of trips abroad have been lifted, a possibility for visits abroad at the invitation of any person has been opened, the procedure of obtaining exit documents has been simplified, and so on.

As a result of this, the number of applications for exit considered in the first six months of 1989 reached 1.7 million, thrice the number for the whole of 1987. Actually all the applications for exit are satisfied. Negative decisions are made only on 0.15 per cent of the number of applications considered.

The procedure of informing applicants about the reasons of refusing their applications for an exit for permanent residence abroad became more democratic. The commission of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on questions of citizenship looks into the justification of negative decisions taken by Interior Ministry bodies. Over the period of the commission's work (from 1987), negative decision in 556 cases have been revised, while the denial of the right to exit was confirmed to 432 persons, because of their knowledge of state secrets, as a rule.

Russian Council of Ministers Session Reported

PM2208115989 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The 16 August session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Council of Ministers devoted its main attention to the forthcoming transition of the RSFSR economy to the principles of territorial self-financing. The principles of this important and crucial action were comprehensively and profoundly analyzed with the participation of scientists from the USSR Academy of Sciences' Siberian and Urals departments, ministers, and department leaders, and approaches to it were outlined. With a view to developing the principles of and the mechanism for territorial self-financing it was decided to hold an experiment in shaping republic and local budgets in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and certain other regions.

The presidium resolved to step up its preparatory work linked with switching the RSFSR economy to the principles of territorial self-financing.

The question of the progress in preparing the republic's housing, municipal, and power services for work in the fall and winter periods was also examined. It was noted that certain ministries, departments, autonomous republic councils of ministers, kray soviet executive committees, and oblast soviet executive committees have not drawn the necessary conclusions from the mistakes and shortcomings that took place during the preparations for work in the last fall-winter period. The preparation of many housing, municipal, and power installations is being conducted unsatisfactorily.

The presidium instructed the relevant organizations to immediately take additional measures to eradicate the shortcomings in preparing the entire housing stock, heat supply sources, utilities, and other city economy installations for the winter. The presidium also established the personal responsibility of economic leaders for ensuring the reliable guaranteed work of all municipal economy services under winter conditions and for supplying fuel to enterprises and the population.

The question of measures to supply the requirements of enterprises in the light and local industries and consumer services to the population in respect of furs and pelts was also examined.

Kirishi 'Warning' Strike Called Over Plant Closure

PM2208112589 Moscow TRUD in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 1

[Report by TRUD special correspondent Ye. Druzhinina under the rubric "Returning to What Was Published": "Compromise Needed"; last two paragraphs are TRUD editorial note]

[Excerpts] Kirishi-Leningrad—The working people of Kirishi Biochemical Plant started their morning shift 1 August in an unusual mood. Everyone knew that by decision of the city soviet session, the protein-vitamin concentrate production facility was to be closed down on that day. Otherwise a citywide strike was planned. The Kirishi public had issued an ultimatum to the plant and the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, which produce, in the city's opinion, output that is ecologically dangerous to people's health. But the closing down of production meant that more than 1,500 plant workers would be left without work. Naturally, the biochemical plant workers were opposed to the soviet's decision. [passage omitted]

"Kirishi's problem is a problem of the correct siting of production forces. I think the city soviet session was hasty in adopting the decision to close down production. It is hard even to say for whose benefit it was adopted," B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committee, expressed his viewpoint to me.

"What will we do with 1,500 people? There is not work for everyone in the city now," G.P. Petrov, deputy chairman of the city soviet executive committee, confirmed.

But the city was in turmoil. And then the chairmen of the labor collective councils of Kirishi's four largest enterprises sent an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the trade union central committee.

That appeal resulted in two telegrams from Moscow. One of them was signed by V.K. Gusev. It stated, in particular, that, mindful of the opinion of the public and of Kirishi City Soviet deputies, the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Chemical and Timber Complex had obliged the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry by 1 October to submit options for converting the protein-vitamin concentrate production facility in Kirishi and to discuss this question in public; before 1 January to draw up technical planning documentation with regard to conversion and to submit claims for the necessary equipment and materials; in 1990 to provide for preparatory work to be done and for the manufacture of equipment and the provision of complete materials; in 1991 to begin work on reprofiling.

And then there was a telegram signed by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. "The USSR Supreme Soviet has received a number of appeals relating to the question of the production and use of protein-vitamin concentrates derived from petroleum paraffins. I have issued instructions to form a commission involving highly competent experts, to investigate this problem in detail, and to make proposals before 1 October. Please be guided by the decision adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers until the matter is discussed at the USSR Supreme Soviet. M.S. Gorbachev"

The problem has already begun to be solved. It has become known that production of disposable syringes will be organized at the biochemical plant. Construction of a block has begun. I believe a sensible compromise is needed for the good of the matter. There probably simply is no other way out. Unfortunately, we have to pay for past willful decisions. And this is another lesson in the fact that nature does not forgive mistakes.

When the Issue Was Being Made Up

A joint session of the labor collective councils of Kirishi enterprises has appealed to the city's residents to hold a 1-hour general warning strike 22 August to demand the closing down of the protein-vitamin concentrate production facility. An appeal has also been adopted at a city soviet executive committee session. It speaks of the inadmissibility of halting the work of enterprises, because this will still further complicate the already complex economic situation both of Kirishi and of the whole of Leningrad Oblast.

Aftermath of Magadan Airport Strike Reported

18290261 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 16 Aug 89 p 2

[Report by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA correspondent V. Androsenko and TASS correspondent in Magadan G. Krasnogor: "An Interrupted Flight. Afterword to Magadan Aviators' Strike"]

[Text] Workers of the comprehensive brigade of the service organization for postal cargo shipments (SOPGP) at the Magadan airport have been on strike for a whole week. It was necessary to take emergency measures. Workers from other services, activists from the city party organization, and military servicemen from the Magadan garrison worked on loading and unloading aircraft. And still the newspapers were delivered very late to the oblast center, Kolyma, and Chukotka, and 12 passenger flights and 15 cargo flights were delayed. More than 30 tonnes of mail accumulated at the airport. A total of 780 tons of cargo failed to reach its destination.

And here are some other results. Losses of profit for the aviation enterprise amounted to R222,000. Fines for failure to keep flight schedules amounted to R85,000. The material incentive fund "became slimmer" by R91,000 and the fund for social development by R116,000.

But how could one brigade eliminate such significant amounts of money from the enterprise's assets? Why did group egoism turn out to be stronger than the interests of the entire collective and of the passengers as well, among whom were nursing mothers and vacationers with passes that had to be used right away... Incidentally, did the strikers not count on the indignation of the latter, hoping they would influence the administration to make concessions sooner?

And that is how events developed. As early as March the service's trade union conference delivered a number of ultimatums to the management of the aviation detachment. Their essence amounted basically to the following: to increase the 13th wage for last year; to change the policy for calculation and thus increase the amount of the monthly bonus; to change the entries in the labor books according to the work that was being performed—i.e. if a person runs a crane, write "crane operator," if he drives a truck—"truck driver"... And not the way it is now: Everyone has the title "comprehensive brigade worker."

A month later a commission was created to study and figure out the brigade's demands. Its conclusions were heard at the Magadan civil aviation administration in the presence of the opposing sides. An agreement was reached that everything would be resolved after the return from a business trip of the first deputy chief of the administration, V. Zharov, who supervised the detachment's work. But in violation of the agreement the council of the service's labor collective held a meeting and decided to strike.

When the dispute was considered at a large number of different levels a conclusion was reached: The entries in the labor books actually did have to be changed. And the questions of bonuses should be discussed at a conference of the labor collective of the entire aviation detachment.

The conference that was convened at the end of May did not make any changes in the conditions or policy for awarding bonuses as demanded by the strikers. And this is understandable. Under conditions of economic accountability [khozraschet] it is possible to give the brigade any additional payments only at the expense of other subdivisions. And why should the service for postal cargo shipments get such a privilege when during the past 2 years labor productivity here has dropped and wages have increased by 6.3 percent?

The conference condemned the actions of the strikers by a majority of two votes. But with the second point of the decree the delegates admitted that their actions had been forced and brought about by the inactivity of the administration and the party and trade union organizations.

The situation is paradoxical. The conference will not give its OK to change conditions for awarding bonuses to workers of the SOPGP, as a result of which, actually, the entire affair flared up. But at the same time the responsibility for the strike is placed...on the administration.

We shall not make excuses for the managers. Many of the shortcomings in the organization of the work are their fault. But what about the collective itself? If they do not like the way things are they can introduce a contract or change over to leasing.... But not everyone wants to be in charge. We asked the head of the SOPGP, I. Ryzhov, why the service did not change over the leasing. After all, then the disputes with the administration would disappear of their own accord.

In response Ivan Vasilyevich began to discuss how poorly the service is supplied with transportation from the automotive base, how the head mechanic refuses to repair cranes, and how the administration ignores the questions they raise... And in general, as became clear from the conversation, I. Ryzhov is bothered more by something else. He announced his intention to "force" the bonuses through the court. There was no mention of looking for ways to increase labor productivity, which would make it possible to earn more. They think that if the work is not going well, everyone is to blame but them. And that it is irrelevant, for example, that the loaders themselves have a barbarian attitude toward equipment, to use the words of their informal leader, A. Tamarkin. The psychology of dependency has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of the people!

This must not be passed over in silence. At all times and in all countries transportation has been in a special position. And one can understand why. When there is disorder in transportation there is chaos in the economy. And not only in the economy. All life relies on it. Is this not why the authorities in other countries do not shrink from applying the harshest, most extreme measures against those who destabilize the work of transportation? Recall that at one time former U.S. President Ronald Reagan with one stroke of the pen fired all striking air traffic controllers. We recall this not to justify the President's action, but as a response to those strikers who in a discussion with us exclaimed: "They can strike in America, but we cannot?" It turns out that "they" cannot do everything they wish either.

Yet the Magadan airline workers, although at the conference of the labor collective they accepted a half measure of a solution, to put it mildly, they reserved the right to strike.

And this in a region that is connected to the rest of the country only by air bridges!

Court Proceedings for Rioters Open in Fergana

LD2208152789 Moscow TASS in English 1438 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Tashkent August 22 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Yuriy Kruzhillin:

Judicial proceedings against participants in inter-ethnic riots that rocked the Soviet Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan last June have been started in the Fergana region.

The conflicts that grew into armed clashes involved native inhabitants and Meskhetian Turks, a Caucasian minority deported under Stalin from their homeland in Georgia to Uzbekistan where they had lived for 45 years.

A court in Kokand, the largest industrial centre of the Fergana Valley, is hearing the case of Khabibullo Abdurakhmanov, a 20-year-old unemployed villager.

He is accused of crimes covered by six articles of the republican penal code, including organisation of mass disturbances, theft of fire-arms and munitions, attempts on the life of militiamen. All these three articles envisage maximum imprisonment of up to 15 years.

According to Alexander Frolov, assistant to the USSR prosecutor-general, it was only thanks to the man's poor skill of using weapons that he did not commit a graver crime: after seizing a pistol and 16 cartridges from a militia inspector, Abdurakhmanov failed to release the safety catch to shoot.

Due to immense public interest, the trial is taking place in a community centre of a local ginnery. On the first day, the court heard an indictment. This is to be followed by interrogations of the defendant, witnesses, experts and arguments of the sides.

"Twenty similar cases have been filed at the regional and district courts of the Fergana region," Frolov said. "35 people stand the charges of organising riots and committing brutal murders and other felonies."

Uzbek Commission on Fergana Restoration Meets

PM0808094189 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 15 Jul 89 p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "In the Uzbek Council of Ministers": "Eliminating the Consequences and Solving the Problems More Rapidly"]

[Text] Questions of more rapidly restoring the devastation, providing workers with jobs, and boosting the population's level of prosperity were examined 13 July at a session of the commission set up by the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers on events in Fergana Oblast. The session was moderated by G.Kh. Kadyrov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

It was noted that the Fergana Oblast Executive Committee [oblispolkom] and local soviet and economic organs have hitherto been unsatisfactory in organizing work to repair and restore housing and other facilities destroyed as a result of the illegal actions. It was recommended that the entire complex of restoration work envisaged in decisions adopted by the republic's government be implemented within a month.

The commission instructed the republic's economic and oblast soviet organs to step up work aimed at ensuring further economic and social development, providing the entire able-bodied population with work, including the previously unemployed section of the population, and increasing manpower resources in oblasts in the Fergana valley.

Serious attention was drawn to boosting the responsibility of the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and oblispolkoms for providing the earliest possible resolution of all the tasks of developing individual housing construction and personal subsidiary plots. The need to continue the daily purposeful work of explaining the statement made by by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on Central Television to the population was particularly stressed.

Kazakh First Secretary Opens Party Conference

LD2208144189 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1400 GMT 19 Aug 89

[Excerpt] On 18 and 19 August a republican conference of first secretaries of town and rayon party committees was held at the Kazakhstan Communist Party [KaCP] Central Committee. It was also attended by secretaries of rayon party committees, and secretaries and department heads of party organizations and cadre work of oblast party committees, officials of the KaCP Central Committee, and the republic's mass media.

The conference was opened by Comrade Nazarbayev, first secretary of the KaCP Central Committee, who also delivered a report on organizational and political task of the republican party committees in the condition for further deepening of restructuring. Reports were also delivered by Sagdiyev, chairman of the Presidium of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet on the introduction of amendments and addenda to the republic's constitution and the draft laws for the forthcoming elections of state government organs; Dzhanibekov, secretary of the KaCP Central Committee, on topical matters of ideological work and party committee tasks connecting with this issue; Gukasov, first deputy chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Agro-Industrial Committee, on mastering of lease contract relations in the agro-industrial complex; Abdullayev, deputy chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Planning Committee, on problems of switching the republic to regional financial autonomy. There was an interested exchange of opinions on a wide range of questions. The discussion was concluded by Comrade Nazarbayev, first secretary of the KaCP Central Committee. [passage omitted]

Socioeconomic Problems in Novyy Uzen Analyzed

PM2208122389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Aug 89 Second Edition p 1

[Correspondent D. Gutenev report under the rubric "Topical Problem: Novyy Uzen": " 'Rubber' Wall"]

[Text] Guryev Oblast—It has now been established that departmental shortcomings and miscalculations in the implementation of social policy lay at the root of the mass riots in Novyy Uzen and other population centers in the south of Guryev Oblast. They were the cause of the exacerbation of ethnic and socioeconomic problems. A month has passed since the curfew was lifted. What is life like in the city today?

"Working life is normal, on the whole," S. Nagayev, second secretary of the Novyy Uzen city party committee (gorkom), said. "A considerable number of collectives are working steadily. The Mangyshlak Gas Extraction Administration has exceeded the state order by 10 percent for the first 7 months. The Kazakh Gas Processing Plant collective is working without disruption. The start-up complex of a branch of the Kustanay Sewn Goods Factory is nearing completion and will provide work for several hundred people. The 'Progress' construction cooperative attached to the 'Uzenneft' Oil and Gas Extraction Administration recently commissioned a vegetable store, has nearly completed a canteen, and is starting capital repairs on housing. But the situation is complex. Well, we did not expect everything to get back to normal very quickly. But all kinds of rumors are being spread. Party activists are constantly working among the masses in order to quash these rumors. They are organizing meetings and attending weddings and funerals where large numbers of people are involved. They recently held a united political day in labor collectives and explained current tasks. And these tasks are great.

"Oil extraction in August is already more than 10,000 tonnes below target. If this continues, we will quickly lose the 'surplus' of just over 40,000 tonnes accumulated over the previous 7 months. The future does not inspire optimism. Borehole maintenance has been neglected. In the past few months, more than 200 specialists in capital and underground repair and many machine operators at hoist units have been let go. True, crash courses have been organized for young people. But when on earth will they be able to replace experienced specialists and skilled workers? Housing construction and the preparation of housing for winter have essentially been paralyzed. A total of 22 residential buildings erected at different times, which are badly designed and of inferior quality, are in a dangerous condition and their foundations urgently need to be reinforced. But we have neither the building materials nor the manpower to do this. In the municipal housing office, only 11 of the original 40-plus sanitary engineers are left. In order to repair heat supply lines, we have been forced to take welders out of industry and from other enterprises.

"The older members of the population understand these problems and try to help us. But young people are showing impatience and a maximalist attitude. They ask us: Why is there no government resolution? This concerns everyone. R. Cherdabayev, first secretary of the party gorkom, made a special trip to Alma-Ata to persuade the ministries and departments to take real action."

... A painfully familiar picture. We start talking about the problems when the situation becomes critical. But, as soon as things ease up a little, the "rubber" wall reappears, to use S. Nagayev's expression. You can make a dent in it but you cannot get through.

Here are some examples. An extensive program has been drawn up for the construction of individual housing. The republic has allocated a loan of R1 million. But there are no building materials—no timber, no slate, no nothing, apart from the cement that the city already has. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Ministry of Trade has set up three retail outlets for the settlements of Tenga and Staryy Uzen. But what are they to sell? During the events they were promised additional consignments, but now the allocations have been halved. And, at the time, there was real talk of moving the "Mangyshlakneftegazstroy" Trust from Shevchenko to Novyy Uzen, but everything now points to the fact that no one has any intention of doing this. This is creating mistrust of the conclusions and proposals made by the government commission which worked here for a long time, as well as mistrust of soviet authority.

Hence the uncertainty felt by the non-Kazakh members of the population. People originating from the Caucasus are still leaving the area. The service now in the shortest supply is the provision of railroad containers. Some families are getting together with others and leasing whole carriages. They are not only going to the Caucasus, where the governments of the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR will give them a loan and a plot of land, but also to Ryazan, Kalinin, and Tyumen Oblasts. Here too they are willingly accepted and all their removal costs are reimbursed.

"To date," N. Beybutov, chairman of "Solidarity"—an informal committee representing the Caucasus people in Novyy Uzen—and senior organizer of the party gorkom, told us, "more than 5,000 people have moved out lock, stock, and barrel. The wave of resettlement also involves Russians and Ukrainians. At the USSR Supreme Soviet session people's deputy S. Khadzhiyev raised the question with the Kazakh government of moral and material compensation for those who are being forced to tear up their roots. Fewer than half of the people of Caucasian nationality who originally lived in Novyy Uzen now remain. And, as the intimidation by extremists is showing no sign of stopping, the remainder also intend to leave."

As many as 500 apartments in the city have become vacant. Approximately half of them have been distributed among people in serious need and local authorities are keeping the rest in reserve. They are appealing to people to come back and hoping that specialists will move here from other areas. This is because not only industrial plants are being stripped of manpower—there is also a great shortage of drivers for industrial transport, and more than 100 store assistants, 40 cooks, and many working people in other professions are needed. In June and July the city bakery was 158 tonnes of bread products and 8 tonnes of confectionery below target. A considerable number of skilled workers have been lost here too.

In short, Novyy Uzen's ordeal is not yet over.

Tbilisi Citizens Refuse To Testify in Rally Case

PM1807103589 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 30 Jun 89 p 3

["Appeal by the Military Prosecutor's Office"—ZARYA VOSTOKA headline]

[Text] As reported earlier in the press, an investigation group of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office is conducting an investigation into the actions of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] internal troops and Soviet Army servicemen in dispersing the unauthorized rally in Tbilisi on the night of 8-9 April 1989 and enforcing the curfew.

The investigation is faced with a tremendous amount of work to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the said events on the basis of the materials of the case. This is achieved primarily with the help of eyewitnesses' testimony.

So as to ensure that the investigation of the circumstances of what happened is comprehensive, exhaustive, and objective, the investigators must question all people who were in one way or another affected by the events, eyewitnesses, and those involved in the events, irrespective of their official or social position and irrespective of their nationality.

The investigators have experienced no difficulties in summoning servicemen for questioning. At the same time, a considerable number of civilians, rally participants, and others, are unwilling to appear before the investigating organs to submit evidence. Here is just the most recent example. On Friday 23 June 11 people refused to accept summonses for questioning. We are not mentioning their names in the hope that they will change their decision once they have read this report.

They are obviously unhappy about the fact that it is the Military Prosecutor's Office which is conducting the investigation. However, this is stipulated by the Law of Criminal Procedure. Criminal proceedings in respect of servicemen fall under the jurisdiction of the Military Prosecutor's Office, which, however, does not answer to territorial military administration organs or the USSR minister of defense. It is part and parcel of the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

On 22 June 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the events of 9 April, which is currently in Tbilisi, was briefed on the progress of the investigation.

However, it is as yet premature to disclose even some of the results of the investigation, since a number of complex expert investigations that have been commissioned—on the causes of death of specific people in the square in front of Government House, for instance—are not yet complete.

The investigation procedure is objective, and all the circumstances which need to be proved are being looked into. There have been no complaints about incorrect conduct on the part of the investigators.

The members of the investigation group hope that the witnesses who are declining to give evidence will recognize that it is their civic duty to help to establish the objective truth. [Signed] Colonel of Justice A. Siryk, assistant to the main military prosecutor
Colonel of Justice V. Matus, investigator for major cases at the Main Military Prosecutor's Office

Clash With Militia Reported in Ivano-Frankovsk

LD2108105989 Kiev in English to North America 2330 GMT 17 Aug 89

[Text] Nearly 3,000 believers of the Greek-Catholic Church gathered for a public prayer on the outskirts of Ivano-Frankovsk. After the prayer the believers ran to the downtown area where they decided to hold a meeting without sanctions of the city authorities.

The extremist elements resorted to violent actions, as a result of which quite a few militiamen received injuries. The Ivano-Frankovsk Procurator's Office has initiated a criminal case.

Tiraspol Workers Protest Moldavian Language Law

LD2208182489 Moscow TASS in English 1701 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Kishinev August 22 TASS—Factories in the Moldavian city of Tiraspol were at a stand-still today as workers of predominantly non-Moldavian origin are voicing their opposition to some provisions of the draft laws on languages published in the press and submitted for confirmation to the parliament of this southern republic to begin session on August 29.

The city workers held a two-hour warning strike five days ago.

The new drafts differ drastically from the proposed legislation discussed last March, believes a leader of the United Council of City Work Collectives, a body that heads the strike movement.

"We submitted a whole number of specific suggestions but no one took them into account," he complained.

"As a result of this lawmaking, there has emerged a draft law that is unacceptable for workers in Tiraspol where more than 87 per cent of the population do not speak the Moldavian language."

Strikers stress that such important issues cannot be handled without due account for the interests not only of the Tiraspol residents but also of the nearly 40-per cent non-Moldavian population of the republic.

The Tiraspol workers do not want to be faced with a fait accompli as it happened in Estonia. They demand that decisions of the 10th session of the city council endorsing bilingualism that has been established in the city for centuries be taken into account.

The republican leadership has decided just to explain the new draft laws in work collectives and meetings rather than submit them for discussion.

City activists and republican parliamentarians had a meeting in Tiraspol in the afternoon. Speakers at the meeting demanded that the new draft laws on languages be submitted for public discussion and their adoption postponed.

Belorussians Describe Post-Chernobyl Plight

PM0908092189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jul 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by A. Illesh: "Exclusion Zone. In the Radiation-Contaminated Area a Little Over 3 Years After Chernobyl"]

[Text] The letter from the inhabitants of the Belorussian city of Khoyniki was brought to the editorial office by Irina Konopelko, a member of the Culture Center staff. The letter bore more than 600 signatures. And even if a nit-picking specialist—radiologist or physicist, biologist or doctor—were to spot inaccuracies in it and notice technical flaws, it would not change the point of it. For it is not a question of details of post-Chernobyl problems, but of something else. The treatment of the people who are compelled to live on radiation-contaminated land.

[Letter begins] The border of Khoynikskiy Rayon is 5 km from the stricken reactor. And the evacuation zone starts 12 km from the center of the city.... We are now well aware that after the explosion the winds blew for several days in the direction of Belorussia—toward Narovlyanskiy, Khoynikskiy, and Braginskiy Rayons. How much radioactivity fell on our land?—to this day we do not know. But it was obviously a lot, because one-third of our rayon's territory is behind barbed wire and the rest, the specialists say, is contaminated.

What do we want, what are we demanding? A basic human right—to be able to breathe clean air, go to the woods, and bathe. In short, to live. At the moment you cannot do this without damaging your health. Why? Our children are denied simple human pleasures. But how do you explain to a child that ordinary sand is dangerous? How do you tell him that grass and flowers are enemies? A mother giving her son or daughter a glass of milk shudders when she wonders how many radionuclides will be consumed with the milk. When we clean potatoes we wonder how much "dirt" there is in the sand and how much remains after we have washed the potatoes several times. Some will say, it is possible, you can wash potatoes clean! But who would dare (while remaining completely honest) claim that you can grow clean products on dirty land? Yet they are being produced....

A very senior comrade said on Belorussian television: The Khoyniki cheese-making combine stopped work in 1986. Not true! The plant is still operating and its products—curds and butter—are distributed throughout the republic. Moreover, our rayon sends potatoes, grain, canned goods, and meat all over the country....

Alas, we still do not have a clear picture of the radioactive contamination of the rayon. the maps that the economic managers possess seem not to reflect reality. Every kolkhoz [collective farm] and sovkhoz [state farm] chairman must have absolutely precise data. Not aerial photographs, but studies carried out on the ground. We posed this question. The answer we got was that there was no foreign currency to buy the requisite equipment for investigations on the ground.

USSR Academy of Medical Sciences L. Ilin wrote in the Belorussian press:

"...At any dosage level, even virtually zero, long-term consequences are theoretically possible. The smaller the dose of radiation, the smaller the likelihood of such an effect.... The no-threshold concept suggests that even with the minutest dose of radiation it is theoretically possible that there will be consequences in time. There are three: congenital deformities (abnormalities), malignant tumors, genetic changes...."

The academician emphasized the word "theoretical" all the time. Where is the guarantee that these three types of effects can occur only theoretically given the doses the people of the rayon have received (and are receiving)? Suppose it is. Is there a guarantee at all that the levels we are experiencing at the moment are entirely safe? Here is an example: In the village of Tulgovichi there lives a girl called Yelena T., who has already reached the level of 13 microcuries per kilogram of weight. And this is not an isolated case. They try to tell us that she has been drinking milk from a cow on the personal plot. But they

(like many other people in the rayon) do not have their own cow! The family (this has been checked) try to observe all the medical recommendations. But there are indeed cases where people have been consuming milk from their own cows. But we are not talking about people who are taking a foolish risk. The point is that deliveries of state milk are very rare....

It is terrible to imagine a situation where they suddenly tell us in 10 years time: People should not have been living here! So why are we living here? They say it is safe here. Then why in just 3 years have most of the leading cadres left our rayon? I will just list the posts. In 1987 the first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Raykom [Rayon Committee] left for Minsk. Was he transferred for good work? But it was not from him that we heard about the accident—it was from the "Vremya" program. Yet at that time, a matter of kilometers from the reactor explosion, people were planting potatoes and children were playing in the sand, walking in the forest, sunbathing, and swimming.... They looked at the smoke streaming out of the stricken unit. First they started removing the livestock, and not until 4 May the people. That is a caring attitude for you.

Let us continue the list of those who have left our area.

In 1988 the raykom second secretary, the chief of the agitation and propaganda department, the chief of the No. 68 Mobile Mechanized Column, the deputy director of the No. 50 Rural Vocational and Technical School, the head teacher at the No. 3 Secondary School, the secretary of the trade union raykom, the chief of the Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] General Department, the "Selkhoztekhnika" chief.... Finally, the chairman of the sports committee. I could continue the list of leaders who have left the city. Is not not rather too many for a rayon center? Many of the chiefs are preparing to leave right now. And they all have a "valid" reason—illness, transfer. So why did the city leaders call those who wanted to leave in the first, most terrible months deserters?

Specialists would have us believe that our indignation, alarm, and illnesses are the result of radiation phobia. Perhaps that is so, but it too is a complex disease, with serious consequences. But who is going to explain why there are now hundreds of children whose blood tests show abnormalities, with frequent cases of anemia.... Throat diseases, various inflammations, and colds are more serious than before. We can see that our children are weaker and all the time there is a disastrous shortage of nurses in the majority of kindergartens in the rayon and the city and there are no medicines and medicinal herbs.

Our children, as those same specialists say, need a varied diet. But how do you get it if the rations issued in Khoyniki comprise two cans of stewed meat a month. And only on one occasion in the past 3 years has everyone been issued a kilogram of buckwheat. You cannot get baby food for love or money—juice, kasha, and purees for infants. In the 3 years there has not been a single sausage in any of the kindergartens (this is documented). Over the past 2 years 79-81 kopecks have been allocated for 4 meals a day. How, pray, can one feed a child in our zone when a glass of juice costs 25 kopeks? Do not bother looking for parsley, sorrel, dill, or lettuce in our stores. It is pointless. Caviar, liver, and cod, which occasionally come to our rayon, no one has ever seen anywhere. It is summer, but we do not even dream about berries. Fruit and vegetables are few and far between.

And how do you explain the fact that food for kindergartens (Nos 1, 2, and 3) is delivered by horse, kicking up clouds of dust on the road! Everyone knows that the most awful thing is dust, in which one can still find radionuclides. Yet the rayon has only two sprinklers, which are used to water the city square. Leaves get burned in the spring and fall and the dust is carried by the wind....

I would like to know how we can observe the rules of personal hygiene (as recommended by scientists) when we are given one (!) piece of soap and one (!) packet of powder every 3 months?

It says in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Health Ministry recommendations: "Taking children away for the summer months is authorized, since it reduces the radiation dose by 20-25 percent, if the therapy lasts at least 2-3 months." As is known, adolescents expel the radionuclides more slowly. How can you talk about therapy when the majority of them get only 15-18 days' leave?

Questions, questions.... All of them unanswered. Why? Well, probably because over the 3 years there has not been a single really committed scientist or correspondent and all the serious checks get only as far as Minsk or Gomel. But we—the locals—no longer believe the local specialists, I am afraid. Those who understated the radiation levels in 1986. Those who even now are reluctant to face up to the truth. So the three rayons are left alone to face their tragedy. They say that human society has a limit to its endurance, which cannot be ignored. We have reached that limit. What now? [letter ends]

"What now?"—the question is also put to the editorial office by 64 teachers and pupils at the No 183 Vocational and Technical School in Khoyniki. They list their problems and pose questions to which they have been unable to obtain cogent answers in Gomel Oblast. In April IZVESTIYA (No 93) published an item headed "Urgent Letter...Do Not Publish." It was also about glasnost in the Belorussian rayons affected by the Chernobyl accident, about the fact that the highly "distinctive" life organized there does not suit the population at all. But the republic's leadership (in the shape of a Council of Ministers deputy chairman) claimed the opposite: Information and assistance for the affected rayons are arriving "in a quantity sufficient for the population." The editorial office has not received a response to the

criticism to this day. We would like to know the views of the comrades who have been in charge of the state of affairs in contaminated areas since the publication of this letter.

This is what occurs to one when one reads such letters.

There is no money to organize a normal diet for children.... The situation is bad in the special zone as far as food, essential food, in fact, is concerned.... Questions are being asked about the quality of the drinking water.... And so much has been said about the quality of the medical services that the Hippocratic oath might as well be abandoned as useless. So many essential (judging by their titles) aid funds of various kinds have been set up in the country of late! Perhaps these organizations' money and the people working in them could in some way help the inhabitants of the rayons affected by the Chernobyl accident? After all the Soviet Children's Foundation named for Lenin has a special "Children of Chernobyl" program.

And another thing. I once tried to establish where the hundreds and hundreds of millions we have all transferred to the celebrated account No 904—the fund to aid the accident victims—have gone. What have the rubles, dollars, pounds, and so forth been spent on? The editorial office was unable to obtain any specific information. How this money would have come in useful in Khoyniki today. But perhaps the account exists and all is not yet lost? That is something else I would like to know.

Professor Comments on Republic Sovereignty

PM1608094589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Aug 89 Second Edition p 3

[Professor B. Krylov, doctor of juridical sciences, article under the rubric "Debating Platform": "Not to the Detriment of Human Rights"]

[Text] There can be no argument that nationalities problems are complex. Recent events have proved how acute they can become. There is great and justified interest in a sensible solution to the problems. In the process of polemics, however, errors are made which seem to me at times to be associated with unwitting distortions of highly important concepts.

This applies primarily to the concept of sovereignty as supremacy and independence of power. Everyone agrees on this in principle. But some authors of published material are unwilling to agree that absolute and unlimited sovereignty does not and cannot exist. In fact no state, no institution of state power is entitled to breach the principles of international law. The sovereignty of any state organ is limited by the rights and freedoms of citizens recognized by the world community.

The recognition of such limitations of sovereignty is very important for the establishment of a rule-of-law state in our country as a guarantee of the free development of the human individual. Human rights must not be violated. It is unlawful to set them in opposition to the rights of the state, the rights of the people, the rights of any society or formation. The use of any power is justified only in the interests of man. This is fundamental.

But the organization of society is such that it does not fit into a scheme. After all, a citizen is part of the people, he is part of society and the state. The abundance of relationships contains an endless number of problems. They are especially complex in a multinational state, especially a federation built on a national basis.

It is impossible to imagine the exercise of state sovereignty [polnovlastiye] by the federation of the USSR without taking into account the specific national features of its constituent republics. It is equally impossible to imagine any sovereignty [polnovlastiye] of a national state formation—a union republic—without taking into account the common interests of all peoples, of the union's entire population.

There are two legal forms prevailing in our country's practice which ensure the combination of the interests of the USSR and of its constituent national union republics. Both forms were designed to ensure the Soviet state's sovereignty by defining and delineating the powers of the union and of the republics.

These two forms are the treaty between the republics and the constitution which was elaborated on the basis of the treaty and developed its basic provisions.

I think that the second form—the constitution—has proved more suitable for the purposes of our state building. Despite the fact that a constitution must be as stable as possible, it can be amended using a relatively straightforward procedure, while the treaty form traditionally does not permit amendment. And yet sometimes life demands amendments.

It must be noted that, to this day, world experience has not recorded the creation of a single federal state which has managed to avoid disputes between organs at different levels. Our federation has not managed to avoid disagreements, either.

It follows from this that a mechanism for the resolution of disputes is necessary. The nature of this mechanism largely determines the nature of mutual relations within the state and society. It ought to be mentioned that the definition of the mechanism for resolving disputes within a federation's framework largely depends on ideas about sovereignty. Strange as it might seem, there still exists a view that it is possible to have a federative state where sovereignty belongs only to the federation's constituent states. In our case, only to union republics. Given this, it is deemed justified to ultimately have just one method for resolving disputes between the federation and the union republics: A republic's exercise of its right to veto decisions by federal organs with which it disagrees.

I think that this formulation of the question cannot be accepted as correct. It cannot be accepted because, as a member of the federation, a republic cannot refuse to recognize the right of the federation, exercised by its organs, to make decisions stemming from its constitutional powers, which are conditioned by the existence of political, economic, social, and other ideas common to all union republics. The federation's right to make decisions which are binding on all can be rejected only if the unity of the development goals of the federation and of all union republics or any one of them is also rejected.

But still, what sort of mechanism ought there to be to coordinate the interests of an individual (union) republic with the interests of the USSR as a whole? This mechanism cannot be by any single institute or any single institution. It comprises a system of institutes and institutions. A leading position ought to be occupied by the USSR representative organs—the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet with its two chambers. The existing experience of their work has proved that many disputed questions, regardless of flaws in the procedure for their examination, have been successfully agreed, and agreed in the common interests of republics and the union.

It was admitted during the discussion of the problem of republican economic accountability that a whole series of disputed points vanished in the process of study in the country's government institutions. It is clear that these institutions, and primarily the USSR Council of Ministers, whose membership includes the heads of government of all union republics, are also part of the mechanism of agreement.

I think that no deadlocks should develop within the framework of a real union. Virtually all federative states have organs which are empowered to make decisions on disputes between the federation and its members. The United States has the Supreme Court, comprising judges appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and having the right to declare juridically invalid laws passed by both the federation and the states. The FRG has the Federal Constitutional Court, which makes decisions on the conformity of laender laws with the federal constitution.

At the same time, let me remark that, in the course of studying federal constitutions and reading works on the problems of federalism, I have not come across a single example of any state belonging to a federation having the right to reject a federal law. There are states which give their member states the right to dispute them. In Switzerland, for example, any law passed by both chambers of the federal parliament can, on petition by 50,000 citizens or 8 cantons (out of a total of 26), be submitted to a referendum whose decision is final.

It is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the USSR Constitution makes provision for a mechanism which sets in motion a procedure for examining draft laws and other most important questions of state life if a union republic is unhappy with them. In conformity with Article 115 of the USSR Constitution, such drafts can be submitted for nationwide discussion at the proposal of a union republic, represented by its supreme organs of state power. This is a serious and democratic guarantee that the common opinion of the whole Soviet people shall be taken into account. As far as I know, nobody has objected to its existence.

The objections by a series of people's deputies from Baltic republics regarding the formation of the Constitutional Oversight Committee in conformity with Article 125 of the USSR Constitution are based on the grounds that it can—or so they claim—suspend the operation of a republican act. Prof I. Gryazin claims that hitherto the exercise of such power "was possible only by unlawful means." Is this right? Let us look at the text of the constitution. Article 74 of the USSR Constitution points out that in the event of "divergence between a union republic law and an all-union law, the USSR law shall prevail." This power means the right to declare that any union republic acts which contravene USSR laws lack juridical force. Not only to suspend their operation but actually to repeal them.

So why has the author found it necessary to deny this right of the USSR to ensure uniformity of legal regulations throughout the country's territory, why is it necessary to employ the ruse of deliberately overlooking the existence of Article 74 of the USSR Constitution? Can the USSR exist without its organs' rights to express the common interests of its population, even if part of the population (or persons considering themselves its representatives) does not always agree with various specific decisions? I think that the answer is unambiguous. It cannot. In the interests of the cause, and as life itself dictates, it is necessary to concentrate not on de facto denial of the powers of union organs to make decisions extending to the whole country, but on seeking the most rational methods to resolve any disagreements that arise. This road is always open.

What is the cause of some persons' desire to exacerbate the situation, to seek constitutional crises, to seek not the road to the temple but the road leading to deadlock? It seems to me that the answer lies in an underestimation of the depth and irreversibility of processes now under way in the country. For example, in the context of the new functions and rights of labor collectives which control (or rather are beginning to control!) the means of production and the results of their labor, the debate on who ought to own the land, the means of production, and so on—the USSR people as a whole or the people of each union republic separately—is beginning to lose its importance.

I think that, in today's conditions, there ought to be a substantial amendment to the concept of the sovereignty of all central state organs, both in the federation and in

the union republics. After all, they both will have to be "squeezed out" to the advantage of territorial (local) collectives of citizens represented by local soviets of people's deputies.

Substantial changes are also occurring in the idea of the sovereignty of the main nation in any national state. Article 1 of the International Convention on Human and Political Rights clearly says that every state "pledges to respect and guarantee to all persons living within its territory and under its jurisdiction the rights...without any discrimination whatsoever with regard to race, color, sex, language, religion, political and other beliefs, national or social origins, property status, birth, or any other factor." I assume that this norm, recognized by the world's entire civilized community, makes de facto and de jure equality mandatory. So the very possibility of introducing residence qualifications in electoral laws or laws on republican citizenship seems dubious. Such a qualification actually implements differentiation between people which is banned by the convention.

All these and many other problems must be taken into account in the process of solving the nationalities question. This process is so important and so multifaceted that it is unimaginable without a comparison of different viewpoints. I agree with the authors of the article "So Who Does Know the Formula?" (PRAVDA 26 July 1989) about the impermissibility of "name-calling." But why are those who are against the introduction of republican currency perceived by some as "people whose thinking is based on the old stereotypes of nationalities policy" and so on? The process of creating a "Common Market" in West Europe is proceeding to the creation of a common currency—so as to make possible a future renunciation of national currencies. Is this not sufficient ground to ponder our own paths of development? Or are there so many "cavemen" among economists in the West?

Of course, everyone must learn to conduct a debate. Nobody has a monopoly of opinions. Arguments are needed—arguments befitting contemporary man and our time.

'Top Priority' Views Nationality Issue

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[Excerpts] [Pozner] How do you, ladies and gentlemen. This is Vladimir Pozner presenting "Top Priority." With me today, as usual, Professor and Doctor Radomir Bogdanov, and we have a newcomer who has been on the program a couple of times but you may not be familiar with his name, (Andrey Melville), who is also an expert on Soviet-American relations.

Today we will not be looking at Soviet-American relations. Today "Top Priority" looks at what is indeed a very, very top priority for this country—the nationalities issues in light of the Communist Party platform that was published on Thursday in PRAVDA as a draft proposal for a law that will certianly be discussed first of all in the republics, on a national level, next month at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. There will be a long and detailed discussion as to what this law, what this draft actually can do to improve a situation that certainly is far from perfect.

I think it could be said that basically the draft does have some radical suggestions in the sense of giving the republics a far greater degree of independence than they have enjoyed up until now and it goes so far, in fact, as to propose a review of the treaty on the formation of the USSR that was signed in December of 1922; and this could lead to a completely new relationship between the republics that would make up either a federation, or a confederation. Who knows how this is going to go.

I would like to ask you, or start this discussion off, with the following question: What is your general feeling; give me if you can an over view of this Communist Party platform? First of all this is the first time I've ever seen a document published in this country that actually says "platform."

[Bogdanov] Yes, this is very interesting observation, this is very interesting observation because if you are offered a platform it means you have plenty of room for discussion. You have plenty of room for controversial approach. This is not something like thesis, thesis or something like, you know, program. This is platform. This is very significant, number one. Number two, in that paper which is called "platform" you have a comprehensive coverage of the problem. This is very important. A comprehensive coverage beginning from this history of the problem. (?As you, I) just would like to remind our listeners that the first part of the platform is called: What we have inherited. This is also very significant, means that on the basis of the analysis of the past we are trying to make conclusions for the future, and to take lessons—bad lessons, good lessons—from the past. Now, if you ask me as a layman, as a Soviet citizen—I am a professional Americanologist, and it may seem like I have not many to do with that—but I should state that it has a very direct and close connection to the Soviet-American relations. It may sound strange.

[Pozner] How so?

[Bogdanov] How so? Because this is the future of our union.

[Pozner] So?

[Bogdanov] In that way it has very close link to the Soviet-American relations, and I believe that the American experts, politicians, professors, academics, they are studying the platform very carefully because they are trying to find out what we are trying to find out—how far that platform will serve to strengthen the union on the new basis. [passage omitted]

[Pozner] Dr (Melville), what I'd like to ask you is: When you read this detailed draft was there anything that made you kind of sit up and pay attention? Now was there anything that really struck you as being of extreme importance?

[(Melville)] Well in the first place, the very fact of the publication of such a platform should be regarded as a radical departure from the traditional practices in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted] Let me remind myself and you that for decades American Sovietologists warned about the potential difficulties in the nationality issue, while this, at least for the majority, for the absolute majority of the Soviets, was not really the issue.

[Pozner] That was, it was a nonexisting issue, that's true.

[(Melville)] It was the nonissue.

[Pozner] [passage omitted] One of the ideas proposed in the draft is that if a law adopted by the federal government—let me use American terminology to make it more understandable—adopted by the federal government is not in the interests, or contradicts the interests, of any of the 15 republics the republics have the right to protest it and to bring it before the court; and that is seen as a radical departure from the past. On the other hand, the draft also says that should a republic adopt a law that contradicts the Constitution, the law of the land, then that is also subject to being protested. And there seems to be a view already that that second qualification that I just brought up in a way takes away the independence that the draft supposedly gives. How do you feel about that? Should the republics have the right to adopt any law?

[Bogdanov] Well you know, I believe that if you have a union based on a treaty, of course you should have some clause that make you sovereign, make you independent in the real sense of that word, not only on paper. And what is independence? First of all, freedom to make laws, freedom to make laws which are considered to be good for your republic. At the same time, if you recognize that you have a pluralistic society, that you have pluralistic interests, pluralistic views, how you can expect that all 16 republics...

[Pozner, interrupting] Fifteen, excuse me.

[Bogdanov] Sorry, 15 republics will adopt the same laws which will be satisfactory for everybody? Of course not. Each republic will follow its own interests; which is, by the way, quite natural. What is the role of the center power? Just to balance all these interests and try to bring all these interests to the common benefit.

[(Melville)] (?Let's) look at the situation in...

[Pozner] Yes, Dr (Melville).

[(Melville)] I think there are two aspects in the problem.

[Pozner] Right.

[(Melville)] One is legal and one is moral and political. In the moral and political sense. the question is whether the republics should have the right to adopt some laws or some legislation which could contradict in principle the constitution or the federal laws.

[Pozner] Right.

[(Melville)] And the solution to this moral and political dilemma, I think, is the fact that some of the republics are bound to give some of their sovereignty to the federal government. And in fact that what has happened in the USA and that was one of the issues of the Civil War in the USA. But the legal aspect of the problem is quite different and we should not probably right now try to discuss the platform as the law.

[Pozner] It's not law.

[(Melville)] The platform is not the law, and that's why in the platform there is no hint of what kind of a political mechanism and legal mechanism there would be established in order to moderate the possible conflict between the different republics.

[Bogdanov] Here Andrey, what about the constitutional court?

[Pozner] Yes, well that exists. Let me call your attention to something that's happening right now, when the (?process is seen to happen). As you know the Supreme Soviet of Estonia adopted a law on local elections, and according to that law, to vote you had to be a permanent resident and you had to live there for no less than 2 years; and to be elected you either had to live in your electoral district for 5 years or in Estonia for 10 years, and this was seen by the non-Estonian part of the population as being discriminatory and as contradicting the constitution of the Soviet Union. And they went on strike, thousands and thousands of people went on strike, and now it seems finally, according to what I've heard and what I've been reading, that the Estonian legislature will be taking another look at that law because indeed it does contradict the Constitution. Now, what do we do with something like that? What, that's what I'm talking about.

[Bogdanov] Already you have a precedent. The Supreme Soviet, I mean the presidium of the Supreme Soviet....

[Pozner, interrupting] Of the USSR.

[Bogdanov] Of the USSR, all-union, the all-union body took already an exception to the laws taken by Estonian Supreme Soviet.

[Pozner] Right.

[Bogdanov] And this law in which it's stated that some clauses of the Estonian law are illegal, becuase they are in contradiction with the all-union Constitution, means what? That they are just postponed, suspended, at least suspended, and some of them just abolished?

[Pozner] Right.

[Bogdanov] But now you have another problem, you have another problem because you have some people at the Estonian end, that claim that their constitution is prevailing over all-union constitution.

[Pozner] Exactly.

[Bogdanov] And they have a right just to do otherwise. If all- union Constitution is in contradiction with their constitution the all-union Constitution is wrong. Then they have to change it, you know. So I am not yet sure where is the legal, what is the legal... [sentence as heard]

[Pozner] Yes, (Andrey)?

[(Melville)] Let me say that I regard the issue in Estonia as a very good example of the difficulty of attempts to solve the nationality problem in the Soviet Union. That's why I am kind of—I am Russian, and I am split in myself. To some extent I fully understand the arguments of Estonians and we all know their own arguments. At the same time, putting a different hat on myself, I try to understand the arguments of the non-Estonian population inside Estonia. And, very frankly, I do not have the answer, I do not have the solution. But that is very important in itself because I think that certain parts, certain elements in the platform, are kind of rhetorical and they remind [one of] our traditional ideological rhetoric of the past. Here I refer to the passage on the goal of the reform of the nationality relations legislation in the Soviet Union. It is stated in the platform that the goal is the harmonization of relations between nationalities. That is utopia. I mean the goal is the management of nationality issue and nationality problems. There is no way to harmonize these clashes of different and opposing interests, and I am thinking that we are entering the period of deep and painful cleavages and conflicts and we are bound to live through and work out the mechanisms, political and legal mechanisms, how to deal with (?this) different and opposing conflicts of interest. There is no way that we can harmonize them, at least in the foreseeable future. I may sound pessimistic, but that's what I think.

[Pozner] Is he sounding pessimistic?

[Bogdanov] Yes he does, but you know my problem is with the whole complex of problems. My impression is that you are talking only about Estonia, but my problem is Russia, Russian Republic. And if you look at the platform you will find out a lot of very interesting things about Russia itself, and don't forget that Russia is the main leading republic by all dimensions.

[Pozner] Well, by physical, by physical...

[(Melville), interrupting] With that I definitely agree.

[Bogdanov] And that will in fact very much...

[(Melville), interrupting] We have lots of other examples, (?not about) Estonia, what about Nagorno-Karabakh, what about Armenia, Azerbaijan, what about Turkmenia?

[Pozner] We have less than a minute left, so I'm going to have to ask you to kind of wind up what is a very interesting discussion. Let me put it this way: Do you see this platform as an honest attempt to come to grips with what is probably the most complex problem we have?

[Bogdanov] Yes, this is a genuine attempt to grasp with the situation, but this is very controversial.

[Pozner] All right.

[(Melville)] I would put it this way: This is the genuine attempt to start the discussion, and only in the discussion some consensus might appear. This is a platform, this is not a legislation.

[Pozner] I quite agree with that and I think we'll get broad participation from all over the country. We'll be with you next week at the same time. On behalf of "Top Priority," good listening.

'Real Democratization' for CPSU Emphasized

PM2308091989 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 22 Aug 89 p 2

[Open letter from Ye. Kushnarev, chief of the organizational department of Kharkov City Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, to O. Kazarov, secretary of Ulyanovsk CPSU Oblast Committee and author of the article "Behind Whom Is the Vanguard Lagging?" (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 5 August 1989), under the rubric "The Party Within Perestroyka, Perestroyka Within the Party": "Let Us Speak Frankly"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Kazarov!

Like you, I am a professional party worker. I follow with understandable interest press articles concerning the theory and practice of perestroyka. And your article left neither myself nor my colleagues indifferent. You may be interested to learn that the most enthusiastic responses came from those who just over 1 year ago were in euphoria at Nina Andreyeva's ill-famed "principles."

I hold different views, but at the same time I am grateful to you for expressing quite frankly and clearly in your article the opinion of a certain section of the party apparatus. That very section which, according to my observations, finds it far easier and more desirable to turn back than to go forward, along the path of democracy and glasnost.

For the past was not so bad for some people: Everyone rose and applauded when you came in, and they unanimously adopted a question when you put it to the vote. No struggle for a deputy's mandate, party-schedule benefits for life....

But this is all by the by. What struck me most of all in the article was your unshakable confidence that things are proceeding normally in the party and that there are no grounds for concern. Believe me, I am no less concerned than you about our party's fate and prestige but, forgive me, I cannot share your optimism.

I believe that the party's prestige today is the lowest it has been in all the 72 years of our state's existence. It is, of course, tempting to cite intrigues by journalists and informals to account for this. It is also possible to complain about the people, who are becoming rapidly politicized (whom you identify with the "howling mob"): We are concerned for their benefit while they, unreasonably, are unwilling to suffer. But it must not be forgotten that it is not society that lives by the party's laws but the party that lives by the laws of society, which it has raised the people to renew. And if society has turned out not quite or not at all as the party promised, then the people have a right to give complaints to it.

You are indignant because Communists have been placed in a position where they answer for everything. But can you name just one structure in our society where there are no Communists? Let us be honest at least before our own conscience: Under a one-party system there can only be one-party responsibility.

I wish to stipulate at once: I am convinced that at the present historical time the CPSU alone is capable of uniting all forces in our society and extricating it from a state of crisis. But for this the party must, as a minimum, express the interests of the greater part of society and enjoy its trust. This can only be done if the CPSU itself is the expression of the highest and most consistent form of democracy.

In your opinion, the process of democratization within the party is taking its course and is even ahead of perestroyka in other spheres. True, I found just two confirmations of this in the article: "The overwhelming majority of party forums today proceed just as sharply as the Congress of USSR People's Deputies" and "the party apparatus has long been streamlined." Not quite enough for total convincingness, you will agree. Therefore I share the opinion that perestroyka within the party is lagging substantially behind the processes occurring in society. Of course, I do not know how things are in Ulyanovsk, but there is more than enough confirmation of this in our Kharkov.

It is possible to recall, for example, the elections of delegates to the 19th party conference, which were organized in the classic stagnation style. And it was characteristic that it was not Communists but informals who openly opposed such actions. It is possible to add to this last year's report and election campaign, with its curtailed democracy and glasnost and the unopposed election of 33 out of 35 oblast party committee [obkom], city party committee [gorkom], and rayon party committee [raykom] secretaries. And the latest campaign to elect USSR people's deputies demonstrated the total collapse of the bureaucratic-apparatus policy in the city. The simulated struggle among four high-ranking republic and oblast leaders in rural okrugs still further undermined our prestige with the people of Kharkov.

In a situation of people's growing dissatisfaction with the practical results of perestroyka and against a background of increased activeness and sometimes even aggressiveness on the part of informals, many of our primary party organizations and Communists, including leaders, have retreated into total defense and displayed an inability to conduct a dialogue with people, to win their confidence, and to carry them along by dint of example and persuasion. These processes (and, in my opinion, they are common to the party) are assuming threatening dimensions. And there is one reason for this: A considerable section of the party apparatus and the party aktiv, particularly those people who have held leading posts for a considerable time, is incapable of displaying ideas and actions consonant with the new conditions. They seek all the answers to today's problems in the past and, not finding them, naturally they frequently take actions that merely worsen the situation.

There is one way out—a real renewal of the leading cadre corps is needed. I am convinced that tremendous cadre potential lies hidden deep within the party. But our electoral mechanism, which has been formalized to the utmost and is quite undemocratic, does not allow it to put itself forward. Real democratization of this process is needed. This alone is capable of sharply enhancing Communists' political activeness and really drawing them into internal party life. If we elect the Congress of USSR People's Deputies by nationwide ballot, why can we not form the CPSU Congress with the direct participation of the entire party? On the whole, the election mechanism must be such as to optimally promote the emergence of strong, enterprising, creative individuals at all levels. Throughout the world this is ensured only through multiple-choice elections.

Considerably more radical measures must also be taken to ensure a normal pluralism of opinions in the party. I believe that a difference of views among Communists, given unity of aims, should be regarded as a normal phenomenon and even one of great value. Proceeding from this, an atmosphere of openness and debate should be created at all party forums, ensuring the expression of various platforms and concepts before the adoption of final decisions. Of course, a decision adopted by the majority must be binding on the minority but must not deprive it of the right to uphold its own viewpoint subsequently. To ascertain the party's opinion on the most important issues, referendums must be instituted in internal party practice.

I believe that it is also necessary to carry out a serious debureaucratization of the system of party leadership. The "upper strata" must give back a considerable number of rights to the "lower strata." It is necessary to ensure not in words but in deeds the priority role of primary party organizations. They must, in particular, become fully independent in questions of admitting to and expelling from the party, delegating their representatives to higher organs and recalling them, making use of a certain portion of the party dues, and changing their own structure.

At the same time it is also necessary to debureaucratize the party apparatus. Its streamlining is a necessary but inadequate measure. I believe that the apparatus monopoly can be eliminated if, instead of departments, we create commissions for areas of work, half of whose composition is to be made up of members of an elected organ and the other half by apparatus workers and the party aktiv. Secretaries and bureau members of party committees could head them. The commissions define and implement the party line and cadre policy in a specific social milieu.

It must be ensured that the party committees themselves are not identified in people's consciousness with official establishments. Many people, including ordinary party members, say that the obkom, gorkom, and raykom buildings themselves, their grandiose appearance, and the militiamen at the entrance overwhelm people and discourage them from calling there again.

Awareness of the party's new role in relations with public organizations, including unofficial ones, also strikes me as of considerable importance. Concerning the trade union, the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League, and women's, veterans', and other organizations with official status, it is necessary to proceed from the premise that party members must win their place on them only through personal prestige, by winning democratic elections, and not be "lowered down" from above. If we speak of representatives of informal movements, it is necessary to conduct a constant dialogue with them, involving healthy intellectual forces in formulating a common policy and action program.

I have enumerated just a few areas in which democratization, in my opinion, must assert itself as quickly as possible. I do not doubt that the concept of the party's perestroyka will be formulated and approved at the 28th CPSU Congress through the joint efforts of the entire thinking section of the party. I foresee that not everything will be smooth on this path, because conservatives in the party, as is clear from your article, are not a myth but a reality.

Forgive my bluntness, but I consider it unacceptable for me to resort to the methods which you employ. I mean your references to certain dark forces, like: "Following somebody's lead," "with somebody's tacit consent...." To judge from the PRAVDA article "Nostalgia for Stagnation?" published simultaneously with yours, you have like-minded colleagues. Only they are more frank and are not ashamed to pass off the country's growing problems as proof of the unviability of perestroyka and, consequently, of its author, too.

But no, do not hope. Neither the party nor the people will send M.S. Gorbachev off to slaughter. In 4 years we have traveled a very difficult but extremely necessary path toward the realization of new truths. And we will go further, even if panic in our ranks temporarily slackens our pace.

Deputy Premier Lukyanov Grants Radio Interviews

Views Development of Democracy

LD1708100189 Moscow International Service in Polish 1300 GMT 16 Aug 89

["Third part" of interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Moscow Radio correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov in Lukyanov's Kremlin office; date of interview not given—Lukyanov and correspondents' remarks recorded in Russian with superimposed Polish translation]

[Text] [Announcer] This is Radio Moscow. We continue to present the view of Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, on the most important problems of the development of Soviet society and the work of the new USSR parliament. We remind you that correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov put questions on the basis, among other things, of the content of letters to Radio Moscow from foreign listeners. Today, the interview is about the problems of the development of democracy in the Soviet Union, and about the role of the Party in the process of formulating the country's political course.

[Correspondent] It is being said in the West that in the process of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, a classic democracy is being approached, by which a bourgeois democracy is undoubtedly understood. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Lukyanov] Our society is becoming more and more strongly democratized. In this process, it has absorbed, and will assimilate to an increasing extent, the democratic experiences of other states. This is a Leninist principle. We can go forward only when we assimilate and enrich ourselves with the experience amassed by humanity, including progressive experiences. There are no doubts on this issue, but this is our experience: Soviet socialist experience. From foreign experience in the development of democracy, we are and will be taking only what suits our Soviet forms of development. For example, the Congress of People's Deputies is primarily a development of the Leninist traditions of congresses of worker, peasant, and soldiers' deputies, and afterwards congresses of worker, peasant, and Red Army deputies.

This is a continuation of our Soviet tradition, linking legislative, executive, and control functions. It is also the continuation of our Soviet position, when the deputies (?or) a decisive number of deputies, reconcile their work in managing the country with production work and thus strengthen bond with the grass roots, with the masses. For this reason, too, we do not reject all democratic traditions. We analyze them thoroughly, and will utilize what is essential; but this is our socialist road and not a return to classic forms, so-called classic forms of democracy. It is their enrichment and utilization for socialism.

[Correspondent] The bourgeois mass media express the hope that the Soviet parliament will undergo a transformation; that it will change from a stormy discussion club into a truly legislative organ. In this way it will liquidate the Communist (?Party's) monopoly on the country's political course. What do you think about this?

[Lukyanov] That is what many opponents of the Soviet system hope. I'd just like to stress that our perestroyka, including the political reform, was initiated by the party; (?the party carefully studied) the trends of development of socialism. The party laid down the main parameters of development of our political system and defined in what forms it would develop. These problems were discussed with the nation. One of the most important constitutents of the political reform is the strengthening of the full authority of the (?soviets). This means that many functions which the party was forced to adopt primarily for economic reasons will now be fulfilled by the soviets, state organs. There are no doubts on this issue. But does the role of the party in the Land of the Soviets have to weaken in connection with this? The point is that the party, in fact, is an organization which not only worked out itself all the directions of development of the restructuring of the political system, but also constitutes the core of the political system. Without the party, the implementation—in their entirety as a complex—of the economic and democratic tasks would be impossible. The party is an organization based on the principles of democratic centralism, and this means that bringing our federation closer together in the political context as well. Without the party leadership, the federation would fall apart. The party is an organization which combines state and public interests. The Communists form the core not only of state organs, but also of the trade unions, Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], cooperative organizations, and other mass movements. In this way the party becomes an organization uniting everyone in one direction. If we want to solve the tasks of perestroyka, then weakening the party's leading role would, at the present stage, undermine the foundation of our move forward. We will not relinquish this, regardless of statements made in the West, and by some activists in the Land of the Soviets.

Views Creation of New Laws

LD1808105389 Moscow in Portuguese to Africa 1800 GMT 17 Aug 89

["Fourth part" of interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Moscow Radio correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov in Lukyanov's office in the Kremlin; date of interview not given; announcer reads correspondents' questions in Portuguese—Lukyanov replies recorded in Russian with superimposed Portuguese translation]

[Text] [Announcer] Today's subject will be the process of creating laws in the Soviet Union and the role of the masses in the administration of the state.

By education, knowledge, and professional training you are a lawyer. The matter of shaping the Soviet state into a law-abiding state probably is very close to your heart. How, in your opinion, should this process proceed and how long will it last? To what extent are such ideas as law abidance and democracy linked to each other, and how far do they correlate with each other, not just in theory, but in practice?

[Lukyanov] True democracy is the highest degress of law abidance. It is the subordination, the conscious subordination, of the will of millions to laws they have formulated themselves. That is what democracy, in the true sense of the word, means. Thus the building of a law-abiding state will take a long time. It will be linked not only to a renewal of the whole of Soviet legislation, but first of all with the elaboration of legislation to regulate the relationship of man to society, of the group to society, and finally, of the nation to society.

Elements of law abidance will be inculcated into the solution of economic problems. A no less difficult task is the introduction of the culture of law into society. One has to say that Soviet society is quite varied. Over 70 years, some nations moved—quite frankly—from a primitive system to socialism, others from feudalism to socialism, still others already had quite a developed legal culture. We must develop this culture from the base up. The 19th century satirist [name indistinct] wrote in his time that the law is there for two reasons: First, to restrain subordinate groups, and second, so that legislators will have something to do.

In the Soviet Union, many laws have been made to insure that the legislators had something to do, that is, pro forma. On the other hand, we now need laws that will be executed, implemented. Thus the most important thing in building a law-abiding state is the creation of mechanisms that will insure the application of laws, and their precise, unconditional, and certain implementation. This is, perhaps, the most difficult thing in building a law-abiding state: Not to hurry with the proclamation of new laws, but to put them forward in a thoughtful way so that they may be implemented later without any reservation.

[Announcer] To what extent, exactly, is the Leninist concept—in a socialist society every person should learn how to manage, and then manage the state—being implemented today?

[Lukyanov] During the course of restructuring, an ever broader mass of people is becoming engaged in political life. The level of political culture of Soviet citizens is rising. I believe that during the 4 years of restructuring, the political awareness of the masses and their participation in management have made such progress that decades would normally have been necessary for it. Sometimes no more than a month was needed and people were pressing forward to take part in management. This is a very important thing, but by no means new. For Lenin, himself, used to say that 1 day of revolution sometimes is equal to decades of peaceful, prerevolution processes. In a sense, the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet session were a unique school for political activity and for society's participation in management.

Here are some figures: The number of citizen's letters containing proposals regarding the further development of managing the improvement of various social relations grew more or less four-fold. About 40,000 letters and telegrams were sent to the session, which were a direct reaction to the decisions undertaken by the Supreme Soviet. Often these were sharp reactions, sometimes contradictory, but this was, after all, undeniable proof of the engagement of the masses in management.

We also should take into account the fact that the congress and the Supreme Soviet session had a tremendous influence on the development of processes on the spot. The Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet session could no longer be held in the traditional way; there were stormy discussions, nonunanimous voting, and the rejection of certain proposals. The same thing happened at Supreme Soviet sessions in nearly all the federated republics and unions. Therefore, we have a chain reaction, as when a whole mass of particles is set in motion thanks to the movement of one small particle.

We have a system of councils, 50,000 councils, in which more than 2 million deputies are active. These councils are becoming politicized and society is becoming politicized around them. This is a healthy process. I was talking about this with the comrades today. We now are seeing a whole new generation of people who are drawn to management, people who are capable of talking with others in an unconventional way, who are able to manage society through dialogue. This is very important and arouses great hopes. Where a new man comes in, there is also a renewed society, developing in a lively way.

Discusses Future of USSR

LD1808230989 Moscow International Service in Polish 1300 GMT 18 Aug 89

["Fifth part" of interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Moscow Radio correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov, in Lukyanov's office in the Kremlin; date of interview not given; announcer reads correspondents' questions in Polish—Lukyanov replies recorded in Russian with superimposed Polish translation]

[Text] [Announcer] Today we will present to our listeners how the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet imagines the Soviet Union of the future—as a federal state or a confederation?

Here is a specific question: In the foreign press, the Soviet Union today is often described as an empire. Particularly in connection with the acute nationality conflicts, a collapse is spoken of—the beginning of the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I would like an evaluation of these arguments.

[Lukyanov] This is how the matter looks: It is not only foreigners unfriendly towards our country who describe the Soviet Union as an empire; some of our activists also do so. I will speak openly: The processes taking place in our country are not simple, but we think they will lead to a consolidation of the Russian Federation and not to its destruction or transformation into a confederation or some other form of contact between peoples.

Indeed, for a long time, the processes of mutual relations among republics were static. No attention was paid to them. What's more, from the end of 1936, not much changed in the forms of contact between republics, their development and so forth and so on. The processes linked with deepening economic and political centralism—a centralism which often hampered the development of the republics—and the development of our autonomies grew at the same time. For that reason, the process currently taking shape in the development of nationality relations was formulated and published several days ago in our party's platform. It is a process of renewal of the Russian Federation. It will be based primarily on increasing the economic independence of the republics, transferring them to regional cost-accounting and independently meeting their own needs. This process will also be based on strengthening the economic contacts between union republics, and not only union republics but also the other entities which exist in our country.

There is no doubt that this will enable each republic to take its own characteristics into account in the process of developing its own economy, in the first place. Secondly, the new nationality relations will be based on a stricter limitation of plenipotenty powers between the union and union republics and autonomous bodies. In a given case, the union will have to relinquish its plenipotentiary powers on certain issues and enable the republics themselves to resolve some problems. The third sphere is that of cultural relations. In a given case, the main role should be played by the republics. However, all these directions of development of the Soviet Federation in no case means that we are going against the current, against the main current of development of the world economy, whose essence lies in economic integration, in broadening the cooperation of peoples and nationality groups.

For this reason, too, all these processes—strengthening sovereignty, strengthening the autonomous foundations for development of the constituent parts of the Soviet federation—by no means signify a weakening of our federation.

[Announcer] But in some of our republics, the belief is prevalent that the Western European Union, before it underwent consolidation, went through the stage of division and that we too have to go through this stage.

[Lukyanov] This process to which our critics, people friendly to us and also those who do not wish us well, refer was carried out in Western Europe at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century, on the other hand, the last confederation had already died, fell apart. So must we repeat the road which those countries traversed? A uniform unit of national economy was created in the Soviet Union. One cannot at present plow up the fate of each republic, because they are most closely intertwined in the economic aspect with the fate of other republics. And in the spiritual aspect, in the development of culture, in the sense of interpersonal contacts and other links they are stronger still. We are not able to name a republic in which there are not many thousands and in some cases even tens of thousands of mixed families, composed of people of different nationalities. We are not able at present to name a single republic which would exist without the other republics. Even a republic with enormous potential like Russia is linked by the closest bonds with the other republics. We cannot imagine our Soviet culture without the cultures of other peoples.

Integration processes are developing in the world—that is, the mutual contacts and mutual understanding of peoples. If we were to take the (?road) of confederation at present, or the road of a greater division of nations, in order to set about their unification in the future, this would be a step backward and not a step forward.

Views Leadership Duties

LD1908213889 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 18 Aug 89

[Interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Moscow Radio correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov, in Lukyanov's office in the Kremlin; date of interview not given; announcer reads correspondents' questions in English—Lukyanov replies recorded in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Text] [Announcer] We continue the interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. He is speaking with our correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov. Today they're discussing Anatoliy Lukyanov's responsibilities. Recently, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov suggested lessening Mikhail Gorbachev's workload to let him concentrate on the central party issues that will determine the present and future of this country. That should probably mean that you, as his first deputy in the Supreme Soviet, will have to take on a considerable part of that load. That question was put to Anatoliy Lukyanov and he replied:

[Lukyanov] To begin with, I'd say that to unload Mikhail Gorbachev of his state responsibilities would mean to relieve him of his personality. He successfully combines party and state work, internal and external issues, though that, of course, takes a lot out of him. Nikolay Ryzhkov is right, of course, that we should try to relieve his workload to some extent. We'll try to do this in the Political Bureau, but it's necessary to bear in mind his qualities and potentials as a political leader. Concerning my duties in the Supreme Soviet, let me point out that apart from the first deputy chairman we have 15 more deputies in the Presidium. They chair at the same time the Supreme Soviets of the constitutent republics. That makes a considerable group of people. Besides many procedural issues in the Supreme Soviet the vice president takes part in preparing bills and coordinates the work of the two houses and various commissions.

[Announcer] Anatoliy Lukyanov continues:

[Lukyanov] There are many other issues handled by the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Those are linked with the constituent republics and local councils and it involves quite a lot of time. People come to the center for consultations. They are raising the questions of giving more power to the local soviets, of the status of deputies, of the councils' revenue and property. I consider that part of my work to be very important. Another part of my office is linked to legislation,. This is a subtle and complicated function since bills are prepared not only by deputies. This requires special participation and expert advice. This requires on-the-spot work locally, studying it in practice. All that has to be organized. There is a third vital aspect: that of developing wide inter-parliamentary contacts which are constantly growing, links between parliaments and between particular committees and commissions receiving foreign parliamentary delegations and sending our delegations abroad. I have to help Mikhail Gorbachev in his presidential functions and sometimes act in his name. That includes accepting ambassadors' credentials, giving out awards, handling matters of citizenship, and granting pardons. Finally, I have to receive people who appeal to the Supreme Soviet, answer letters, meet the public, the press and so on. Rather a lot of duties as you see.

[Announcer] You work in close contact with Mikhail Gorbachev. You've known each other since your student days. Our listeners would like to know the way you work together and if you always see eye to eye.

[Lukyanov] That is a difficult question, answered Anatoliy Lukyanov, for we often act as one person. We are in contact daily, sometimes three or four times a day on the phone or in person. Besides, I am also a member of the Political Bureau. The Political Bureau meets once a week to discuss all our problems. There is also a variety of opinions, heated debates and different positions. When I compare the situation now with the one that existed 5 and 10 years ago, I can tell you that never before has

there been a more democratic atmosphere in the Political Bureau. Mikhail Gorbachev usually speaks last, after a point has been well argued and views compared. He has enough courage to either concede a point or to fight for his position singlehandedly. There have been cases like that. I can't say we always agree. We often argue, particularly before plenary sessions of the Central Committee which are to decide important issues such as new legislation or the work of the soviets, that is councils. But we understand each other well enough to settle our differences. Other members of the Political Bureau also join in the arguments. I don't mean to say I have any exclusive influence.

Discusses Personal Life

LD1908215789 Moscow World Service in English 0310 GMT 19 Aug 89

["Final part" of interview with Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by Moscow Radio correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslaw Terekhov, in Lukyanov's office in the Kremlin; date of interview not given; announcer reads correspondents' questions in English—Lukyanov's replies recorded in Russian with superimposed English translation]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] And today we bring you the final part of an interview with Soviet vice President Anatoliy lukyanov. He was talking to our correspondents Aleksandr Plevako and Vyacheslav Terekhov about his duties and his family and his relations with Mikhail Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

Do you have enough time for a good rest, like to read a book, go to a theater or devote an hour or 2 to your family?

[Lukyanov] Regrettably, politics have been taking up more and more of my time, but in fact I don't divide my life into work and leisure. I take it as a whole. I'm very proud of my personal library in which there are nearly 6,000 volumes of Russian and foreign verses. My wife is a doctor of biology and professor of a large medical college. She specializes in biophysics. I have an adult daughter who is an assistant professor at a higher school. Despite my efforts to talk her out of it, she once chose the profession of a lawyer and now she is an expert on state and law. She has written a few books in which she questions some of the ideas I have voiced.

[Announcer] So it looks like there is pluralism of opinion in your family, too?

[Lukyanov] I daresay there is. And I have been having hard times indeed, since after a day of debating on the job I come home only to get involved in similar debates which often are even more heated and passionate. As far as my grandchildren are concerned, I have a grandson, a fourth-grader at a secondary school. When I get home earlier than 11 pm, he wonders if Grandaddy's all right.

[Announcer] And what human qualities do you value most?

[Lukyanov] I value honesty and frankness most. My life credo is: Be honest and ready to openly defend your ideals.

[Announcer] And what human drawback strikes you as most revolting?

[Lukyanov] I hate servility most of all.

[Announcer] How do you picture happiness to yourself?

[Lukyanov] Much the way Karl Marx did. I think happiness is obtained through struggle. The struggle which is now going on is worth living for.

[Announcer] In conclusion of the interview Vice President Anatoliy Lukyanov said a few words for our listeners.

[Lukyanov] I'd like to recommend all Radio Moscow listeners to accept Russia, I mean the Soviet Union, objectively and avoid being too much impressed by the numerous propagandistic claims made in both East and West. Accepting this country as it is, one can understand many things better. Thank you.

Trade Union Protests to Ryzhkov Over Pay Delays

PM2208140189 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Aug 89 p 2

["Open Letter from Moscow Trade Unions to Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers"—MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA headline; letter undated]

[Text] Esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich!

Every month the situation in Moscow labor collectives gets worse in connection with delays in the payment of wages.

Late payments are creating conflict situations at enterprises and in organizations. The capital's working people are rightly demanding that their administration honor collective contracts.

The Moscow City Trade Union Council Presidium is not satisfied with the response by Comrade A.V. Vlasov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers, to the newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on 4 August 1989 following an appeal by Moscow trade unions for the prompt payment of wages to labor collectives and an end to the arbitrary withdrawal of monetary income at a higher rate. Especially in view of the fact that this practice is continuing. For example, in August this year it is planned to transfer cash to centralized funds in amounts that are 1.5 times higher than the amount withdrawn in July.

Moscow industry manufactures consumer goods worth more than the amount paid in wages to the city's working people. Goods worth R1.41 are manufactured for every R1 in wages.

Appreciating the importance of saturating the market with consumer goods, collectives are taking vigorous measures to create new capacities for the production of these goods, modernize and retool their facilities, and carry out conversions.

The proposals sent by the city to the USSR Council of Ministers in May this year, which aimed to limit the payment of cash to cooperatives, have not been supported by the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Ministry of Finance, or the USSR State Bank. As a result, in the first 6 months of this year, cooperatives withdrew R1.242 million in cash and deposited just over R200 million in banks.

At the same time, the majority of families are living from one wage packet to the next. Delays in the payment of wages mean that many of them cannot buy essential goods for themselves or go away on vacation when they want, and labor productivity is declining.

Voicing the opinion of the working people, Moscow trade unions urgently demand that the payment of wages to workers and employees at state enterprises and organizations within the period laid down by collective contracts and schedules be ensured and that accounts be settled with cooperatives only after this has been done.
[Signed] The Moscow City Trade Union Council Presidium

Draft Law on Languages Published in Kazakhstan

LD2208095189 Moscow TASS in English 0905 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Alma-Ata August 22 TASS—By TASS correspondent Olga Babii:

Today's newspapers in the Soviet Asian Republic of Kazakhstan contain a draft law on languages for nationwide discussion.

It is significant that not only Kazakhs and Russians but also Germans, Koreans, Uighurs as well as Arabic-reading people will be able to read and study the draft law in their native languages.

Commenting on the main draft, Mukhtar Shakhanov, a prominent poet, pointed out that Kazakhstan, which has a population of 16 million, by virtue of historical circumstances has long been a republic of a hundred languages.

However, during the process, the development of the languages of the indigenous population was restrained and the scope of its use narrowed. This prompted the emergence of the draft law which suggersts that, considering the principle of political self-determination and equality of nations and free development of languages and culture, Kazakh should be regarded as the only official language while Russian should be the language of inter-ethnic contacts.

The draft confirms that the changing status of the two languages does not preclude the use and development of the languages of other nationalities and ethnic groups. Every citizen may choose any langugage for the upbringing and education of his children.

Shakhanov pointed out that all languages functioning in the republic will from now on be legally protected. The draft stipulates, for example, that a refusal by an official to accept an inquiry or complaint due to the lack of knowledge of a language entails responsibility provided for by legislation. It is also prohibited to limit citizens' rights in the choice of language or discriminate from linguistic motives.

"People, their culture, customs and traditions live on as long as their language is alive. Therefore the future of any language may not be decided by mere voting," Shakhanov said. "A small nationality should have as many rights as a large one in deciding the future of their language".

Embezzlement Persists in State Enterprises

18001527 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Aug 89 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Yevgeniy Manko: "A Hand in Someone Else's Pocket"]

[Text] A thief specializing in house burglaries or angling for the coffers of a savings bank does not need much: Select your minions, latchkeys, wait for a darker night, and embark on what you have planned. The damage they inflict is great both in terms of financial and moral losses. "The thieves are behaving more and more brazenly. Why? Because the force of the law is not used well. The militia and the procuracy protect the citizens of the country poorly," writes the railroad worker from the Donbass L.P. Litvak.

This assessment by our reader may be applied without special corrections to another kind of theft as well, the kind which does not call for a dark night, which is committed in broad daylight. Moreover, it is justified in the most diligent manner by numerical summaries in resounding reports forwarded to higher echelons and in the reporting documents of enterprises and organizations. Of course, you have understood that padding is at issue.

There is the city of Svalyava in Transcarpathian Oblast, a city like any other, with its own soviet of people's deputies, and the executive committee which sets up authorized commissions as needed in order to commission residential buildings and social, cultural, and service facilities. Specialists who serve on these commissions are our Soviet people. Ask any one of them about

what he believes to be the main point in the work of the commission, and he will answer without thinking: Safeguard the quality of construction and the interests of new residents. In this case, you should not believe the sincere intonation of their voices. In the fall of last year, such authorized representatives of the ispolkom [soviet executive committee] accepted an 80-apartment house on Mendeleyev Street from the builders: Supposedly, everything was all right; comrade-new residents were free to move in and to enjoy living there. What did the house look like? There were no floors in the apartments, the plasterers had not completed, and painters and glass installers had not even started their work! Gas, heat, and power were not turned on at the building.

This is a frightening but a quite customary picture. Authorized representatives of the soviets accept myths from the builders—apartments which are good for nothing, day-care centers the construction of which is not yet over, clinics where a doctor may be able to see the first patient in maybe half a year. Let us put it bluntly: The almost overt theft from all of us, from the people is under way. Yes, this is exactly how padding in reporting documents should be regarded. Fictitious statistics of plan fulfillment and overfulfillment turn into quite decent unearned wages and respectable bonuses for the falsifiers.

I do not know what quota in compensation the construction personnel finagling in the city of Svalyava, in the aforementioned house on Mendeleyeva Street, were after. Here are altogether overwhelming statistics of a broader scope. Financial damages in the amount of 13.1 million rubles due to padding were discovered by the control and auditing apparatus of the finance organs alone last year. Out of this, illegal payments of wages and bonuses amount to more than 10 million. The geographical array of those wishing to receive what they are not entitled to is quite broad. For example, in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], such payments amounted to 4.2 million rubles, in the Ukraine—2.8, in Kazakhstan—over 1 million. The theft "justified" by report documentation embraces the most varied sectors of the economy: the construction complex already referred to, trucking, services to the populace, light and local industries....

Tremendous sums are misappropriated in the course of drilling and geological-prospecting work, in the assembly of equipment. In the course of audits last year, the offices of financing banks identified direct padding only in the amount of 140 million rubles. Specialists calculated that in 319 cases the quarter and annual plans were "fulfilled" only due to the inclusion of work not performed in reporting. "The take" was quite respectable—almost 4.5 million rubles in undeserved bonuses, and, so to say, remuneration.

Enterprise managers inclined to practice fraud, who are aware of all of this, try to justify their machinations by the interests of labor collectives when they are caught, so to say, in the act. This is a very dubious argument: It is not only the damage done to the interests of the entire people that is frightening. What truly statesmanlike, master's approach to business, exactingness with regard to oneself, and active participation in perestroyka can there be in the production unit where such an environment has developed!? No, lies cannot bring about good; they call for evil and corrupt people.

I recall a conversation with the worker of the Kamennyy Most (Nikolayevsk Oblast) Agricultural Machinery Plant A. He called the editorial office demanding to punish "a commission which besmirches the honor of the working class, accuses the enterprise of padding for no reason at all, and of the collective having been paid thousands of rubles in bonuses unjustifiably." When I responded that it is up to the monitoring organs to sort this out, he was indignant:

"You are supporting the officials, the ones who are against perestroyka?!"

Now I have in front of me a document signed by the representatives of the Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], the Minfin [Ministry of Finance], and the USSR Promstroybank [Bank for Industrial Construction] which says black on white: "At the Kamennyy Most Agricultural Machinery Plant, 28,500 rubles in bonuses were paid out unlawfully in conjunction with the padding of plan fulfillment." This is the chain which emerges: management of the enterprise—management of services—management of shops. As a result, workers, the labor collective, turn out to be involved in the affair, whether wittingly or not.

The blame for this devolves not only on the economic managers. In quite a few instances, the local soviets and party committees have not truly joined the struggle against falsification. Let us address tne following fact, for example. In the Buryat ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], incidentally, as well as in a number of adjacent regions, last years cannot be regarded as favorable in terms of improving reporting and reinforcing the attack on fraud. Many messages on "tricks" in commissioning installations have been reaching the local press organs, party committees, and ispolkoms of local soviets. This was done to residential buildings and shops. The measures taken were usually cosmetic in nature. Considerably greater "Panama affairs" matured and came to the fore. At the very end of last year, the state acceptance commission signed the acceptance protocol for a capacity producing 500,000 tons (!) of coal a year at the Tugnuyskiy Opencast Mine (estimated cost—79 million rubles!). The ceremony went off without a hitch. Meanwhile, a naked eye could see that that the removal of overburden and other construction work at the facility have not been completed. An altogether criminal step against nature was allowed to occur here. Regardless of the fact that the enterprise lies on the watershed of the Lake Baykal, a number of installations

for the purification of harmful discharges into the atmosphere, the water, and the soil were removed from the composition of the commissioned complex without much thought. Neither the oblast party committee nor the soviet organs raised a real alarm and beat the drum. I believe that this was exactly the reason why a USSR deputy minister of the coal industry confirmed without hindrance the phony protocol of the acceptance commission as early as January of this year. The case described is not unique in the republic. Early this year, the ministry signed off on the acceptance protocol of a plant producing concrete blocks in the city of Ulan-Ude, despite large construction defects completely ruling out an opportunity to start up the enterprise.

It is no accident that I referred to padding as "justified thievery." One becomes even more convinced of that as he encounters quite frequent cases in which the distortion of bookkeeping and report data is accompanied by the direct theft of socialist property on a large scale. The neglect for elementary honesty propagated by managers practicing fraud sort of blurs the line between good and evil, integrity and shamelessness, between the positions of a citizen and a philistine. An environment of permissiveness of sorts develops. An epidemic spreads through the shops, services, and departments spawning pilferers and petty thieves; it happens as in the song: "And thus they stole the entire brick plant, one small stone, one brick at a time." Here is a real-life example. When conducting an audit at the Stavropol Liquor and Wine Plant, representatives of the finance organs established that the books camouflaged considerable shortfalls in raw and other materials. The thread which began there brought to revealing unreported alcohol products worth a tremendous quota—2.5 million rubles. Retribution did come, though belatedly: More than 1 million rubles were confiscated from those guilty.

Various punitive measures were applied last year to more than 70,000 persons, including 4,000 who were recalled from the positions they held, for padding, bookkeeping and reporting violations, based on the materials of statistical and finance organs and bank offices. Almost 9,000 files on the abuses found were referred to the procuracy organs for the criminal prosecution of falsifiers. Unfortunately, the price of fear which the hard-boiled operators pay is not high. In one year, the offices of the Goskomstat and the Promstroybank referred 1,892 such files. Only 52 criminal cases were initiated, and...14 persons were brought up on criminal charges. One cannot but recall the mountain which gave birth to a mouse....

It has long been said in high forums in our country: It is time to resolutely bring padding to an end. However, padding declines much too slowly, and in some regions and sectors it even prospers. The important and correct slogan—Socialism equals reporting and monitoring—looks dim at present.

Radiation Meters Distributed Near Semipalatinsk
LD2208163689 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] The Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences has started making exposure meters for collective use. These are to be installed in the zones immediately adjacent to the nuclear test site in the Semipalatinsk area. Experimental models of the exposure meters have already been tried out in Semipalatinsk and Karaganda. Therefore, at the request of local soviets and supporters of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement, the institute is producing another 15 of these instruments. All of them will be installed in rayon centers and villages in Semipalatinsk Oblast, as well as in the satellite towns of Karaganda. The instruments will help all who wish it to have an objective picture of the radiation situation and thus to dispel rumors of allegedly excessively high radiation levels on the territory around the test site.

Various Changes in 'Vremya' Newscast Planned
PM1108121389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 7

[I. Kukin article: "Long Goodbye to Things Official"]

[Text] The editorial office receives many letters concerning the television page like that sent by Tengiz Pachkoriya, an educationalist from Sukhumi. The nub of his letter is as follows.

"It is essential," he writes, "to urgently unburden the 'Vremya' program so that it really becomes a news program. Detailed reporting of ceremonial meetings and sendoffs during visits by party and state leaders, speeches by foreign envoys, and other official business have reached the point where 'Vremya' has begun to shed its primary function. Its unpredictable length sometimes means that other broadcasts by Central Television and local studios are disrupted. Might it be worth creating a special program called Government Bulletin, say, which would broadcast all the 'official' reports?..."

So it happens, such suggestions are also sent to "Vremya" itself. Eduard Sagalayev, chief editor of the Main News Desk, says:

"Let me say bluntly that the idea of creating a special bulletin to cover 'official business' bothers me. I do not think that the bulletin would attract viewers if many people already protest the 'official business' carried on 'Vremya.' Second, such a Government Bulletin is by nature not suited to television. It is not a congress or session where everything is interesting and informative. Who needs all these departures and arrivals? Television is ideally the most democratic of all mass media, the most omnivorous, in the best sense of the word. So why emphasize the most unspectacular, pure diplomacy? If you produce reports on visits, do it differently in some

way. Let someone be interviewed on the tarmac and asked insightful questions. For example: 'What is the real benefit from your trip to the country?...'

"Let me now tell you what we have already managed to drop. We have stopped reporting the publication of political brochures. Reports about departures and arrivals have been cut from 40 to 5 seconds and we make do with stills instead of live footage. We persistently raise the question of leaving out envoys' speeches from 'Vremya.' That, too, is at variance, in our opinion, with the nature of a news program.

"We are often asked whether we intend to change the actual image of 'Vremya.' Of course, this has to be done. Two decades is an unconscionably long time for a news program to run unchanged. We have signed an agreement to cooperate with the USSR Union of Designers—they will be working on a new studio layout. The All-Union Television and Radio Science Research Institute is developing a new lighting concept for the 'Vremya' studio. But problems do arise here, as the necessary lighting equipment is not made in our country. It has to be purchased abroad with hard currency, which is also necessary for the purchase of new TV cameras and autocues. The studio from which 'Vremya' is broadcast is only 150 square meters. Nowhere else in the world are there such tiny studios. And all this because our building, which was built for the Moscow Olympics, has for 2-3 years now been overloaded with various services...

"Last year, when in Japan, I learned that the leading TV company, NHK, took 4 years to create a new image. That is Japan—a country that is incredibly dynamic in everything. As you will appreciate, it is also difficult for us to create a new image for 'Vremya', not in a purely formal way, not just changing it externally, but enhancing its response time and deepening the idea that it conveys...."

Part of New Book on Stalin Published

LD2208163289 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 22 Aug (TASS)—The NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY publishing house has published the first part of a book by the well-known Soviet military historian Dmitriy Volkogonov, "Triumph and Tragedy." In this work, which will consist of two volumes, the author gives his own interpretation of the personality of Josef Stalin.

The author draws on little-known archive materials, rare documents, the testimonies and letters of those who took part in these events, so as to trace the process of the intensification of autocracy and of the substitution of the dictatorship of "the Boss" for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The first part shows the sources of the "cult of personality," and of the lawless acts that were carried out in the country in the 30's.

The publishing house is planning to complete publication of the two books by Dmitriy Volkogonov before the end of the year.

First Issue of KARAVAN Monthly Published

LD2208163489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Summary] The first issue of the monthly magazine KARAVAN has been published. It contains modern Azerbaijani and Soviet prose, and highlights of foreign literature.

Economic

Prices Committee Chairman Interviewed

PM2208150789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with V.K. Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices, by correspondent R. Lynev: "How To Switch on Market Mechanism"; first three paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Over the past year the prices index in the country has risen 2.3 percent. For individual groups of goods the increase in average prices has been higher: For meat 4 percent, for refrigerators 7 percent, for automobiles and washington machines 8 percent, the same for shoes, and 10 percent for clothing, underwear, and textiles.

And the fact that wages have also risen—by 9.5 percent in 6 months—is of little reassurance: The shelves are bare.

It was with a statement of these sorry facts that we began our talk with V.K. Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices. Formerly a worker, student, graduate student, doctor of economic sciences, responsible employee of the State Planning Committee, and USSR deputy minister of finances, he is a new man in a new government. A complex sector has been entrusted to him. And the first question put to him was of course: Why is everything becoming more expensive? Surely the rise in prices can be halted?

"My reply will not of course please everyone," Vyacheslav Konstantinovich began. "Yet in all the rest of the world the cost of living and inflation have been growing for a long time now. That means that this is based on objective causes. The worker's labor is increasingly complex and more highly skilled. It costs more and that is reflected in the price of goods. On the other hand, people's demands are increasing and becoming more complex—the demand for increasingly modern output is growing.

[Lynev] Surely the cost of labor in our country is one of the lowest?

[Senchagov] If you do not count the public consumption funds. But its cheapness explains why, in addition to other things, it is more advantageous for enterprises to use manual labor than equipment.

To return to what I said just a little earlier, I note that it is not so much a case of the growth of the cost of living and inflation in itself but of the way in which they are compensated for. In our country the compensation system is imperfect.

[Lynev] That is the operation of objective causes in our country is supplemented by our own internal causes?

[Senchagov] They have been formed by the conditions of a closed economy. The general trend is that conditions for the extraction of natural raw material are becoming worse and worse. But the fact that our domestic prices for raw material and fuel are considerably lower than world prices does not mean that expenditure on extraction in our country is lower. And since fuel and raw materials are cheap there is no interest in saving them. Hence the universal overexpenditure of raw materials and fuel. And further on, in the processing industries, this distortion is merely aggravated. Prices for the means of production are growing. They have increased 12 percent for new equipment over the past 2 years and have increased even more—by 15 percent—for agricultural equipment: You only have to recall what the "Don" combines cost the farms. But the cost of equipment for the light and food industries is increasing still more—by 25 percent.

[Lynev] But surely this increase in cost is the natural payment for the growth of the productivity of the new technology?

[Senchagov] Over the same period productivity has increased 12.8 percent. But if you consider that the new equipment is badly used it becomes clear that this completely undermines the sources of accumulation and is a heavy burden on the prices of a whole range of consumer goods.

[Lynev] Well, since that is so how can we fail to understand those who blame the increase in prices on economic accountability [khozraschet] in its present form and enterprises' desire to increase their profits by the easiest method—by hiking prices?

[Senchagov] The point is that the reform of the economy is still far from complete. A number of its important elements have not been put into operation. The economic limiter on the unbounded growth of wages has been turned on only very recently—by the well known addition to the law on the state enterprise adopted by the Supreme Soviet. After all so far wages have increased almost twice as rapidly as labor productivity.

[Lynev] Yet three times more rapidly than prices.

[Senchagov] However, this growth was immediately cancelled out by inflation and the market shortage. After all it is virtually only in Moscow that the main proportion of food goods reaches the population through state trade. In many regions the proportion of the nonstate provision of food is constantly increasing. Here prices in the state sector, the cooperative sector, and on the kolkhoz market interact—and as a whole they are growing. That is the law of the market in which goods are in short supply. With a saturated market prices behave differently: They are increased for new output—in assimilating this output the enterprise must have a "cushion" making it possible not only to cover increased expenses but also to obtain a profit. When mass production has been set up prices are reduced. The next reduction in prices for basic output takes place when even more sophisticated output appears on the market.

But in our country the price is reduced only during sales. There are now almost no goods of similar function but different prices. While cheap, medium, and expensive refrigerators were on sale, no one would have been particularly offended by the appearance of a refrigerator costing R800-1,000. But today, when there are increasingly few cheap goods, the cost of living angers people by its social injustice.

[Lynev] Readers write that the rise in the cost of living has been caused by the application of contract prices. And they are worried about what will happen if the sphere of their application is expanded.

[Senchagov] Today it is very narrow: only for new output. The proportion of machine building output, for instance, sold at contract prices is 7.5 percent of the total volume of products to be marketed. It is true that this proportion has doubled over the past year. And I must note that for the first time in many years thanks to contract prices we have succeeded in turning, albeit with great difficulty, the handle of the renewal of output. That means that the game is nonetheless worth the candle. Nonetheless I see the mechanics of establishing contract prices not as a deal only between the producer (and as a rule he is a monopolist) and the consumer—the mediation of representatives of the bank, financial organs, and price formation organs is needed here. And not, of course, for all output, but for new output with key importance, prices should, I am convinced, be established in precisely this way and not exceed some particular limit.

[Lynev] In the FRG the state controls primarily, of course, economically, half of all prices...

[Senchagov] Is it not for that reason that in that country inflation rates and the growth of prices are lower than in other countries? Although there are a number of countries where state control is not so effective: the United States, France, Britain.

[Lynev] All that is so. But in our country it is different. There is universal control of prices by the state and in particular by the special committee which you head and which is designed, it seems, not only to keep track of these processes but also to influence them, offering a prices policy and elaborating when necessary a plan for reforming price formation.

[Senchagov] Thousands and thousands of types of goods are produced in our country. The state committee approves prices for 80 percent of production and technical output and 65 percent of retail prices for basic food and nonfood goods. The centralization is obviously excessive. It is impossible through the efforts of prices inspectors, even if we were to increase their numbers to a little over 6,000, as is proposed at present, to check, on the one hand, the justification of expenditure on the production of an article, and, on the other the market demand for it so that this contradiction should be resolved through its price. That is why it is not purely administrative control from above that is needed but, first, conditions for the economic regulation of wholesale, purchase, and retail prices are needed and, second, the regulation of prices should become more democratic. Part of this regulation should be assumed by the republican state committees for prices. But the main thing—I tried to show this above—is that prices and their reform cannot be torn away from the entire complex of problems of restructuring the economy: the stabilization of the ruble, the overcoming of the market and budget deficit, the struggle against monopolism. By tearing away prices from this complex, especially as a one-off measure, it is possible to achieve a result opposite to that which is desired. The experience of our neighbors which we are following is convincing evidence of that. Here we must determine the order of priority in setting and resolving tasks.

[Lynev] If today the task of increasing prices for agricultural products is not a priority problem, there remains the problem of the subsidy to the agro-industrial complex—R100 billion. How to resolve it?

[Senchagov] The trouble is not only that subsidies are such a heavy burden to the budget—they already comprise 20 percent of its expenditure—but also that they are dissipated at all levels and through various channels. It is obvious that subsidies should be spent more purposefully, encouraging the emergence of final output, and that we should gradually seek the progressive reduction of subsidies.

[Lynev] And again: If prices are not the priority, then what is?

[Senchagov] The market. Its saturation with consumer goods. Yet this is hampered by the structure of our production. Over many years a situation has taken shape whereby the "heavy" group "A" in our country has literally suppressed group "B"—the production of the means of consumption which provides goods directly for the consumer market. A ruble put into this sphere is turned over far more rapidly and gives a return that is four times greater. But while we receive 10 percent of accumulations from light industry we invest in it only... 1 percent of capital investments. There is food for thought. We continue to pump the market not with goods but with money, which only provokes an increase in prices. I am even sure that the recent measure to restrict the unjustified increase in wages legalized by the Supreme Soviet is not understood or accepted by everyone. Yet in Sweden agreed wages grow 4 percent a year. If they are higher the firm pays a fine to the union of businessmen. In the United States the size of the hourly wage rate is agreed upon between the labor union and the businessmen. The mechanisms are different but the essence is the same: economic control of the payment of labor. That is world practice.

[Lynev] The economic public and press is putting increasingly persistently the question of bringing our domestic prices into line with world prices. You also touched on this question at the Supreme Soviet session. How should this measure be understood?

[Senchagov] The bringing of our prices into line with world prices means that we must know exactly what costs what and where we are in the production of particular goods. In the development of which technology we can come out in front and determine market prices and what we should simply not undertake but acquire readymade. Here development engineers are very short of aid from skilled economists who know the foreign market and its prices. Yet these prices consider more factors than domestic prices. Their analysis requires a different, adaptive thinking.

[Lynev] Adaptive means more adapted to a consideration of the changeable market situation?

[Senchagov] And also to a consideration of expenses and the revelation of the natural laws of demand and prospects and trends and the financial situation. The "Volkswagen" firm knows today what expenditure will be required by a model of automobile which will come out at the end of the nineties.

[Lynev] Our State Planning Committee should have the ability to make that kind of analysis.

[Senchagov] I think this ability is formed only on the basis of the market and market relations. We must overcome over quite a long period the ailment of our planning's one-dimensional orientation toward directives [direktivnost] contracted a long time ago.

[Lynev] Why will it take a long time?

[Senchagov] Because economic regulators which really operate take a long time to form.

[Lynev] The fall session of the Supreme Soviet will adopt a code of laws for the economy. Do you think that even this will not set matters in motion?

[Senchagov] At any rate the reform will not be completed with the adoption of these laws. Because after forms of economic management we must also master another part of the economic mechanism—the part which regulates production relations. We will need laws on finances, banks, and joint-stock companies, and antimonopoly and anti-inflation laws. They exist in the majority of countries. The State Committee on Prices has elaborated a provision on the control of price formation. But a higher ranking document is needed—a law on prices. We have already sent its draft to a number of departments. We do not want to waste time although it is clear that you cannot adopt all the laws you need straight away.

Afanasyev Comments on Defense Industry Conversion

18200442 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 15 Aug 89 p 2

[Report on interview with K.A. Afanasyev, deputy minister of the Ministry of the Defense Industry, by V. Bykadorov: "On Peaceful Conveyers"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] **As we are aware, plants putting out equipment for processing agricultural products have been transferred to the Ministry of the Defense Industry. Our correspondent discusses the peaceful work of the military department with Deputy Minister K.A. Afanasyev.**

[Bykadorov] Konstantin Andreyevich, as I seem to recall, the word "conversion" was first heard in December of last year. What did it mean to you then?

[Afanasyev] In any event, not a great deal. Upon hearing this short word which encompasses so much, I opened the "Encyclopedic Dictionary," 1983 edition...

[Bykadorov] Excuse me, but isn't this distracting us from the topic?

[Afanasyev] Not at all. Conversion is from the Latin: change, transformation... But it is applicable to the language. For example, the Russian word "pech" [oven] is a noun, and "pech" [to bake] is a verb. And just a few years ago, this word had nothing to do with our industry.

[Bykadorov] Nevertheless, you have started to produce ovens in the direct sense. The residents of Vologda are turning out commercial ovens; in Murom, they are making micro-mills. I would like to find out more about the goals set, and about how they are being reached.

[Afanasyev] The decision on the transfer of civilian enterprises turning out agricultural products processing equipment was adopted late in 1987. Plants were operating at a loss all around; conditions there were difficult. Resources were promptly allocated from the ministry's reserves, and a stabilization of the industrial base was carried out. As a result, they finished the year with positive indices.

[Bykodorov] Could you explain in greater detail?

[Afanasyev] Before being transferred to us, the enterprises produced somewhat more than 31,000 units annually. Now they produce almost 43,000. A development program through 1995 has been compiled with a list of equipment of about 1,160 denominations. Some 535 products must still be developed and assimilated. While we increased production last year by 13 percent over the 1987 level, and 9 percent of that is attributable to our defense industries. This year the production output at defense industries will grow even more.

[Bykodorov] Are there any hitches as well?

[Afanasyev] Unfortunately there are. To fulfill the program which had been confirmed, 48 of our enterprises, 40 scientific research institutions and construction bureaus were involved. A construction bureau was allotted for each type of equipment.

And here two vitally important factors were noted. The first was about the course of the reduction of equipment of the newly freed production capacity. But reorientation of a technological process is not a simple task. What was there had to be taken away; space had to be cleared, new equipment brought in, mounted, and fitted; new technology had to be developed, and people had to be taught. All of this was indeed done at the plants which were shifted to implementing the program.

For example, people in Minsk developed in a short time, practically within 3 months, a production-design manual and procedures for the livestock primary processing shop; the units they assembled have a 3-ton capacity per shift. And in the first half of the year, the shifted defense industries have already begun assembly line production of this equipment.

The second factor is the partial reduction of production. The efficacy here is substantially lower. Why? Imagine: Ten lathes had been in operation, two are freed. More workers. How is it going to be here? There is no integral transition to producing another type of product. If we cut armaments production by billions of rubles, it still does not mean that we can release that much into other production.

[Bykodorov] Konstantin Andreyevich, what are the trends in equipment production going to be?

[Afanasyev] They are for the primary processing of livestock and poultry, the weighing and packaging of fruits and vegetables, refined sugar, pelmeni [Russian ravioli], production of metal containers, controlled-filling lines to pour food products into glass containers... The scope of work is vast.

[Bykodorov] Has anything previously been done in this direction?

[Afanasyev] Quite a bit. Pavel Vasilyevich Finogenov, the former minister of the defense industry, gave these matters the utmost attention. I will cite such an index: The defense workers annually produced 1 billion rubles' worth of spare parts for the country's agroindustrial complex. These orders have remained and new ones are coming in.

[Bykodorov] In reflecting upon the very process of conversion, I experience a certain anxiety. Even before, the plants did not stand idle; they produced something. It would seem that they had to provide the country with equipment 100 years ahead of its time, but in actuality we always have to start almost from scratch. Does this mean we have not done the right thing?

[Afanasyev] I am not certain I can dispel your anxiety. We had just managed to become involved in implementing the new program when new tasks were imposed: Create low-capacity plants! A sharp turn away from preoccupation with the gargantuan. Well, what to do with that equipment? In Melitopol, they set up a line to fill glass containers with beer and nonalcoholic beverages at a production rate of 48,000 bottles per hour, but the demand for them is limited: The production is too high. Or, a milk pasteurization unit with a 50-ton-per-hour capacity was sent to Udmurtia, and again there were complications: Milk has to be trucked in from almost the entire autonomous republic.

It is good that we have consented to produce low-capacity shops. But after all, the plan has already been imposed. They tell us, it must be done! So, we make the decision to begin development. And from the workers, we get letters signed by the committees of labor collectives and delegations: We will not do it; it is difficult... But this is another subject. In view of this, it would make sense to transfer us to the scientific research institutions concerned with the development of processor equipment. There must be one master. It doesn't get us anywhere when the right hand doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

[Bykodorov] Konstantin Andreyevich, there most likely are problems associated not only with the plan. Tell me, what are relations with your subcontractors like? Have you finished with the problem of spare parts, which used to set our teeth on edge?

[Afanasyev] We are experiencing dependency upon many departments, especially the electronic technology department. They significantly increase our production output, but for them, lower volume is planned. What would you have them do? Where to get the products that subcontractors produce in meager quantities? In our view, the only real measure here is to bring our subcontractors' plans into accord with ours.

Unfortunately the spare parts problem has also moved toward us. What is the solution here? There are repair enterprises in the rayon centers. Since the time of Selkhoztekhnika, they have had practically no overloading. It would be good to create service centers on the basis of these enterprises, and they would concern themselves with all types of service of processing enterprises, including repair and installation of spare parts.

[Bykodorov] But all the same, how is it going with the enterprises transferred to you? What has been their fate?

[Afanasyev] The minister's orders are issued for each of the plants; they stipulate the system of measures for the reconstruction of the production base and the social sphere. This is housing, kindergartens, schools, cultural institutions, and recreational sites. But we do not always and everywhere find understanding on the spot. In particular, this concerns the Ukraine and Lithuania. We have to take a long time to explain that the processors have become defense workers, and that the defense workers have become processors, without quotation marks. It is as if we had combined the professions. And even though these plants are in our ministry, they are concerned with the realization of the most essential, peaceful problems. We would request that the local authorities regard these enterprises' development in a manner befitting the state. Without increasing production capacity, we would wait in vain for growth in production yield.

[Bykodorov] Konstantin Andreyevich, I saw your equipment at the USSR Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy. I was a witness when those placing orders—farm managers—requested this or that piece of equipment: a micro-mill or ice cream freezer, a commercial oven or a production line for metal containers... But the requests have not been filled. What is the problem?

[Afanasyev] By decision of the CPSU Central Committee, this exhibition must be permanent. One of its tasks, nevertheless, is to manifest the true demand and supply for equipment for processing agricultural products. Even though there is a program for development through 1995 which envisions the quantitative and qualitative aspects of development, practice already shows that it does not take everything into consideration. It seems to us that these exhibitions must become a center for the formation of future plans for equipment production. We are obligated to fill all orders, and in the immediate future the issues of equipment shortages must and will be stricken from the agenda.

IZVESTIYA Scores Declining Productivity

18280275 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Aug 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Vasiliy Parfenov: "Do Not Forget the Most Important Thing"]

[Text] Today there is hardly anybody to whom it is not clear that flaming speeches at conventions and meetings alone, without relevant action, will not prove the advantages of our system. If we continue working at a low level of activity, without application, our life will not get better, and the restructuring we have begun will not move forward.

Let us not forget what is most important for the victory of the new order—the uninterrupted growth of labor productivity. Lenin farsightedly predicted that in the new society which we are building, "the key task is to create a higher social level than under capitalism; namely, a rise in labor productivity and a concurrent improved organization of labor." This, he said, is a matter of first priority.

Why, for instance, is the growth of labor productivity not gradual these days, but practically explosive when a collective changes to land rental or when a production collective is founded? First of all, the organization of labor improves radically. Second, during the time of rental people become fully empowered to apply the means of production. Earlier government property, belonging to no one in particular, could be freely taken or allowed to deteriorate. Under rentals it is given to living people who become interested in maintaining it and making it productive, creating more material goods for themselves and others.

Our press writes little about the crucial importance of increasing the yield from labor. To become convinced of it I had to study dozens of regional and republic-level papers. I wasted my time. In the last year this theme seemingly disappeared from our sight.

Perhaps we work so productively and well that it is not necessary to talk about growth in yield from labor? No, far from that. Dry numbers from summaries of the State Commission for Statistics, gradually becoming more unvarnished, attest to the lowering of labor productivity. If during the first 2 years of perestroyka, our economy, while overcoming the obstacles of the past, stubbornly moved upwards, in the last year and a half it has been losing speed.

Labor productivity in the construction industry from quarter to quarter is not growing, but falling. In the first half-year instead of fulfilling half the plan, only 16 percent of the schools were built, professional and technical schools—13 percent, hospitals—19 percent, clubs and houses of culture—16 percent of the year's plan. Does this mean that the builders move the lion's share of the year's program, by honored custom, to the last months of the year? But time does not work in favor of the trusts: The days become shorter, and it freezes and snows in the mountains. Can one say with assurance that builders will quadruple their productivity from spring and summer to the year's end? It is clear that the threat of failure hangs over the currently devised program.

In the first 3 years of the 5-year plan labor productivity in industry grew only by 14 percent. Such low growth is a warning. After all, the overall plans for economic development accepted earlier assumed a 2.3 to 2.5 times growth in labor productivity by the year 2000. Until this deadline two 5-year plans remain. If already in the nearest years there is no radical move toward improvement in the growth of labor productivity, this will remain a paper program. And this, as is known, can cause the long-range plans for social development to disconnect.

We do not have time to dawdle and wait until we educate new, harder-working, and better-trained generations. We must ourselves change decisively, relearn without delay, raise the quality of skilled work, and foster the spirit of enterprise and perseverance at work. It seems that the very spirit of perestroyka calls on one to attain new peaks of effort. That has not yet happened in reality. From year to year, as statistics show, fewer and fewer people are retrained. Some 29.9 million workers improved their qualifications in 1987; last year—about 3 million fewer. And further, the number of violators of work discipline increased.

It is certain that a rapid growth in productivity rests first of all on complete familiarity with the tools of labor. Properly workers are strictly accountable to their colleagues—scientists, designers, technologists. The level of productivity depends directly on the level of perfection and reliability of technology. One cannot plow as much with a wooden plow as with a tractor; using a hammer will produce less coal than using a high-power mechanical digger. Therefore the creators of technology must be given an economic interest in the growth of production of their creations. May they not get colds on the job; may they not go by numbers, but by competence. May the flower of engineering intellect be concentrated in design offices. And the workers need not regard intelligent engineers as parasites. Truly creative mental work is not easier than physical work.

Daily interruptions of the work rhythm, unfortunately more frequent in the last year and a half, are blamed on others by many. The factory supplier did not supply key parts for a machine in time for assembly; suppliers held up the completion of the order; transport people did not provide the railroad cars... "We are not guilty, others are" is the most common excuse for interruptions. But if we look at the sources of interruptions, we will find at every link actual people working sloppily with low productivity. This is the crux of the problem: We should not have among us negligent, irresponsible, lazy people, indifferent to their work.

The last stage of the current 5-year plan is before us. Depending on how productively and responsibly we work, in corresponding measure will be the forward movement of the economy, the solution of social problems, the fate of perestroyka as a whole.

Let us now draw the conclusions. First of all, because millions and millions of our compatriots—workers, specialists, managers all the way to ministers—work with less productivity than in more technically developed countries of the West, we have not yet built the society of which we dreamed, for which our fathers and grandfathers shed blood on the barricades of October, on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. But this does not mean we will not build a new society. All is in our hands! Either we will continue to work unproductively and therefore live in poverty, or every one of us must radically change our attitude toward work. The economy will not tolerate people who receive unearned pay without raising productivity. Let us remember the chief and most important factor without which our life will not change—the uninterrupted and rapid rise in the productivity of social labor.

Agricultural

Southwest Siberian Areas Declared Disaster Zone

LD2208121289 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Several areas in the south of western Siberia were affected by severe drought. They have been proclaimed a zone of disaster. The merciless heat destroyed grain crops on 300,000 hectares. Hundreds of pastures were burned. Small rivers and lakes dried up. The Government of the Russian Federation granted to the farmers in the regions struck by the drought thousands of tons of fodder. One thousand five hundred trucks from the Moscow district alone are engaged in transporting the fodder. In the zone of disaster a special stock of fodder is being established to give aid to the farm cooperatives and state farms affected by the drought.

Nation's Weather, Crop Status Reported

18240228 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Aug 89 p 2

[Report by S. Malikova, agrometeorologist: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] Moderately warm weather predominates over the majority of the European territory of the USSR. Here, rain has passed over almost all locations. Conditions were favorable for the formation of late agricultural crops. Spring cereal cultures ripened. Fullness of their grain has been completed only in the northern regions. Milky grain ripeness has come to the corn in the territory's south. In the remaining areas, ear inflorescence has been observed, with tassel formation and head blossoming in the Baltic republics. Sunflower ripening has begun. The warm weather has been conducive to fine growth of the sugar beet root crop, and the accumulation of sugar. The massive harvest of perennial sown and meadow grasses continues, and their sprouting after regular mowing has been observed.

Hot and dry weather has predominated in the Transcaucasian republics. The average air temperature is 2-5 degrees higher than normal. The daytime high air temperature has reached 35-40 degrees. Cotton plant blossoming continues.

Hot (2-5 degrees above normal), predominantly dry weather remained over the majority of the agricultural zone of Western Siberia and the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan; it does not favor the agricultural crop harvest formation. The daytime high air temperature was 30-39 degrees. In the last days of the 10-day period the temperature dropped sharply; frost was noted on the soil surface in individual regions of Western Siberia.

Grain fullness has been noted in the early summer crops. Waxy ripeness has come to the plants from the early sowing periods. Their full ripeness has been noted in the Ural Oblast and in a number of rayons of Aktyubinsk Oblast. Potato blossoming has ended in northern Kazakhstan, and potatoes continue to blossom in Western Siberia. In Eastern Siberia, the greatest amount of precipitation fell over a large part of the Krasnoyarskiy Kray and in Irkutsk Oblast. There was little precipitation in the remainder of the territory. Crop moisture content remained sufficient. Plant growth and development conditions were satisfactory. Blossoming and milky ripeness were noted in early spring cereal crops. Grass blossoming continues. In the Far East, frequent downpours (quantity of precipitation 50-100 millimeters, in some places 120-200 millimeters) caused agricultural crops to be beaten down.

Moderately hot weather was observed in the Central Asian republics. On individual days, the air temperature rose to 40-43 degrees. The cotton plants are being pinched back everywhere. The formation of the fourth alfalfa crop has begun in the south.

Scientific

'Progress M' Cargo Ship Launched 23 Aug

LD2308064389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0611 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 23 August (TASS)—At 0710 Moscow time today [0310 GMT], in accordance with the program to ensure the further functioning of the "Mir" orbital science-research complex, the "Progress M", a new series automatic cargo ship, was launched in the Soviet Union.

Perfected "Progress M" cargo ships are intended to carry out transport operations to ensure more effective use of orbital piloted stations.

The program of the first flight of the new series cargo ship envisages testing of on-board systems in various modes and the delivery of expendable materials aboard the "Mir" complex.

The "Progress M" ship has been put into orbit with the parameters:

- maximum distance from the earth's surface—235 km;

- minimum distance from the earth's surface—191 km;

- period of revolution—88.5 minutes;

- inclination—51.6 degrees.

According to telemetry information, the ship's onboard systems are working normally. The docking of the "Progress M" with the orbital complex is planned for 25 August.

'Mir' Continues Flight According to Plan

LD2208133389 Moscow TASS in English 1255 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow August 22 TASS—By TASS special correspondent from the Mission Control Centre:

The orbital research complex Mir continues its flight in an automatic mode. Astrophysical and geophysical experiments are performed regularly in accordance with the planned programme.

A regular cycle of extra-atmospheric astronomy research was carried out under the Roentgen international project. A new X-ray source was discovered by means of the telescopes of the Kvant module in serpent-bearer constellation on August 16.

During one of observation sessions the telescopes recorded a powerful burst the nature of which is connected with a nuclear explosion on the surface of that neutron star.

Several more series of research into the newly discovered celestial object were performed in the past few days. Observations of X-ray sources in Perseus and Swan constellations and in the centre of the galaxy were also made.

According to flight path measurements, the parametres of the orbit of the research complex Mir are now as follows:

The maximum distance from the earth's surface—402 km,

The minimum distance from the earth's surface—386 km,

Orbital period—92.3 minutes,

Orbital inclination—51.6 degrees.

Preparations for launching a "Progress M" automatic spacecraft are being completed at Baikonur Cosmodrome. The launch is scheduled for Wednesday [23 August] morning.

'Cosmos-2036' Satellite Launched 22 Aug

LD2308080189 Moscow TASS in English 0625 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] Moscow, 23 August TASS—The launch of the latest artificial earth satellite "Cosmos-2036" was carried out in the Soviet Union on 22 August with the "Soyuz" rocket carrier.

Scientific apparatus intended for continuing space research is installed aboard the satellite.

The satellite has been put into orbit with the parameters:

—initial period of revolution—89.6 minutes;

—maximum distance from the earth's surface (in apogee)—273 km;

—minimum distance from the earth's surface (in perigee)—248 km;

—inclination of orbit—62.8 degrees.

Apart from scientific apparatus, the satellite carries:

—A radio system for accurate measurement of elements of orbit, a radiotelemetric system for transmitting data to earth on the work of instruments and scientific apparatus.

The apparatus installed on the satellite is working normally. A coordinating-computing center is processing incoming information.

News Conference on Aktivnyy Space Project

LD2208201489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Aug 89

[Text] At the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences today a press conference was held at which Soviet and foreign journalists were informed that at the end of September a craft would be launched from Plesetsk cosmodrome to operate in near-Earth space under the international Aktivnyy project. The project is being implemented by institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and organizations of the country's Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research with the participation of experts from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. It was noted that the scientific results of the active experiments in space were of great importance for the development of space communications and forecasting of earthquakes. Scientists from Brazil, Canada, Cuba, New Zealand, the United States, Finland, and Japan have been invited to take part in the project with the help of ground geophysical facilities.

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